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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
Over the past century, Hollywood has achieved remarkable commercial success 
worldwide. The "Hollywoodization" of film markets, however, is not the same 
everywhere. In light of these variations, this research takes Hong Kong as a case to 
examine how a film industry of the receiving countries could survive and prosper 
when faced with the challenge from Hollywood in the 1980s, yet have experienced a 
downfall since the mid-1990s. Applying a Political-cultural approach, this study 
explicates how the major film companies, as the incumbents, set the rules and 
agendas to wit, the "conceptions of control" to stabilize the competitions 
with their challengers throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. The political or social 
movement-like process involved gave rise to the distributor-led production and 
exhibition system. This system enabled the major film companies to thrive and 
hence, generated the rampant growth of the industry. 
In the late 1980s, however, the shift in film policies of the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) triggered off an exogenous shock 
to the Hong Kong film market. This shock together with the endogenous factors, 
notably two conventional practices in the industry——the entwined financial 
practice and the exclusive exhibition practice as well as the rising land price, put 
the Hong Kong film market in crisis. Not only did most major film companies go 
out of business, but the market underwent also a transformation in its exhibition 
sectors as Cineplex cinemas gradually replaced the traditional theatres from the . 
1990s. 
This transformation ftirther undercut the incumbents and provided an 
opportunity for the challengers, the distributors of foreign movies, to capture the 
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market niche that was formerly dominated by Hong Kong movies. When the 
distributors of foreign movies forged alliances with the Cineplex exhibitors who 
retrieved the "booking rights" to control the exhibition blocks from the major 
distributors of local movies, the "conceptions of control" inscribed in the 
distributor-led production and exhibition system crumbled. The commodity chain 
became driven by the Cineplex exhibitors after that. This set up the new 
"conceptions of control" that reshaped the interactions of film companies in the 
market. 
Under the new "conceptions", film companies that possess the "booking rights" 
are not the key investors in local movies. As Hong Kong movies no longer 
acquired secured exhibition blocks for their theatrical release, their box-office 
receipts plummeted. With less desirable box-office results, the key investors in 
Hong Kong movies who switched their major exhibition channel from theatrical 
screening to retail in ancillary markets during the 2000s could hardly get a better 
deal from the retailers. This drove many of them to trim their investment in their 
impending film projects which resulted in turn in a heavy slump in the film outputs 
and box-office grosses of Hong Kong movies. 
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Chapter 1 
Framing the Puzzles 
Movie/ film, or motion picture differs from other commodities. It is a visual 
product which carries deep meaning. This meaning can reflect the culture of its 
origin. In this regard, the film trade is often construed as an exchange of culture 
among societies. As Hollywood has had the most abundant resources and the most 
advanced filmmaking technologies, it has been the world's largest film factory and 
the movies it has produced are often assumed to be so alluring that audiences from 
different nations cannot resist viewing them. While the commercial success of its 
blockbusters in different film markets has aroused much scholarly attention, the 
Cultural Imperialism thesis was developed into an overarching paradigm that served 
to explain the global dominance of American culture by means of its film exports. 
In recent years, however, considerable interest has arisen over the dissimilar 
pattern of, and the divergent reactions to, the film exports from Hollywood. The 
Cultural Flows/ Network approach and the Reception school are two notable 
alternative paradigms which appeared to address this issue. While the Cultural 
Flows/ Network approach contends that the film industries of receiving countries' 
may survive amid the threat of Hollywood if they can boost their movie exports, the 
Reception school focuses on the variations in acceptance of Hollywood movies by 
the receiving countries' recipients whose socio-demographic characteristics are 
dissimilar. Although these two bodies of literature have made sensible arguments, 
‘Receiving countries refer to the film markets that import the film products from other countries. 
For instance, when Hollywood movies are screened in Hong Kong, Hong Kong (China) is regarded as 
the receiving country while the United States (U.S.) is considered to be the exporting country, or the 
film exporter. 
- 1 -
scant attention has been paid to the institutional settings of the film industries in 
receiving countries. Since the institutional settings are arguably central to the 
development of these industries, the relevant factors in these settings ought to be 
examined. These include the social structure of the film industry in receiving 
countries, the strategies adopted by film companies in the industry, the state's 
involvement in the film market, and inter-state relations which can influence the 
interactions among film companies. 
To examine how the foregoing factors have steered the development of the film 
industry in the receiving country, this study applies a coherent framework, namely 
the Political-cultural approach, from economic sociology. Following this approach, 
this study is intended to supplement the findings of existing literature by bringing in 
an institutional level of analysis that focuses on the dynamics of power relations 
among companies in film production, distribution, and exhibition. These dynamics 
may shed light on the rise and fall of the film industry in receiving countries. 
To study the development of a film industry in the receiving country, Hong 
Kong presents a noteworthy case as it grew to be a production hub of movies in the 
Southeast Asia region after WWII. More importantly, despite the absence of 
restriction on imports of foreign movies in Hong Kong (Lam 2007: 58), its film 
industry still managed to survive and expand, reaching its peak in the 1980s. 
Nonetheless, the industry subsequently experienced a sharp decline since the 1990s 
when imported films, mostly from Hollywood, rebounded and came to occupy a 
lion's share of the film market. Because of its rise and fall over the past three 
decades, the Hong Kong film market serves an ideal site to study the development of 
a film industry in a receiving country. 
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INTRODUCING: "The Curious Case of … a Fallen 'Asian Hollywood'" 
Over the past century, Hong Kong has been well-known for its motion picture 
industry. Although the Hong Kong film industry was deemed the "Hollywood of 
the East" or the "Asian Hollywood" (Stokes 2007; Lam 2007: 60-61; Hammond 
2000; Stokes and Hoover 1999: 17; Dannen and Long 1997), its box-office grosses 
had been dominated by imported movies for several decades prior to 1982. In spite 
of the famed Chinese martial-arts pictures produced by Golden Harvest and starring 
Bruce Lee in the early 1970s, the output of Hong Kong film companies accounted 
for only around forty per cent of the total box-office revenue throughout the 1970s 
(Table 1). The rebound of Hong Kong movies^ did not take place until the early 
1980s. For the first time in the history of Hong Kong cinema, the box-office 
grosses of Hong Kong movies outweighed those of the imported films in 1982 
(Table 1). The output of Hong Kong movies subsequently surged to 120 in 1990, 
and reached its peak of 186 in 1993 (Table 1). 
Despite the worldwide repute of Hong Kong cinema, the industry's heyday 
lasted for only one and a half decades. The film outputs and box-office revenue for 
Hong Kong movies began to plunge from their peak after 1993. The preponderance 
of Hong Kong movies in the domestic market was increasingly eroded by imported 
2 According to the definition given by the Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry Association Limited • 
(MPIA), "Hong Kong movies" refer to the films produced by any registered companies in Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry Association Limited 2010a). Fifty per cent or above of the 
"listed effective post(s)" in the movie should also be taken up by Hong Kong permanent residents 
(ibid.). These posts include "film producer, director, script writer, actor or actress" (ibid.). Movies 
that fulfill these criteria are regarded as "Hong Kong movies". 
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films, mainly from Holly wood). In 1997，foreign movies once again surpassed 
Hong Kong movies in box-office performance (Table 1). The difference in 
theatrical receipts between imported films and local movies widened even further 
after that. From 1997 to 2006, the annual domestic box-office grosses of Hong 
Kong movies slumped from 547.5 million HK dollars to 290.3 million (Table 1) 
while simultaneously, the box-office grosses of imported films spurted upwards by 
eleven per cent, climbing from 617 million HK dollars in 1997 to 685.8 million in 
2006 (Table 1). 
Table 1 Screening, Box-office Grosses, and Market share of Local Movies and 
Imported Films in Hong Kong, 1971-2006 
Local Movies Imported Films 
Number of Box Office Market Number of Box Office Market 
Movies HK$ Share Films HK$ Share 
Year (in million) % (in million) % 
1971 94 42.2 32.05 441 89.6 67.95 
1975 98 58.3 40.83 300 84.5 59.17 
1979 109 132.7 44.73 293 163.9 55.27 
1982 99 404.1 59.33 265 277.0 40.67 
1983 95 411.2 70.98 176 168.2 29.02 
1987 76 777.3 70.11 290 331.3 29.89 
1990 120 939.2 71.56 222 373.3 28.44 
1993 186 1,146.1 72.52 273 434.3 27.48 
1997 86 547.5 47.02 383 617.0 52.98 
2003 77 417.8 46.23 169 485.9 53.77 , 
2006 54 290.3 29.74 172 685.8 70.26 
Sources: Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry 
Association Limited, various years. 
3 See Table 1.5 cited in Davis and Yeh (2008: 32-33). 
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The above data provide a rough picture of the development of the Hong Kong 
film industry during the past four decades. While the gap between the box-office 
revenue for foreign and local movies began to narrow in the 1970s, the industry 
especially prospered during the early 1980s，and was in full bloom around the late 
1980s. It has, however, experienced a freefall since 1993, with the downturn 
persisting throughout the late 1990s and the 2000s. 
This study attempts to probe into the causes of this respective boom of the Hong 
Kong film industry from the 1970s to the late 1980s, and then its decline since 
around the mid-1990s. As such, it aims to solve several puzzles in particular. 
These include why the industry was able to survive and even prosper amid the 
challenge from Hollywood in the 1980s; how the industry reacted to the challenge of 
the Hollywood blockbusters at that time; why the major film companies in Hong 
Kong failed to retain their power and dominance over the film market in the 1990s; 
how the commodity chain of Hong Kong movies was restructured during the late 
1990s; and how the restructuring has impacted on the Hong Kong film industry 
throughout the 2000s. 
To solve these puzzles, this study will explicate how the film companies in the 
commodity chain, as well as the states or the governments not only of Hong 
Kong, but also of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) played a part in the development of the Hong Kong film market. The . 
political, or social movement-like, process that shapes the changing relationships 
among film companies, especially the incumbent-firms, or the "majors", vis-a-vis the 
challenger-firms, the distributors of foreign movies, will also be discussed. 
Applying the Political-cultural approach as the theoretical framework, this research 
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will examine how exogenous and endogenous forces shaped the strategies adopted 
by the film companies in Hong Kong, and how and why that sparked off the 
industry's downfall since the mid-1990s. 
METHOD AND DATA 
This research relies heavily on secondary-source information on film 
production, distribution, and exhibition, and the archival data from existing literature. 
For compilation of the required data, I am indebted to Professor Stephen W. K. Chiu 
for his kind permission to use the materials collected in a larger project of the Public 
Policy Research Centre of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (HKIAPS) 
on the Asian film industries. Without the Centre's support, this research could not 
be completed on schedule. 
This research does not seek to explain or predict the box-office success or 
performance of particular movies, either imported or locally produced, in the Hong 
Kong film market. Instead, it intends to find out why the Hong Kong film industry 
on the whole, with respect to its film outputs and box-office performance in home 
market, could outperform the imported movies throughout the 1980s, and what 
constituted the turnaround from the mid-1990s. Since the study focuses on the 
collective level of the overall performance of the industry, the market share of local 
films vis-a-vis foreign movies screened in Hong Kong is the key concern of the 
study. 
The self-sufficiency ratio is employed as it can illustrate "the proportion of 
domestic films' share in gross box office revenues" (Oh 2001: 31). The ratio is 
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derived by dividing the total box-office grosses of local movies in their domestic 
market by the total theatrical receipts of both the local and imported films in the 
market within a given period. The value of the ratio is expected to lie between 0 
and 1, with values close to zero denoting a monopolistic share of imported movies in 
the film market and the values close to one implying that local movies dominate in 
their domestic market. Another way to interpret the ratio is: the smaller the value, 
the smaller the share of local movies in their home market, and vice versa. 
To understand the rise and fall of the industry, this research analyzes the film 
companies in Hong Kong. Information on the film outputs of each production 
company and the movies released by each distribution company is needed for the 
analysis. However, this information is hard to come by because in the Hong Kong 
film industry, "bookkeeping was informal, if not erratic, ... among both distributors 
and producers" (Curtin 2007: 63). Curtin explains this practice as a way for the 
film companies to evade paying taxes and disclosing their financial position to 
competitors (ibid,). 
Given this situation, this research employs "movie", rather than "company", as 
the unit of analysis. There are several variables that have to be compiled from the 
information on each movie screened in Hong Kong. These variables are the 
box-office results of the movie, the year of its release, and the company/ companies 
that produced and distributed it. To compile these variables without primary data 
provided by the film companies, this research draws on the movies screened in Hong 
Kong to trace back the corresponding company/ companies that produced or 
distributed them. This involved several procedures. 
\ 
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First of all, this research sorts the title of the movies produced and distributed 
by each company from a filmography provided by the Hong Kong Film Archive'^ 
(2009). This filmography keeps a complete record of the movies produced in Hong 
Kong from 1913 to 2006. Since the coverage of data in the filmography is until 
2006 and this study focuses on the development of the Hong Kong film industry 
since the 1970s, the scope of the research is from 1970 to 2006. Only the movies 
listed in the filmography within this period are analyzed. The dataset, in this 
respect, covers 3,977 movies. 
After grouping the titles of the movies produced and distributed by each 
company in Hong Kong from 1970 to 2006, information on the box-office results of 
these movies is gathered from the annual reviews of the Hong Kong Motion Picture 
Industry Association Limited^ (MPIA) which are published in City Entertainment 
(電影雙周干 11)，a periodical of the Hong Kong film industry. The annual reviews of 
MPIA documented the box-office results of all movies, including both the Hong 
Kong movies and foreign movies, screened in Hong Kong every year. However, 
the box-office records covered by these annual reviews are available only after 1982^. 
Lacking earlier records from MPIA, this research has compiled the box-office 
figures of the movies produced and distributed by film companies in Hong Kong 
from 1970 to 1981 from Chan's The Structure and Marketing Analysis of the Hong 
4 Hong Kong Film Archive (HKFA) is an organization established by the Hong Kong government in 
2001 to "acquire and conserve Hong Kong films and related materials" (Hong Kong Film Archive 
2010b). 
Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry Association Limited (MPIA) is an association established in 
1986 that represents the Hong Kong film industry to "express and substantiate views and opinions on ‘ 
matters concerning the ... industry" (Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry Association Limited 2010b). 
It is also the "sole copyright authentication body for HK produced films" (HKfilmart 2010a). 
6 Although MPIA was officially established in 1986, it began to collect data and information on the 
industry before 1986. The data and information collected since 1982 were published in City 
Entertainment. 
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Kong Film Industry (2000). The box-office figures of foreign movies screened in 
Hong Kong during this period are collected also from Chan (2000). While some 
analyses of the box-office figures in this research are weighted by the ticket price in 
each corresponding year and are at constant 1997 prices, ticket price information is 
gathered from Chan (2000) as well. With the box-office results of the movies from 
each company in the market, this study can evaluate the performance of the film 
companies in Hong Kong. 
Apart from film production and distribution, exhibition is also a pivotal element 
in the development of the film industry. Therefore, "cinema" or "theatre" is also 
the unit of analysis in this research. The definition of "cinema" in this study is 
different from "theatre" in the sense that "cinema" refers to the exhibition venue that 
is equipped with at least two screens or houses, with each house having less than a 
thousand seats to wit, a Cineplex setting whereas "theatre" is an exhibition 
venue in "traditional" settings, only one to two screen(s) or house(s) with more than 
a thousand seats installed in each house. 
Information on theatres and cinemas is difficult to collect. As Jarvie (1977) 
notes, the "standard Hong Kong business practice of secrecy" makes it difficult for 
researchers to find out "who exactly owns which cinemas" and how they operate 
(P.69). Thus, this research has gleaned archival data from newspapers, film 
periodicals, such as City Entertainment, and the Hong Kong Economy Yearbook to 
trace back the history of the exhibition sectors in Hong Kong. The total number of 
theatres and cinemas in Hong Kong each year is provided by the Hong Kong 
Yearbook. These materials provide a brief picture of when and how the theatre 
chains and cinema circuits were formed. 
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For each theatre or cinema in Hong Kong since 1970, there are several variables 
which have to be compiled. These variables are the number of exhibition houses or 
screens equipped in each theatre and cinema, the number of seats in each house, the 
years of its establishment and closure, and the usage of the theatre or cinema after its 
closure. This information is collected from three sources. They are the annual 
reviews of MPIA, Wong's Yiji xiyuan jiyi [Cinemas in Memory] (2007), and 
CinemaTreasures.org, a "website devoted to movie theater preservation and 
awareness" (Cinema Treasures 2010). Since none of these sources exhaust all of 
the theatres and cinemas in the market, the three data sources supplement each other. 
This research has constructed in this fashion an exhaustive dataset of 344 theatres 
and cinemas in Hong Kong. It should include almost all available venues for film 
exhibition from 1970 to 2006. 
When the data from any of these sources are inconsistent, this research uses the 
information provided by the annual reviews of MPIA. This is because the records 
from MPIA's annual reviews are the most reliable among the three as they were 
given by the Hong Kong Theatres Association Ltd.，(HKTA) year by year. 
However, since the annual reviews of MPIA do not cover the period of the 1970s, the 
information that is not covered by MPIA is collected from Wong (2007) and Cinema 
Treasures (2010). Most records from the two sources fortunately do not contradict 
each other. When there is a discrepancy in the records from the two sources, this , 
research excludes these unverified records from the data analysis since there is no 
way to establish which is accurate. As these records, together with a few theatres 
7 Hong Kong Theatres Association Ltd. (HKTA) is an association of the theatre owners in Hong 
Kong (HKfilmart 2010b). 
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and cinemas without available data and complete information on their year of 
establishment and year of closure, are excluded from the dataset, figures for the total 
number of theatres and cinemas in the market are slightly underestimated. With 67 
out of the 344 cases excluded from the dataset for the above reasons, the analysis 
covers 277 theatres and cinemas. 
To find out what movies were screened in each theatre, this study relies on the 
cinematic advertisements in newspapers which list out the movies shown in each 
theatre and cinema everyday. Two newspapers are selected to gather the required 
information. They are Singtao daily and Mingpao daily. These two newspapers 
are chosen because they together kept a complete record of the cinematic 
advertisements documenting what movies were screened in which theatre and 
cinema everyday since the 1970s. The information listed in the cinematic 
advertisements of the two newspapers is consistent because it was provided by the 
Hong Kong Theatres Association Ltd, (HKTA) on a daily basis. From these 
newspapers, two days, June 30 and December 31, of each year are sampled. These 
two dates are chosen not only because they are the midyear and the year-end, but 
also because they cover two peak seasons of the market, the summer vacations of 
students in Hong Kong and Christmas (Chan 2000: 93-94). 
Besides the data noted above, this research has collected archival data from 
various sources. Background information about the film companies being studied 
is found in film periodicals, such as City Entertainment, as well as the websites and 
the annual reports of the companies. The biographies of some film investors are 
based upon the existing literature on Hong Kong film studies. Although this 
research has tried all possible ways to compile the required information, it is also 
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mindful of Fu and Wildman (2008) who stress in their critical reflection on existing 
literature on media industries in Asia that there is a "painful deficiency in reliable 
economic or market data on Asian media markets" (p.94). It should, therefore, be 
acknowledged that records from many archival sources could not be cross-verified. 
If the original chronicle failed to reflect the situation accurately, researchers could 
hardly be expected to identify the source of the inaccuracy of the given information. 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists of five chapters. The current chapter (Ch.l) is an 
introduction to this research. It states the objectives, focus, and methodology of the 
study. An overview of the case study, the Hong Kong film industry since the 1970s, 
is also presented. 
, The next chapter (Ch.2) is a review of the literature. While the existing 
literature propounds a melange of factors related to the downturn of the Hong Kong 
film industry, these factors are interconnected with each other and some of them are 
interlaced with several theoretical perspectives. To evaluate the credibility of these 
arguments, the chapter will group the factors into two broad categories, namely the 
"conventional explanations" ^ and the "theoretical explanations" ^. After an 
evaluation of the two groups, a Political-cultural approach from economic sociology 
is brought in to resolve the puzzles stated earlier. This is followed by a brief note , 
8 "Conventional explanations" are the arguments drawn from the viewpoints that are commonly “ 
shared among the public in Hong Kong. These arguments are, however, scarcely articulated by the 
four theoretical approaches addressed in Chapter 2. 
9 "Theoretical explanations" are the contentions that are consonant with the suppositions of the four 
theoretical approaches reviewed in Chapter 2. Explanations that fit with the arguments of the four 
theatrical approaches will also be discussed together with the theoretical approaches themselves. 
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on how the approach will be applied in the analysis. 
The analysis begins in the third chapter. In the chapter (Ch.3), the rise of a 
distributor-led independent production and exhibition system in the Hong Kong film 
industry since the 1970s is documented. It explains why the industry could survive 
and even prosper amid the challenge from Hollywood in the 1980s. Since the 
factors in the boom of the industry may throw light on the underlying dynamics of 
how the market evolved, the way of which the Hong Kong film market was 
restructured and stabilized in the 1970s and the 1980s may provide clues to the 
causes of its transformation and the industry's downfall during the 1990s. As the 
subsequent chapter (Ch.4) attempts to argue that the "conceptions of control", or the 
rules and agendas, promoted by the major film companies throughout the 1970s and 
the 1980s had become an endogenous factor in the market transformation during the 
1990s, Chapter 3 serves a backdrop to the market transformation presented in 
Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 lays out the central argument of this study. It provides detailed 
answers for the puzzles posed in the first chapter. It explains why the film outputs 
and box-office receipts of Hong Kong movies have fallen from their peak since 1993; 
why most of the major film companies in Hong Kong failed to survive in the 1990s; 
how the distributors of imported movies together with the Cineplex exhibitors had 
successfully restructured the commodity chain of Hong Kong movies and fostered a 
new set of "conceptions of control" since the late 1990s; and how the new 
"conceptions of control" has impacted on the industry throughout the 2000s. As 
such, the chapter seeks to decipher the causes of the downturn of the Hong Kong 
film industry since the 1990s. 
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The concluding chapter (Ch.5) presents a summary of the result of this research. 
It compares the arguments of this study with those from the theoretical approaches 
reviewed in Chapter 2. Finally, the limitations of the research will be discussed, 
and suggestions are made for future studies. 
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Chapter 2 
“The Blind Side，，】" of Existing Explanations 
This research intends to examine the causes of the decline of Hong Kong film 
industry since the mid-1990s. The beginning of the industry's downfall, notes Teo 
(2008), can be traced back to 1993, the year when Steven Spielberg's Jurassic Park 
set a new record for the highest box-office grosses in Hong Kong. From that time 
onwards, Hollywood movies began to gain a firm grip over the Hong Kong film 
market. From 1993 to 2006, the market share of imported films，mainly from 
Hollywood, skyrocketed from 27.48 per cent to 70.26 per cent (Table 2.1). The 
blockbuster of the year was a Hollywood picture most of the time (Hong Kong 
Motion Picture Industry Association Limited, various years). In 1997, James 
Cameron's Titanic became the first movie to earn more than 100 million HK dollars 
in the “ Hong Kong box office. This record stood until Avatar, a Hollywood 
science-fiction epic film directed again by James Cameron, surpassed it in 2009. 
While Hollywood movies have gained a growing share in the Hong Kong film 
market, the film outputs in Hong Kong as well as their "box-office returns have 
slumped precipitously since the 1990s. The film outputs in Hong Kong slumped 
from 186 to 54, or by 71 per cent, between 1993 and 2006 (Table 2.1). During the 
same period, the annual domestic box-office receipts of Hong Kong movies dived 
four-fold from 1.15 billion HK dollars in 1993 to 290.3 million in 2006 (Table 2.1). 
"The Blind Side" is a movie directed by John Lee Hancock, and distributed by Warner Brothers in 
2009. This chapter borrows the title to review and to evaluate the several conventional explanations 
and theoretical approaches that served to study the development of the film industries of the exporting 
and receiving countries. 
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Table 2.1 Screening, Box-office Grosses, and Market share of Local Movies and 
Imported Films in Hong Kong, 1993-2006 
Local Movies Imported Films 
Number of Box Office Market Number of Box Office Market 
Movies HK$ Share Films HK$ Share 
Year (in million) % (in million) % 
1993 186 1,146.1 72.52 273 434.3 27.48 
1996 108 686.4 51.88 312 636.7 48.12 
1999 163 345.7 39.81 281 522.7 60.19 
2003 77 417.8 46.23 169 485.9 53.77 
2006 54 290.3 29.74 172 685.8 70.26 
Sources: Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry 
Association Limited, various years. 
Among the different voices commenting on the bleak condition of Hong Kong 
cinema, Teo (2008) attributes the industry's downfall to a melange of factors. They 
include the growth of Hollywood's market share in Hong Kong, video piracy, poor 
quality of the screenplays of Hong Kong movies, the underdeveloped market in 
China which was not ready to serve as an outlet for the movies exported from Hong 
Kong at the time, as well as the rise of other Asian film industries in the 1990s which, 
in turn, eliminated the traditional Asian markets for Hong Kong movies (pp.342-343). 
While all of the mentioned factors are interconnected with each other, some of them 
are interlaced with several theoretical perspectives. 
To evaluate the credibility of these arguments, the following sections will group 
the foregoing factors into two broad categories, namely the "conventional 
explanations"" and the "theoretical explanations"'^. After an evaluation of these 
“"Conventional explanations" are the arguments drawn from the viewpoints that are commonly 
shared among the public in Hong Kong. These arguments are, however, scarcely articulated by the 
four theoretical approaches addressed below. 
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two groups of arguments, the subsequent section will set forth a Political-cultural 
approach from economic sociology that will be applied to examine the development 
of the Hong Kong film industry. 
CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS 
Triad Intrusion and Piracy 
Among the various aforementioned reasons advanced for the decline of the 
Hong Kong film industry, piracy is an issue that generates widespread concern and is 
oftentimes held to be an obvious explanation for the industry's downfall (Bai 1993; 
Curtin 2003b). From the interviews conducted by Lim (2006) with some veterans 
in the field, some insiders claim that the active involvement of triads in the Hong 
Kong film market during the 1990s caused a serious distraction to the industry''^. 
Triad involvement is often intertwined with illegal behaviors in the film market, with 
video piracy regarded as one of them (Curtin 2007: 82). 
Some commentators denounce video piracy as a factor that exacerbated the 
decline of the Hong Kong film industry (Lim 2006: 351). “ Curtin (2003b) stresses 
that the rising demand for pirated copies of movies reflected the "continuing 
popularity of the industry's output, yet ... many fans [the cinemagoers] are now 
12 "Theoretical explanations" are the contentions that are consonant with the suppositions of the four 
theoretical approaches reviewed in this chapter. Explanations which tally with the thesis of the four 
theoretical approaches will also be discussed together with these theoretical approaches. 
Curtin (2007) points out that even though triad involvement could be a factor in the downward 
spiral of the Hong Kong film industry, the triads did perform a "service" to the industry. This is 
because before 1997，the Hong Kong colonial government rarely provided assistance in any film “ 
project. The triads, therefore, often provided "location services" for filmmakers who were shooting 
movies in public areas. These "services" included an effort to ensure the "cooperation of the 
shopkeepers and the people who live" in the area (p.72). Curtin notes also that the triads have 
financed many film projects in Hong Kong. Since triads are always seeking places for 
money-laundering, "small production houses with casual accounting practices are ... an ideal place 
for triads to invest" (p.74). In these respects, triads did contribute to the Hong Kong film industry. 
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more willing to buy and rent video copies than to buy theatre tickets. When it 
comes to theatrical exhibition, audiences are showing an increasing preference for 
lavish Hollywood productions" (p.238). As a result, distributors hesitated to 
purchase the rights to Hong Kong movies because of the possibility that pirated 
copies could be released before the movies were launched officially (Symonds 2007). 
Instead, they would prefer distributing Hollywood movies that are more likely to 
draw in cinemagoers rather than distributing local productions. In this respect, a 
Hong Kong film director, Chan Hing-kai, claims piracy to be the biggest challenge to 
the Hong Kong film industry before 1997 (Ma et al. 2007: 31), and because of piracy, 
film investors trimmed their investment in film production which, in turn, dragged 
down the film outputs precipitously (ibid.). 
Although piracy is an issue of widespread concern and has often been treated as 
a cause of the calamity experienced by the Hong Kong film industry during the late 
1990s (Curtin 2003b: 238), the decline of the Hong Kong film industry should not be 
attributed to the "piracy problem". This is because piracy existed almost a decade 
prior to the freefall of Hong Kong movies circa the mid-1990s. Since the late 
1980s, the widespread distribution of pirated copies of movies in the form of video 
cassettes or Video Home System (VHS) in Asia has already menaced the worldwide 
distribution of Hollywood movies (Buck 1992: 127; Darlin 1992), In Hong Kong, 
even industry insiders acknowledge that piracy has been a problem ever since video 
copies of Hong Kong movies became available for rental, that is to say, around the 
1980s (Booth 2000). This period, however, was the "golden age" of the Hong 
Kong film industry as the film outputs in Hong Kong climbed steadily and even 
surpassed the imported movies from Hollywood in the domestic box office. 
Therefore, piracy should not be taken as the root cause of the decay of the Hong 
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Kong film industry even though it could have harmed the film market to some 
degree (see Wang 2003; De Vany and Walls 2007; Dejean 2009). 
Hasty and Unpolished Productions 
Not only is triad intrusion claimed to have exacerbated the problem of piracy, 
but it is also often blamed for having jeopardized the standards, or the quality, of 
film products in Hong Kong. Lie (2007) condemns the triad encroachment as a 
consequence of the lack of state control over the film industry (p.54). With no 
measures to combat money-laundering through the film industry, triads could easily 
engage in film production. This ravaged the industry in that the triads rarely 
thought about making high-quality movies but were concerned mainly with making 
quick profits (Lim 2006: 351). Curtin (2007) contends that the triads vied with one 
another for big stars since they thought the use of big stars would guarantee higher 
box-office return (p.74). This pushed up the remuneration for movie actors which 
in turn raised the total production cost (Jones 2010). 
Another acute problem resulting from this situation was that the plots and 
scripts of the movies were increasingly downplayed in the production process (Jones 
2010). With the main focus being placed on the cast and less attention being paid 
to the screenplays, the phrase "hasty and unpolished productions" came to be 
repeatedly applied to describe the quality of most Hong Kong movies throughout the 
1990s (Chan et al. 2009; Teo 2008; Stephanie Chung 2007). 
Despite the negative perception of Hong Kong movies among the public, the 
alleged "hasty and unpolished productions" was not supposed to be the cause of the 
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contracted box office of Hong Kong movies; instead, it was a consequence of the 
conventional practice in which the scripts and plots are underemphasized in the 
production process. Looking for the root of the decay of the Hong Kong film 
industry, some film critics and commentators reproach the triads for making much 
out of the cast but not the plots of the movies in the 1990s. This, they claim, 
sparked off a trend of unpolished and hasty production of movies in the industry 
(Lim 2006). 
Nonetheless, the disregard of plots and scripts, as a conventional practice in the 
Hong Kong film industry, should not be attributed wholly to triad intrusion. While 
Teo (2008), like others, attributes the decline of the Hong Kong film industry to the 
tendency to make movies with poor-quality screenplays and in a cursory manner, he 
correctly points out that the "seeds" of this trend "were sowed back in the 1980s", 
the period which most scholars recognize as a "golden age" or "boom times" for the 
Hong Kong cinema. Teo reminds us that this was also the time in which "a trend of 
overproduction and the tendency of investors to milk profits from tasteless 
production with little care for quality and artistic precepts" took place (p.341). 
Even though there is no absolute standard of "overproduction" nor of "tasteless 
production", Teo (2008) notes that even during the 1980s, the period with less triad 
intrusion in the Hong Kong film industry, the tendency toward a disregard of 
screenplays was already embedded in the production process of Hong Kong movies. 
This undermines the contention that the decline of Hong Kong film industry was 
primarily caused by the triads who pushed the industry towards hasty and unpolished 
production involving poor scripts and plots. In this regard, this study will probe 
into the underlying structural factors which gave rise to a production system that 
- 2 0 -
conventionally underrates the importance of screenplays. Investigations into these 
structural factors are expected to throw light on the causes of the decline of Hong 
Kong film industry since the mid-1990s. 
EXPLANATIONS DERIVED FROM THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Although the aforementioned conventional explanations fall short in accounting 
effectively for the root cause of the downfall of Hong Kong film industry, they 
present a useful lesson for the current study, namely that one should avoid taking the 
"result", such as the hasty and unpolished productions, for granted when explaining 
the decline of a film industry. Besides the foregoing focus on the internal dynamics 
of the industrial production system, the external environment may also affect the 
performance of the Hong Kong film industry. While there are many contending 
voices regarding the nature and effects of these external and internal factors, a way 
to address the different voices is to look into the "context" in which those external 
and internal factors come into p l a y . ‘ 
Cultural globalization is the context in which cultural industries, including 
national cinema, have been operating nowadays (Hesmondhalgh 2007). In this 
context, various forms of media and the arts transmit or diffuse across national 
borders (Crane et al. 2002). Since movies, or motion pictures, are a form of media 
and art, discussions on the development of the film industry should pay heed to the 
various perspectives on cultural globalization. Apropos of the various 
interpretations of cultural globalization, Diana Crane (2002) identifies three 
theoretical models that have been widely debated in the academic circles for over 
three decades, namely the Cultural Imperialism approach, the Cultural-flows/ 
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Network approach, and the Reception approach. In addition, Crane proposes the 
Cultural Policy and Strategies approach to explain cultural globalization with regard 
to the reactions of economic organizations and political institutions in their national 
context. Indeed, not only do these four models serve as a guiding light for 
uncovering the causes of the decline of Hong Kong film industry, but they also 
present a systemic way to address the different voices on the matter. 
In an attempt to elucidate the factors involved in the development of the Hong 
Kong film industry, this study follows Crane's (2002) classifications by depicting 
four types of theoretical approaches to study cultural industries in the globalized 
context. Findings from some studies in media economics, cultural economics, 
cultural studies, economic geography, and political economy will also be discussed 
in connection with these approaches. Following this literature review with some 
disagreements highlighted, this study will bring in a Political-cultural approach from 
economic sociology. A subsequent section will provide details on why such an 
approach could serve as a theoretical tool to explain the rise and fall of the Hong 
Kong film industry. 
The Cultural Imperialism approach 
The Cultural Imperialism approach or the Media Imperialism thesis examines 
the imbalance in international media flow (Boyd-Barret 1977). It considers cultural 
globalization to involve an invasion of the Western, or American, popular culture 
(Staiger 2002; Thompson 1997). It makes this contention because it observes that 
the expansion of "Western" media production has expedited a monotonic flow of 
cultural products from the "First to the Third World in a situation whereby the media 
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of the advanced capitalist economies were able to substantially influence, if not 
actually determine, the nature of cultural production and consumption within Third 
World countries" (Chadha and Kavoori 2000: 416). Following in this vein, the 
thesis claims that the global cultural system, if there is any, is dominated by a "core" 
of developed countries in the West; while the less-developed countries, which remain 
at the "periphery" of the system, will have little control over their cultural 
development (Schiller 1992; Lee 1980). 
The Cultural Imperialism approach contends, moreover, that when the 
multinational corporations, mostly from the "core" countries, produce and 
disseminate cultural goods, including film products, to the "peripheral" countries 
(Tomlinson 2008), the audiences in "peripheral" countries generally accept these 
cultural goods passively (Cecil 1971). As a result, the control of the international 
flow of media content by some developed countries, such as the United States (U.S.) 
and its European allies, is expected to give rise to the "Western media hegemony 
[that] diminishes indigenous production capacity and undermines the expressive 
potential of national cultures [and will consequently bring about a] cultural 
homogenization worldwide" (Curtin 2007: 6; Gitlin 2001). _ 
Since the foreign movies screened in most countries these days come mainly 
from the U.S., advocates of the Cultural Imperialism approach would consider 
Hollywood to be the "core" or the "center", and the receiving countries, including 
Hong Kong, to be the "periphery" (Hamm and Smandych 2005; Segrave 1997). 
According to the postulation of this thesis that the market domination of the "core's" 
film products, notably the movies from the West, over the receiving countries may 
consequently demolish the indigenous movie industries of the recipients (Armes 
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1987), the development of the Hong Kong film industry should therefore be 
expected to be negatively affected by the import of movies from the U.S. 
Past researches from media economics and cultural economics complement the 
Cultural Imperialism thesis by throwing light on the "economic fundamentals" of the 
media industries in "core" countries. Media trade models are applied to prove that 
the large-scale domestic market of the "core" countries could provide their media 
producers with strong capital power to offset any cultural depreciation in the 
products to be disseminated offshore (Hoskins and Minis 1988; Wildman and Siwek 
1988; Hoskins et al. 1997). Wildman (1995)，for example, finds that international 
trade in films and television programs is a one-way flow from the large markets in 
the developed countries to the small markets in the less-developed counterparts. 
This observation is consonant with the Cultural Imperialism thesis. Wildman's 
contention is based upon the assumption that, other things being equal, a large-scale 
domestic market in the developed countries allows their media companies to make 
"optimal production budgets". By contrast, media products from the 
less-developed countries with a small-scale domestic market, from which less capital 
power is expected to be generated, will be less capable of competing with the 
products imported from the developed countries. In this sense, the less-developed 
countries may even cede their domestic market to the imported media products. 
This results in a domination of the developed countries over the less-developed 
counterparts in media trade. 
Given the large-scale domestic film market in the U.S., this line of research 
shows that the major film companies in Hollywood are more able to afford a larger 
budget for their film productions. This gives them the advantage over the film 
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companies in other nations for they could produce movies with "de-contextualized" 
scenes which usually involve high-cost computer graphics (CG). A prominent 
example is Avatar (2009)，a science-fiction movie directed by James Cameron. 
Since the screenplay is set in a fictitious planet, Pandora, the "de-contextualized" 
scenes protect the movie from any "cultural discount"''* and hence, helped to gain its 
acceptance in different culturally-defined markets. Other Hollywood blockbusters, 
such as Harry Potter, Jurassic Park, and Star Wars, share the same characteristics. 
Producers of these pictures, notes Oh (2001), intentionally choose to focus on the 
"less culturally resistant genres and more internationally appealing content in order 
to diminish the cultural discount effect” (p.42). 
In reality, these "de-contextualized" blockbusters seem to have achieved 
remarkable commercial success worldwide. In Lee's (2006a; 2009) analyses of 
cinemagoers' acceptance of U.S. movies in East Asia, he observes that Hollywood 
blockbusters, particularly those received academy awards in visual, audio, and 
technical effects, are more likely to overcome cultural barriers, and to achieve better 
box-office results abroad. As the film companies in Hollywood, notably the "core", 
could garner more financial resources from their domestic market to make 
high-budget movies than the "peripheries", they are in a better position to produce 
"de-contextualized" movies that carry universal content. Since these pictures are 
expected to gain higher acceptance when traversing cultural borders (Noam 1993)， 
they are more likely to excel than the films produced elsewhere in overseas markets. 
In consequence, the U.S. could maintain its dominance over other nations in the film 
14 The Cultural-discount thesis proposes that "whether someone likes a script or not is likely to be 
partly affected by factors such as their acceptance of the social and cultural values embedded in the 
story and familiarity with the narrative conventions being employed" (Lee 2009: 245). Their 
acceptance is mediated by the "aesthetic tastes, social and cultural values, language, and other factors 
[that] may lead to different judgments of whether certain media products are better than others" (Lee 
2006b: 260). 






Although the Media Imperialism thesis and the related studies of media/ 
cultural economics contribute by highlighting the basis of the "core's", notably 
Hollywood's, dominance over the "periphery", this approach overlooks some 
"peripheral" film industries, such as Hong Kong in the 1980s and South Korea in the 
1990s, which prospered despite the challenge posed by Hollywood. Thus, the 
"disregard of the variations in local context" has been constantly construed as an 
opposition to the Cultural Imperialism approach (Fu and Sim 2010: 122). These 
variations can stem from the differences in the size and the development of the local 
film markets, as well as the "variance in political and social systems within and 
between recipient countries" (Lee 1980: 44). For instance, South Korea imposes 
screen quotas on foreign movies (Jin 2006), Thailand charges taxes on imported 
movies (Boonyaketmala 1992), and the Hong Kong cinema was often coined as a 
case of a laissez-faire'^ market before the late 1990s (Lee 2008: 124). With 
varying degrees of state's involvement in film markets, the development of movie 
industries in different countries is expected to show diversity rather than 
homogeneity even though the global expansion of Hollywood is a peril to all of 
them. 
In short, although the Cultural Imperialism approach has its merits as it 
provides a backdrop for understanding the global dissemination of cultural products 
from the developed countries, the credibility of its generalization about the inevitable 
hegemonic dominance of the "core" over the "peripheral" countries is questionable. 
15 Among other film industries of different nations, Leung (1993) contends that the Hong Kong 
[colonial] government had "the least participation or involvement in cultivating the local movie 
industry [before the handover of Hong Kong in 1997]" (p.3). 
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The Cultural Imperialism thesis contends that there is a one-way regular flow of 
media contents from the "core" to the "peripheries". This argument, however, 
underrates the vitality of some "peripheries" which are de facto exporters of cultural 
products, and overlooks also a variety of local responses from the receiving countries 
to the "incursion" of foreign media products. These two recognized shortcomings 
from the Cultural Imperialism approach are indeed well articulated by the 
Cultural-flows/ Network approach and the Reception approach as the following 
sections will discuss in more detail. 
The Cultural-flows/ Network approach 
As noted in the foregoing section, the Cultural Imperialism approach 
accentuates the dominance of the "developed" over the "less-developed" countries 
via a regular flow of media/ cultural products from the former to the latter. The 
Cultural-flows/ Network approach challenges this argument of the Cultural 
Imperialism thesis by stressing that the nature of global media trade is not 
characterized by an unidirectional flow of media content or cultural products, but a 
"plurality of actors and media flows" (Chadha and Kavoori 2000). In contrast to 
the unidirectional transmission process of cultural goods, the Cultural-flows/ 
Network approach notes that the receivers of cultural goods in the system may also 
be the originators of cultural products that are globally circulated (Jenkins 2004). 
In this vein, not only does culture flow out from the developed countries, but it can , 
also flow in from the less-developed ones (Srebemy-Mohammadi 2000). The 
global cultural system thus resembles an aggregation of networks with no clear 
demarcation of cultural flows between the "core" and "peripheral" nations 
(Appadurai 1990). 
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Empirically, the hegemonic model associated with the Cultural Imperialism 
approach is challenged by the emergence of many media industries in the developing 
countries which have witnessed a rampant growth in exports of their cultural 
products. There are scores of studies on the South Korean film industry as an 
exemplary case"^ to illustrate how the state in less-developed countries together with 
the economic actors could scale new heights in the development of their cultural 
industries (see Shim 2002; Ryoo 2005; Jin 2006; Joo 2007; Ryoo 2008). These 
studies explicate how the state-business collaboration in Korea has turned its media 
industry into a regional "powerhouse of popular culture" (Shim 2006: 38). This 
hastens the spread of Korean cultural commodities in several parts of Asia (Jin 2007: 
761). Some scholars describe this situation as a "Korea wave" of cultural exports 
in the region (Leong 2002; Russell 2008). 
South Korea has also been repeatedly cited by studies of "cultural hybridity" to 
challenge the idea of a "duality" or a "dichotomy" between the dissemination of 
media content at the global level, as stressed by the Cultural Imperialism thesis, and 
the interpretation or acceptance of those media content at the local level, an emphasis 
of the Reception thesis (Shim 2005; Joo 2007; Chua and Koichi 2008). Going 
beyond the binary understanding of transnational cultural flows, this body of 
literature argues that cultures are rarely "pure" in a sense that almost all societies 
16 Despite the Korean success in export of cultural products, some scholars stress that cultural ‘ 
imperialism maintains its rule in Korea, and also in other developing countries 
(Srebemy-Mohammadi 1997; Joo 2007). They note that the U.S.-based media conglomerates have 
already penetrated into Korea with their capital in form of joint ventures. In this respect, the • 
dominance of the developed countries over other nations persists not only through the export of 
cultural products, but also in form of capital investment and the institutionalization of organizational 
practices in their media/ cultural industries (Srebemy-Mohammadi 1997; Joo 2007). Since the 
cultural market in Korea is still largely influenced by transnational corporations, Jin (2007) contends 
that Korea has neither overtaken nor escaped from the cultural dominance of the developed countries, 
notably the U.S. 
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undergo a dynamic process of adaptation to foreign cultures when they interact with 
other societies (Appadurai 1996). The "transcultural convergence" between the 
"local" and the "global" is thus expected to lead to a hybridization of culture or a 
hybrid form of cultural flows among societies (see Pieterse 1994; Kraidy 2002 for an 
overview). 
Besides the "Korea wave", media scholars recognize a similar pattern of 
hybridization of cultural flow in Hong Kong (Tarn et al. 2002; Curtin 2002). In 
addition to the large-scale film exports from Hong Kong to the Southeast Asia region 
(Leung and Chan 1997), Cheung and Chu (2004) observe that some Hollywood 
movies originated to some extent from Hong Kong. They note that while there has 
been an outflow of personnel from the Hong Kong movie industry to Hollywood 
since the 1990s, quite a number of Hollywood movies have incorporated elements 
from the films produced in Hong Kong. Film producers in the U.S. have also 
acquired the rights to remake the movies from Hong Kong. For example, The 
Departed (2006) is a Hollywood movie remade from the trilogy of Infernal Affairs 
(2002-2003), a Hong Kong production. These demonstrate that the receiving or 
"peripheral" countries of Western cultural products are not "passive recipients"; 
instead, they may also influence the decisions of the producers, or the media 
conglomerates, in the "core" countries on the content of the cultural goods that they 
produced and exported (Kipen 2004; Elberse and Eliashberg 2003). 
The experiences of South Korea and Hong Kong clearly challenge the 
assumption of cultural imperialism that the developed countries or the "First World" 
are considered to be the producers and exporters of cultural goods, while the 
non-Western countries or the "Third World" are construed to be only the receivers 
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and the passive victims (Armes 1987; Reeves 1993). Antithetical to the Cultural 
Imperialism thesis, studies following the Cultural-flows/ Network approach draw our 
attention to some less-developed countries, which are supposedly experiencing the 
cultural dominance of the developed countries but which are however found to be 
capable of producing and exporting media content and cultural products to other 
nations (Sinclair et al. 1996). Being an exporter of culture, therefore, the 
less-developed countries may gamer resources from the regional market, enabling 
them to build and strengthen their own media industries amid the widespread influx 
of media content from the Western developed countries (Reeves 1993). 
Viewed in this light, the Cultural-flows/ Network approach considers the export 
of film products to overseas markets to be an imperative for the success of a film 
industry. Even as Hollywood blockbusters penetrated into different film markets 
from the 1980s, the Hong Kong film market, notes Leung (1993), was "immune 
from this worldwide threat" (p.l). She stresses that the prosperity of the Hong 
Kong film industry before the mid-1990s is largely due to the ability of its 
market-oriented filmmakers who were flexible enough to overcome the limitation of 
its small-scale domestic market, and to enlarge the "scope of target customers to 
overseas China and later international audiences" (p. 112). In this sense, the ability 
to maintain a high level of film exports is treated as a reason for the outstanding 
performance of the Hong Kong film industry before the mid-1990s. 
Besides the ability of filmmakers in Hong Kong, some studies claim that since 
most Asian film industries were relatively less developed during the 1980s，their film 
products were less competitive than those of the Hong Kong movie industry (Lee 
2006a). This gave the filmmakers in Hong Kong an opportunity to develop their 
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film industry into a regional movie production hub and an export center in Asia 
(Leung 1993). As a result, the Hong Kong film industry experienced its heyday in 
the 1970s and the 1980s. Also, it was coined as the "Hollywood of the East" since 
its market share in some countries even matched with that of Hollywood (Leung 
1993: 1-2; Dannen and Long 1997; Stokes and Hoover 1999: 17; Hammond 2000; 
Stokes 2007; Lam 2007: 60-61). As Lee (2006a) puts it: 
During the 1970s and the 1980s, the underdevelopment of movie 
industries in the [East Asia] region made Taiwan and Southeast Asia 
lucrative markets for Hong Kong films. Hence, U.S. movies have not 
dominated the Hong Kong market historically, (p.887) 
Even though the results of film exports from Hong Kong could be a sign or an 
indicator of the overall performance of the film industry, the statement quoted above 
does not square perfectly with the reality. This is because the market share of 
imported films in Hong Kong has no relation to the number of films exported from 
Hong Kong. Even a film industry with a relatively low level of exports may still be 
able to resist the domination of Hollywood movies in its market. Bollywood of 
India in the past several decades serves to illustrate the point. The film outputs of 
Bollywood are comparable to that of Hollywood, yet the scale of its film exports is 
much smaller than that of the U.S. Nonetheless, Bollywood movies could still gain 
a huge share in their domestic market (Dudrah 2006; Bose 2007; Dudrah and Desai 
2008). This implies that the number of films exported from a given country does 
not necessarily make a significant difference in the share of foreign movies in its 
domestic market. 
Although the revenue from overseas markets is clearly an important income 
stream for local film companies, film exports might not help the movie industries in 
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the receiving countries to fend off the competition from foreign movies. Hence, the 
triumph of exports achieved by the Hong Kong film industry in the Southeast Asia 
region before the mid-1990s should not be regarded as a reason why the Hong Kong 
movies could outperform the Hollywood blockbusters in its domestic market. By 
the same token, the expansion of Hollywood's market share in Hong Kong since the 
mid-1990s should not be caused by the changes in the number of movies exported 
from Hong Kong. 
Suppositions related to the Cultural-flows/ Network approach 
As for the decline of the Hong Kong film industry during the mid-1990s, Curtin 
(2003b) points out that a restructuring in the Taiwan ^ ^ film market during the 
mid-1990s has shorten the theatrical exhibition period of Hong Kong movies. This 
resulted in a "collapse of release windows" for Hong Kong movies, which 
consequently pushed the movies, albeit well made, to be sold in ancillary markets, 
such as TV stations and video rental outlets, soon after their theatrical release. To 
combat this problem, Curtin urges film companies from Hong Kong to change their 
distribution strategies in Taiwan by maintaining their offices in such an important 
offshore market. If film companies promote their movies by themselves in the 
Taiwan market, he claims, their revenue may rise substantially. This will also help 
to rekindle the demand of Taiwan's distributors and exhibitors for Hong Kong 
movies, and may restore the "theatrical premier" of these movies to the "status of a 
special event that could only be experienced in the theater" (p.252). If such a 
change in the distribution system could be made, the Hong Kong film industry might 
be able to garner more resources from abroad, and hence have a better chance for 
17 Taiwan was one of the most important sources of pre-sale financing for the Hong Kong film 
industry particularly during the late 1980s and the early 1990s (Curtin 2003b: 244). 
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revitalization. Following in this vein, Curtin proposes the following diagnosis of 
the decay of the Hong Kong film industry: 
[G]ood movies are still being made every year in Hong Kong. 
The creative side may need fewer repairs than the distribution 
infrastructure a situation that has less to do with Hollywood 
dominance than it has to do with a failure to adapt to shifting 
market conditions. (p.241) [A]s we have observed, it is just 
as much a consequence of mismanagement on the part of the 
Chinese film industry, (p.253) 
While the revenue from film exports is crucial to the Hong Kojng film industry 
(Leung and Chan 1997), this study pinpoints that the decline involves far more than 
a "mismanagement" of offshore distribution. Counter to the determinacy of 
cultural exports emphasized in the Cultural-flows/ Network approach, the ample 
literature on media economics shows that the domestic market of a film industry is 
crucial to the export of its film products. As shown in this literature, economic 
models are widely applied to test the "home market effect", the extent to which the 
domestic market scale could influence the exports of a given country (see Hadida 
2008; Weder 1996 for an overview). These studies demonstrate that "larger and 
wealthier countries [could gamer better resources from their domestic market, 
whereby this might] account for larger proportions of exports [in international 
trade]" (Jayakar and Waterman 2000: 155). The movies produced in the developed 
countries that could generate higher box-office grosses from the domestic market are 
expected to perform better abroad. Following in this vein, the box-office figures of 
movies in the domestic market are therefore often taken as an indicator or a 
benchmark for the distributors and exhibitors in overseas markets to determine “ 
whether, or for what duration, the movies will be released or screened (Vogel 2007). 
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In sum, these studies argue that the performance of a film product distributed 
overseas hinges on the "economic fundamentals" of its domestic market, which can 
be indicated by the population size, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the cinema 
attendance, the total box-office revenue, the quantity of film outputs, the volume of 
domestic movie spending, and/ or the gross value-added by the movies produced at a 
given year (Lee and Kim 2010; Fu and Lee 2008; Lee and Waterman 2007; Oh 2001; 
Jayakar and Waterman 2000; Waterman and Jayakar 2000; Owen and Wildman 
1992). 
In line with the abovementioned research findings, some studies have identified 
the drawbacks of Hong Kong's small-scale domestic film market. Lee (2006b) 
stresses that in recent years, the small-scale domestic market fails to support the 
Hong Kong film industry to compete effectively with other rising movie industries in 
the East Asia region (p.265). Parallel to Lee's (2006b) concern, Fu and Sim (2010) 
take Hong Kong as a case to illustrate how a small domestic film market limits its 
film companies' ability to make movies that are "culturally transmissible". This is 
why, they stress, most films exported from Hong Kong are "kung-fu and gangster 
movies" as film companies rarely make "innovation beyond duplicating such 
themes ... [and develop] more broad-appeal programs" (p. 138). 
Furthermore, as a rule of thumb in the Hong Kong film market, the local 
theatrical screening, being the first window of exhibition, is the key conduit of profit 
return. Distributors typically try to "signify the premium value" of their film 
products by launching them in theatres (Curtin 2007: 84). Then, they would market 
the products "through discount outlets" according to the movies' theatrical 
performance (ibid.). In this regard, the box-office results from domestic theatrical 
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screening are used as a benchmark for the local distributors to bargain with the 
overseas exhibitors and retailers over better terms in the exhibition or distribution 
contracts aboard (Hong Kong Film Archive 1997: 69). The local distributors could 
hardly get a good deal from the exhibitors and retailers in overseas markets for 
movies that achieve less desirable box-office results from the domestic market. 
Even if the foreign exhibitors have already acquired the rights to the pre-sales in 
overseas markets, they may still curtail their future investment in Hong Kong movies, 
or lower the price of the pre-sales they are willing to pay in ftiture, when the movies 
they brought receive poor box-office results in Hong Kong. In a nutshell, these 
findings collectively accentuate the importance of an industry's domestic market to 
its film exports. 
In sum, the Cultural-flows/ Network approach refutes the Media Imperialism 
thesis by reproaching it for underestimating the complex dynamics of cultural 
interaction among societies. Laying special emphasis on a hybridized form of 
cultural flow, this body of literature highlights the vitality of some less-developed 
countries which are supposedly ground down by the Western cultural hegemony. 
While these countries receive imported media content from the Western developed 
countries, they are also capable of producing and exporting cultural products to other 
nations. The export of media and cultural products, in this regard, becomes a way 
for the less-developed countries to gamer resources from overseas markets, and to 
build up their own media industries which may resist Western cultural hegemony. 
Viewed in this light, the Cultural-flows/ Network approach advances an argument 
against the Media Imperialism thesis by proposing that the root of the decline of 
Hong Kong film industry does not stem from its direct competition with Hollywood 
in domestic market. Instead, the industry's downfall is attributed to both the slump 
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in exports of Hong Kong movies, and the meager profits they gained in overseas 
markets. 
Nonetheless, findings from the studies in media economics are antithetical to 
the postulation of the Cultural-flows/ Network approach. As discussed earlier, 
media economics by and large accepts as fact that the performance of film exports, 
as a media or cultural product, is heavily determined by the scale of their home 
market. These studies highlight the factors in domestic market other than exports 
are imperative for a thriving film industry. Although the pre-sales or prior export of 
movies to overseas markets constitutes a crucial component of the film industry (as 
for Hong Kong, see Leung 1993; Leung and Chan 1997)，they should not be treated 
as a cause of the decline of Hong Kong cinema. Even in practice, the box-office 
results from domestic theatrical screening are conventionally treated as the 
benchmark for local distributors to bargain with overseas exhibitors and retailers 
over better terms in the exhibition or distribution contracts abroad. For this reason, 
film exports are only a sign or an indicator of the performance of a film industry, 
rather than an exogenous or a determinant factor in the performance of the industry. 
In this respect, the Cultural-flows/ Network approach may not be able to get to the 
} 
root cause of the decay of Hong Kong film industry in the mid-1990s. 
The Reception approach 
While the Cultural Imperialism approach falls short of explaining the divergent 
paths of the development of different cultural industries amid globalization, and the 
Cultural-flows/ Network approach does not adequately account for the forces from 
the domestic market that sparked off the decline of the Hong Kong film industry, the 
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Reception approach offers sensible postulations by bringing in socio-demographic 
f a c t o r s 18 to explain the shift in demand for local movies in the domestic market. 
The Reception thesis assumes that audience and consumers in receiving countries 
respond actively to cultural products (Watson 2006). They actively interpret, 
negotiate, and even sometimes reject the media content imported to their markets 
(Chadha and Kavoori 2000: 416). 
The interpretations of, and the reactions to, the same cultural goods may vary 
across different national, ethnic, and racial groups (Basuroy et al. 2006; Collins and 
Hand 2005; Neelamiegham and Jain 1999) because audiences are expected to exhibit 
a preference for the imported cultural products that appear most relevant or 
proximate to their own cultural context (Straubhaar 1991). In this sense, the 
cultural products distributed abroad may suffer a "cultural discount" (Hoskins and 
Minis 1988) since the products may lose their appeal if the consumers in other 
markets do not share the same socio-demographic characteristics, such as "to have 
the same background knowledge, linguistic competence, and other forms of cultural 
capital to fully appreciate them" (Lee 2008: 119). Following in this vein, the 
Reception thesis argues that commodities which are more culturally proximate or 
specific to the socio-demographic characteristics of a market will gain a higher 
degree of acceptance in this market (Fu and Govindaraju 2010; Fu and Lee 2008). 
By contrast, commodities that are less culturally specific may exhibit a lower level of 
"cultural discount", and therefore are more likely to gain acceptance in different 
markets across cultural borders (Lee 2006b, 2008，2009; Straubhaar 1991; Wildman 
and Siwek 1988). 
18 These socio-demographic factors include the language, class, gender, ethnicity, and social 
experiences of the audience who receive the imported cultural products (Chadha and Kavoori 2000: 
425). 
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According to the Reception thesis, the responses of cinemagoers to Hong Kong 
movies vis-a-vis foreign movies are expected to exert considerable influence on the 
survival of the local film industry. Examining the local acceptance of foreign 
movies, Lee (2006b) finds that less culturally specific movies from Hollywood, 
presumably the science-fiction and action films, are more accepted by the 
cinemagoers in Hong Kong as compared with the American comedies which contain 
more culturally specific contents. Lee (2008) comes up with a similar finding for 
several film markets in East Asia. He shows that American comedies experienced a 
lower degree of "cultural discount" in the Hong Kong film market and are more 
accepted by its cinemagoers in comparison with those of Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, 
and Thailand (ibid.: 127). 
Following Fu and Sim's (2010) conclusion'^ that the "cultural discount" of a 
media product is expected to be lower if both the exporting country and the receiving 
country speak or share a common language, the findings from Lee's (2008) analysis 
can be interpreted as indicating that American comedies gain greater acceptance in 
Hong Kong since English is more popular among the public in Hong Kong than in 
Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and Thailand. As Hong Kong was a colony of the 
U.K. until 1997, English has been a compulsory subject in the curriculum of the 
primary and secondary schools. Moreover, the expansion of higher education in 
Hong Kong has probably boosted the number of people who are able to use English. 
19 Similar conclusions can be found in Wildman and Siwek's (1988), Wildman's (1994)， 
Chan-Olmsted et al.'s (2008), and Ksiazek and Webster's (2008) analyses. However, Chadha and 
Kavoori (2000) take issue with the idea drawn from these conclusions. They take India as an 
example to demonstrate that linguistic proximity does not necessarily relate to the local acceptance of 
imported cultural goods. They stress that despite the "large English-speaking population" in India, 
"local [television] programs ... [are still] more popular than the imported Western ones" (p.425). 
- 3 8 -
* 
Table 2.2 Education Attainment of the Population Aged 15 and Over at 
Matriculation Level or Taking Degree Courses, 1976-2005 
Number Percentage Share of Percentage 
of Persons Change Population Change 
Year % % % 
1976 158,340 - 5.3 -
1981 261,350 65.06 7.0 32.08 
1986 374,675 43.36 9.1 30.00 
1989 377,885 0.86 8.5 -6.59 
1991 414,350 9.65 9.1 7.06 
1992 428,618 3.44 9.3 2.20 
1994 547,530 27.74 11.3 13.07 
1995 625,086 14.16 12.6 11.50 
1996 706,239 12.98 13.5 7.14 
1997 754,205 6.79 14.2 5.19 
1998 780,724 3.52 14.5 2.11 
1999 823,282 5.45 15.1 4.14 
2000 869,293 5.59 15.7 3.97 
2001 955,536 9.92 17.0 8.28 
2002 1,001,898 4.85 17.6 3.53 
2003 1,072,239 7.02 18.7 6.25 
2004 1,139,366 6.26 19.5 4.28 
2005 1,180,170 3.58 19.9 2.05 
Notes: Data on 1976 and 1986 are collected from By-Census. Data on 1981 are 
collected from Census. Data on 1989 and after are collected from the 
General Household Survey. 
Figures for 1996 to 1999 presented in this table may be different from those 
presented in the earlier editions oiHong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics 
before 2001 because of the change in the approach for compiling 
population figures adopted by the Census and Statistics Department since 
August 2000. 
Persons with educational attainment at matriculation level refer to those 
with Secondary 6 to Secondary 7 education or equivalent level. Persons 
taking degree courses refer to those enrolled in degree programs in tertiary 
level academic institutions. 
Sources: Tabulation compiled from Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics (Census • 
and Statistics Department, various years). 
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As shown in Table 2.2，over the past three decades, there was a sevenfold 
increase in the number of persons at Matriculation level or taking Degree courses. 
Their share of the entire population aged 15 and above almost quadrupled from 5.3 
per cent in 1976 to 19.9 per cent in 2005. Since people with this level of education 
attainment must have completed their secondary education, it is expected that more 
people in Hong Kong would have become familiar with English over the past three 
decades, and that the population's acceptance of imported movies, particularly those 
from Hollywood, could have grown. 
Although the Reception approach has spelled out the possible variations in the 
demand for movies imported from foreign countries, the apparent growth of 
popularity or acceptance of Hollywood movies in Hong Kong is primarily a 
consequence rather than the cause of the decline in both the output and the domestic 
box-office grosses of Hong Kong movies. Even Lee (2006a) notes in his analysis 
that but for the decline of local movies at the outset, there would not be space in the 
Hong Kong film market for foreign movies to be screened to an overwhelming 
extent (pp.889-890). This indicates that, as Lee acknowledges, something must 
have happened in the Hong Kong film industry that consequently dragged down the 
film output as well as the box-office receipts of Hong Kong movies during the early 
1990s. 
Given that the Hong Kong film market might have experienced a slump in the 
supply of local movies and/ or a declining public acceptance of local movies, 
distributors and/ or exhibitors may have demanded a larger number of foreign 
movies imported mainly from the U.S. to replace the local movies. In this respect, 
the number of imported films screened in Hong Kong could have increased 
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substantially on the condition that they were used to fill up the market niche that was 
formerly occupied by Hong Kong movies. While more and more imported films 
have been screened in Hong Kong since the mid-1990s, these movies are found to 
have gained much acceptance from the public. The Reception approach at this 
stage may provide a cultural explanation for the variations in the acceptance of 
Hollywood movies in different culturally-defined markets. 
In this vein, even though the Reception approach pinpoints the reasons for the 
changes in movie-consumption habits or in audience tastes of the local public, it does 
not aim to, and should not serve to, explain the dynamics on the production side of a 
film industry. The growth in popularity of Hollywood movies in Hong Kong is 
therefore a consequence rather than the cause of the decline of the Hong Kong film 
industry. Sole reliance on the Reception approach may risk posing a lopsided 
concentration on the demand side while underrating the factors involved in the 
supply and distribution of cultural products in explaining the downfall of Hong Kong 
film industry. Since these factors may also account for the development of the 
Hong Kong film industry, the following section will take a closer look at them under 
the framework of the Cultural Policy and Strategies approach. 
The Cultural Policy and Strategies approach 
As shown in the foregoing sections, the Cultural Imperialism approach and the 
Cultural-flows/ Network approach treat "nation" as their primary unit of analysis, 
while the "individual cultural consumer" is the unit of analysis in the Reception 
approach. These approaches, however, overlook the fact that "cultural 
globalization requires an organizational infrastructure" (Crane 2002: 4). The 
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organizational context deserves much attention because it determines how the 
production and distribution of cultural products are processed. As a complement to 
the three aforementioned approaches, Crane (2002) puts forth a middle-range 
approach, namely the Cultural Policy and Strategies approach, that calls for 
deliberations on the reactions of economic organizations and political institutions to 
cultural globalization. This approach explores further into different cultural 
industries at the firm- or industry-level by examining the strategies adopted by 
economic actors or firms, and the policies enacted by the state or the government. 
Crane (2002) identifies cultural globalization as an ongoing process that 
involves "competition and negotiation" among different cultural exporters. 
Economic organizations and political institutions in different countries are supposed 
to "preserve, position, or protect their [national] cultures in global space" (p.4). As 
such, they may employ their own set of strategies and policies to attain the goal. In 
academia, institutional economics and economic geography delineate how the 
business strategies adopted by the U.S.-based media companies have gained them a 
comparative advantage over other exporting countries. Their studies largely focus 
on how the organizational structure, including the production system (Wasko 2003), 
the star system (McDonald 2008), the financial system (Simon and Wiese 2001; 
Wasko 1982)，the distribution system (Scott 2004), and the exhibition system (Wasko 
2003; Litman 1998), could have given the Hollywood film companies an 
"operational" advantage in international film trade (Curtin 2003b: 241). Findings 
from these studies throw light on the solid foundation that enables Hollywood to 
realize its comparative advantage over other film industries^". Akin to media 
20 There is abundant literature on media economics that focus on the comparative advantage enjoyed 
by the U.S.-based media conglomerates. The earlier sections on the "Cultural Imperialism 
approach" and the "Cultural-flows/ Network approach" have briefly reviewed some of these studies. 
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economics, arguments from institutional economics and economic geography 
complement the Cultural Imperialism thesis by enriching our understanding of the 
reasons for the global dominance of American media products. The Cultural Policy 
and Strategies approach emphasizes that the comparative advantage enjoyed by the 
conglomerates that dominate the global media trade should not be treated as a natural 
state of affairs. Instead, it is the state policies together with the business strategies 
that shape the conditions in which the international flow of cultural products takes 
place. 
While the Cultural Policy and Strategies approach alerts us to the 
taken-for-granted idea of the comparative advantage enjoyed by the dominant media 
conglomerates, it stresses that the policies enacted by the state or the government are 
central to the development of film industry and its comparative advantage or lack 
thereof. Cultural policies, notes Crane (2002), are the instruments that nation-states, 
or city-states, employ to "control the types of channels and types of content that 
enter and leave their territory" (p. 12). As such, three goals of cultural policies are 
identified: (i) to preserve and protect national and local cultures; (ii) to create and 
maintain international images of the country or the city; and (iii) to develop and 
protect international markets and venues for the export of cultural products. 
Parallel to the emphasis of Cultural Policy and Strategies approach on state's 
involvement, Miller et al. (2001; 2005) proffer a critical political-economy 
perspective to sift through the historical context of the development of media and 
film companies in the U.S. Their analyses illustrate that the expansion of foreign 
market share of Hollywood movies is dependent on the support of the U.S. 
government which assists the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) in 
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prying open foreign markets through pressuring other nation-states to eliminate their 
screen quota for imported films. 
Studies in film history come up with a similar finding. Pendakur (2008) notes 
that the U.S. government and the American motion picture industry cartel are closely 
linked. Although the Paramount Decree was granted in 1948 to prohibit the 
integration of film production and exhibition in the U.S., no antitrust measure has 
been applied to the offshore business of American film companies. The 
Webb-Pomerene Export Trust Act (1918) even gave the film corporations "the means 
to collude abroad in ways forbidden them at home" (Trumpbour 2002: 115). Since 
1922，the U.S. government has allowed the U.S.-based film production and 
distribution companies to forge alliances under the umbrella of the Motion Picture 
Producers and Distributors of America, the predecessor of the Motion Picture 
Association of America (MPAA). In 1945，the Motion Picture Export Association 
(MPEA)^' was established as a sister-corporation of MPAA to integrate and to 
expand the distribution network of American major film distributors, so as to 
promote the export of their film products. 
Trumpbour (2002), moreover, illustrates how the U.S. government has provided 
diplomatic and political support to the Hollywood cartel since the 1920s. For 
instance, the State Department of the U.S. has repeatedly used "international trade 
forums as an arena for demanding greater access for [its] cultural exports" (p.l 16). 
Lobbying at inter-state level has therefore helped the American film industry to fend 
off the threats of restrictive measures imposed by the states of other nations although 
21 The Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA) was renamed as the Motion Picture Association 
(MPA) in 1994. 
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not all attempts to eliminate import restrictions have been successful (Buck 1992). 
All in all, these studies illustrate how the seamless state-business relationship in the 
U.S. film market helps the American film industry to open up foreign markets. 
State's involvement, in this fashion, has actualized the comparative advantage of the 
American media providers over other cultural exporters. 
In Asia, the unexpected resurgence of the Korean film industry in the late 1990s, 
finds Ryoo (2008), is also due to the proactive role of its government, which has 
ardently promoted the cultural industry since the 1990s. Following the 
liberalization of the Korean cultural industry under Kim Young Sam's regime, the 
government set up its Film Promotion Fund and Cultural Promotion Fund around the 
mid-1990s (Shin 2005). Tax incentives have been provided to companies which 
invest in the film industry. These induced massive private investment from 
corporations, including conglomerates, known as the chaebol. Jin (2006) stresses 
that these measures have bolstered the Korean film industry by facilitating a 
favorable regulatory framework and the pouring of domestic capital into the industry 
throughout the 1990s. Suffice it to say that the cultural policies enacted by the 
government in South Korea have provided a positive setting for the growth of its 
film industry. 
In a nutshell, while the Cultural Imperialism thesis and media economics 
underscore the comparative advantage of the "core" exporting countries over the 
"peripheral" importing countries which results in an imbalance in international 
media trade and the dominance of the former over the latter, the political-economy 
perspective tallies with the Cultural Policy and Strategies approach since both 
consider the comparative advantage enjoyed by the "core", notably the U.S.-based 
- 4 5 -
media conglomerates, as not a natural state of affairs. Instead, they pinpoint the 
importance of political and economic institutions to American dominance in global 
media trade. They also treat the imbalance in global media trade as a matter of 
concern regardless of how the media goods are understood and consumed on the 
demand side in the importing markets, a focus of the Reception studies. In this 
fashion, the Cultural Policy and Strategies approach and the related studies of 
political economy expound on the organizational infrastructure as the foundation that 
enabled Hollywood and other media conglomerates to realize their comparative 
advantage over their competitors, and thereby maintain their ascendancy in 
international film/ media trade. 
What about the Receiving Countries? 
Although studies related to the Cultural Policy and Strategies approach suggest 
that the development of a cultural industry hinges on both the strategies adopted by 
economic organizations and the policies enacted by political institutions, most of 
them focus on the analyses of the political and economic parameters of Hollywood's 
success, as well as the factors in "performance predictability"^^ of American film 
products in different markets. Taking stock of the existing literature, just a few 
studies explicate why some countries could build up their film industries when faced 
with the challenge of Hollywood while most could not. Only scant attention has 
been paid to the strategies that the state and the economic actors in the receiving 
countries^^ employed to develop their cultural industry. In a critical reflection on 
22 Studies of "performance predictability" examine the extent to which the performance of film • 
products in different markets can be predicted by some particular characteristics of the film products 
or of the film market. A review of these studies can be found in Eliashberg et al. (2006) and Hadida 
(2008). 
23 Of the few related studies, many of them are done in Taiwan (see Lee 1999; Tien 1999; X. Lin 
2000; Wang 2004). The different responses from the states in the U.K., Belgium, and France to the 
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existing literature on media industries in Asia, Fu and Wildman (2008) stress that 
scholarly studies which focus on the industrial dynamics remain rare, unfortunately 
(P.94). The current study thus addresses the issue of industry dynamics by taking 
the Hong Kong film industry as a case to examine how it could prosper under the 
threat from Hollywood throughout the 1970s and the yet have experienced a 
freefall since the mid-1990s. 
To resolve this puzzle, this study proposes employing the concept of 
"commodity chain" in the analysis (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). This concept 
helps to direct attention to the different stages involved in the production and 
delivery of film products. Furthermore, it enables researchers to describe the power 
relations, whether as a producer-driven or a buyer-driven relation, among different 
actors who are involved in the production and delivery process of the film product 
(Gereffi 1994). With a clear picture of the "internal governance structure" of the 
supply chain, studies that attempt to inquire into the development of a film industry 
could identify the impact of economic strategies and political policies on each stage 
of the "commodity chain". 
Although the concept of "commodity chain" helps to clarify the possible 
expansion of film exports from Hollywood have been addressed by Trampbour (2002). Buck (1992) 
has reviewed the state policies on the national cinema of some ASEAN countries. Related studies 
can also be found in the special issue of East-West Film Journal volume 6，number 2，published in 
July 1992. 
24 Curtin (2007) attributes the exuberance of the Hong Kong film industry in the 1970s and the 1980s 
to its success in accumulation of "media capital" (see also Curtin 2003a). Although he correctly 
points out that when Taiwan's investors vied for Hong Kong film products, they bade up the pre-sale 
prices and sparked off a cycle of hyper-production of Hong Kong movies during the early 1990s ‘ 
(Curtin 2007; 272-273), his analysis has missed the "dynamics that produce new structures" in the 
market (Fligstein 2008: 48). These dynamics are worthy of attention since they are the factors in the 
market transformation which in turn, sparked off the downturn of the Hong Kong film industry. 
Thus, this study intends to elucidate how the dynamics of changes in the market structure as well as in 
the formal and informal rules of the game, or the "conceptions of control", have turned the Hong 
Kong cinema into a moribund industry since the mid-1990s. 
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impacts of economic strategies and political policies on each stage of the production 
and distribution process, these impacts may vary from country to country because 
the historical context in which their cultural industries are developed may differ from 
each other. For example, Wasko's (1980; 1981, 2003, 2008) studies of the 
American film industry highlight the influence of bankers on the production system 
in Hollywood. The power relationships^^ between bankers, or investors, and the 
film companies in the U.S., however, can differ from those in other countries. Film 
companies in Asia which share dissimilar historical backgrounds with those from 
America may adopt different financial models in their business. Since film markets 
of different nations are separate albeit interlinked fields, they are developed in 
diverse contexts and hence, may follow a divergent path of development. Film 
industries in different countries, therefore, ought to be examined case by case. 
THE POLITICAL-CULTURAL APPROACH 
To examine the context in which the state and the economic actors impact on 
the performance of a film industry, this research draws on insights from the 
economic sociology literature. In particular, Neil Fligstein's Political-cultural 
approach is found to be a theoretical tool that could complement the foregoing 
literature. This is because the Political-cultural approach provides a coherent 
theoretical frame that spells out the intricate relations between the historical contexts 
in which the market is formed and the ways in which political institutions and 
economic strategies have affected the different stages of the "commodity chain" of 
film products. 
25 Wasko (1981) stresses that the relationship between bankers and the film industry has to be 
examined in the first place before trying "to identify and [to] fiilly understand any possible effects on 
the production process" (p. 152). 
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The Political-cultural approach builds a model of how markets emerge, stabilize, 
and change in capitalist societies^''. It views markets as a fields in which economic 
actors interact with each other. In the field, the ultimate goal of these actors is to 
survive, rather than to maximize the profit they could make. In this respect, 
effectiveness a matter of survival in preference to efficiency, a concern with 
profit-maximization, is the frame of reference to evaluate the actions of economic 
actors. To survive in the field, actors have to stabilize or to routinize competitions. 
Competitions are stabilized or routinized when some actors succeed in imposing a 
set of "conceptions of control" over other actors in the field (Fligstein 1990). 
"Conceptions of control" refer to the "cognitive frames" by which actors in the field 
are encircled (Fligstein 2001: 71). These "cognitive frames" shape the actors' 
perceptions of how the market works and their positions in the market. 
"Conceptions of control" do not emerge spontaneously; instead, they are the 
"result of concerted efforts by collective actors to fashion a consensus" or "political 
compromise" among different actors in the field (Fligstein 2008: 10). For this to 
happen, the construction of "conceptions of control" resembles a "political project" 
or a "social movement" in the market (Fligstein 1996; 2001). This process takes 
place when a market is newly formed or re-formed. As the field emerges, 
economic actors in the field would try to defend their fiefdom. Some actors may 
persuade or motivate others to follow their ideas. These ideas direct the actors' 
conceptualization of the opportunities they have, as well as the ways they could 
26 Arguments derived from the Political-cultural approach apply mainly to markets in capitalist 
societies instead of socialist societies because this approach is based on the assumption that economic 
actors survive in the field by means of gleaning resources through market competitions. Power 
relations between incumbents and challengers are also expected to grow out of the political struggles 
in market competitions rather than a nationalized market structure in which the survival of economic 
actors hinges on the resources allocated centrally by the state or the government. 
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exploit those opportunities. Some actors may try to discover or create a "common 
language" or "rhetoric" in an effort to "hypnotize" other actors into following their 
ideas. These actors are known as the "institutional entrepreneurs" (Fligstein 1997: 
28, 39). By this means, the "institutional entrepreneurs" attempt to control market 
competitions. Actors in the field will follow and share a "common language" or the 
"rhetoric" propelled by the "institutional entrepreneurs" if that "language" or 
"rhetoric" becomes legitimate ^^  and institutionalized. The market will then 
produce local cultures, known as the "conceptions of control", which define the 
status and the role of the incumbents and the challengers. 
In general, the "institutional entrepreneurs" who discover or create that 
"common language" will become the incumbents in the market. They are expected 
to be the actors who set the "rules and agendas for others" (Fligstein 2001: 70) and 
they benefit the most from the "conceptions of control". By contrast, the actors 
who follow the "language" or "rhetoric" and the "rules and agendas" imposed by the 
incumbents will be the challengers (ibid.: 15). They survive by finding ways to fit 
into the "dominant scheme" in the "conceptions of control" from which they benefit 
less. When the "identities" and "status hierarchy" of the incumbents and the 
challengers are apparent and well known to all actors in the field, the market is 
stabilized (Fligstein 2001: 76; 1996: 667). At this stage, there should only be one 
set of "conceptions of control" in the market. 
In a stable market, the behaviors of economic actors are expected to be bound 
by the "cognitive frames" of the prevailing "conceptions of control" (Fligstein 1997: 
27 Fligstein (2001; 1996) notes that legitimacy is bestowed by the state on markets (p.97; p.671) in a 
sense that governments would "intervene to produce rules to promote [market] stability" (2001: 19). 
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28). Since the "conceptions of control" define the social relations and the 
hierarchical status of actors, not only are these conceptions conceived by actors as 
the "worldview" to frame their relationships with each other, but they also provide 
actors with a "cognitive map" to interpret or to make sense of others' actions, and to 
make strategic moves (Fligstein 2001: 35). These strategic moves, nonetheless, are 
constrained by the "worldview" to which the "conceptions of control" are attached. 
In this vein, a stable market is characterized by the reproduction of a set of shared 
understandings of the incumbent-challenger relationships. These understandings 
constitute the cognitive map that defines the legitimate form of behavior of different 
actors. If the behavior of actors follows the cognitive map, the relations between 
incumbents and challengers would foster the social structure of the field, and the 
field may remain stable. 
However, when there are exogenous forces that drive market transformation, the 
challengers may question the existing order as well as the shared understandings or 
the cultural frame that governs the operation of the field. These challengers may 
mobilize resources so as to redefine the rules of the game. In this situation, the 
preceding "conceptions of control" may no longer be shared by the actors in the field. 
Economic actors, hence, have to re-conceptualize opportunities, and to find new 
ways to exploit the opportunities. Since some actors would try to discover or create 
another set of "common language" or set of ideas and persuade other actors to follow 
them，a new group of "institutional entrepreneurs" may arise. This returns to the 
stage of market formation, yet it will be a stage in which the market is re-formed 
rather than newly formed. While the "conceptions of control" are in fact the 
"worldview" constructed, framed, and imposed by the "institutional entrepreneurs" 
or the incumbents on other actors in the field, the formal rules and regulations as 
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well as the informal conventional practices in markets reflect the interests of the 
incumbents vis-a-vis the challengers, and the power of the former over the latter. 
As such, the construction of institutions in markets is expected to be driven by a 
political or social movement-like process (Fligstein 2001: 120). Most market 
institutions, in this regard, are the outcome of the political struggles between 
incumbents and challengers (ibid.: 38). Fligstein, therefore, describes markets not 
only as fields but also as politics (ibid.: 98; see also Fligstein 1996). 
In brief, the Political-cultural approach is shown to be a theoretical tool which 
complements the literature reviewed earlier. This approach sheds light on how the 
contexts in which a market is situated and the interactions among economic actors 
and the state could affect the structure of the "commodity chain" of film products. 
Applying the Political-cultural approach, the following chapter will map the conduits 
by which the economic actors along the commodity chain have wrestled over the 
"conceptions of control" in the Hong Kong film market. Since the Political-cultural 
approach provides a baseline for consideration of the historical, political, and 
cultural influences upon the emergence, stability, and transformation of markets, it 
sets forth a coherent theoretical framework that enables this study to probe into the 
exogenous and endogenous factors that have steered the development of Hong Kong 
cinema. As will be shown in the subsequent chapters, these inquiries provide clues 
to the reasons for the freefall of the Hong Kong film industry since the 1990s. 
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Chapter 3 
The “BU)om”28 in the 1970s and the 1980s 
Although the main focus of this study is to examine the decline of the Hong 
Kong film industry, the growth of the Hong Kong film industry in the 1970s and the 
1980s is worthy of attention. This is because the factors involved in the 
efflorescence of the industry can point to the dynamics underlying of how the market 
evolved. Fligstein (2001) notes that the exposition of why and how a market 
transforms requires "careful consideration of ... [these] dynamics over some period 
of time" (P.229). In this sense, how the Hong Kong film market was restructured 
and stabilized in the 1970s and the 1980s may provide clues to the causes of its 
transformation and the industry's downfall during the 1990s. While the subsequent 
chapter attempts to argue that the "conceptions of control" promoted by the 
incumbents in the 1970s had become an endogenous factor in the market 
transformation during the mid-1990s, this chapter provides a backdrop to this 
transformation. Thus, the following sections will recapitulate the "bloom" of the 
Hong Kong film market in the 1970s and the 1980s. The "conceptions of control" 
which emerged in this period will also be discussed. These conceptions are found 
to have stabilized the film market until the mid-1990s. 
THE “BLOOM，， 
Hong Kong has been well-known for its motion picture industry for the past 
28 "Bloom" is the title of several movies. They include a comedy directed by Terri Measel Adams 
and Daniel Measel in 2008, and a short film made by Ron Houghtaling and Eric Kritzler in 2004. 
TWs chapter borrows the title to describe the heyday of the Hong Kong film industry during the 1970s 
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century. The industry experienced its heyday in the 1980s. The annual number of 
film outputs soared from 94 in 1971 to 108 in 1981，and stood at 116 in 1989 (Table 
3.1). Meanwhile, the box office of Hong Kong movies in 1989 was 2.4 times those 
in 1971 at constant 1997 prices (Table 3.1). Some studies attribute this success to 
various "indigenous" factors, including both the supply of and the demand for local 
film products (Cheuk 2008; Zhao 2007). On the supply side, the rise of a "new 
wave" of young directors, many of whom received tertiary education in Hong Kong 
or in overseas film schools, and who have been trained in the television sector, 
resulted in a burst of local movies that resonated with the taste； or as some may 
argue, the quest for self-identity of Hong Kong cinema-goers during the 1970s and 
the 1980s (Fu and Desser 2000; Teo 1997). 
On the demand side, as the baby-boom generation with its rising consumption 
power reached adolescence in the 1980s, it resulted in a surging demand for 
entertainment, including cinema-going, that boosted the box-office receipts of Hong 
Kong movies (Sui 2009: 109). Due to this emergence of the "new wave" of 
directors along with the rising demand from the baby-boom generation for 
entertainment, the industry achieved remarkable success not only in its domestic 
market, but it also reaped prodigious profits from its distribution network in the 
region (Leung 1993; Leung and Chan 1997). With the highest per capita 
production in the world, and the second largest number of films exported in the early 
1990s，the Hong Kong film industry was coined the "Hollywood of the East" or the 
"Asian Hollywood" (Stokes 2007; Lam 2007: 60-61; Hammond 2000; Stokes and 
Hoover 1999: 17; Dannen and Long 1997). 
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Table 3.1 Film Outputs and Box-office Grosses of Hong Kong Movies, 
1971-1989 
Year Film Box-office Grosses 
Outputs HK$ At constant 1997 prices # 
(in million) (in million HK$) 
1971 94 42.2 535.0 
1972 99 65.1 729.4 
1973 96 70.5 610.0 
1974 103 67.5 541.4 
1975 98 58.3 450.5 
1976 95 76.6 572.6 
1977 88 84.6 • 573.1 
1978 99 112.9 718.6 
1979 109 132.7 692.1 
1980 118 184.3 814.4 
1981 108 241.9 831.7 
1982 99 404.1 1183.2 
1983 95 411.2 1086.0 
1984 87 560.8 1252.0 
1985 89 608.8 1268.1 
1986 86 640.4 1168.7 
1987 76 777.3 1402.9 
1988 115 1024.8 1626.1 
198 9 878.6 • 1285.6 
Note: # Figures are weighted by the ticket price in each corresponding year, 
and are at constant 1997 prices. 
Sources: Chan (2000); Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion 
Picture Industry Association Limited, various years. 
t 
Although the spurt in both the supply of and the demand for local film products 
signify the commercial success of Hong Kong cinema, less attention has been 
devoted to why those "new-wave" directors had the chance to prove their ability 
during the 1970s and the 1980s. The structural factors, on the supply side, which 
enabled those directors to make a successful ascent, are often overlooked in existing 
- 5 5 -
literature. Hence, this chapter proposes that the accession of the "new-wave" 
directors attested not only to their talent and ability but was also related to the 
conversion of the dominant mode of production in the Hong Kong film industry; to 
wit, from Shaw Brothers' studio system to Golden Harvest's independent production 
system during the 1970s. As discussed in the following sections, this conversion 
provided the "new-wave" filmmakers an opportunity to prove their talents in a 
less-restricted environment, and led to a distributor-driven commodity chain which 
was fostered by the "conceptions of control" throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Besides, on the demand side, even though the baby-boom cohort would have 
boosted the rate of theatrical attendance, these potential audiences might not 
necessarily prefer to watch Hong Kong movies. Since the baby-boom generation, 
in general, has attained a higher level of education than their parents, they could be 
expected to show a higher degree of interest in imported movies in a foreign 
language (Leung 1993: 61). As Curtin (2007) puts it: 
[T]his generation was more experienced with Western popular 
culture than with traditional Chinese culture and politics. 
Consequently, Hollywood movies and American music became 
quite popular in Hong Kong during the 1960s, (p.43) 
In this sense, "the quest for self-identity" might not be an adequate explanation 
for why the baby-boom cohort favored local productions over foreign movies. This 
pinpoints that the aforementioned "indigenous" factors could not account for the 
success of the Hong Kong film industry in the 1970s and the 1980s. Thus, this 
study suggests taking a closer look at the historical context in which the industry is • 
situated in order to examine the development of the industry. To this end, the 
subsequent section will apply Fligstein's Political-cultural approach to elucidate how 
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the historical context of the Hong Kong film market and the interactions among film 
companies have shaped the development of the film industry. These findings are 
expected to serve as a backdrop to the transformation of the Hong Kong film market 
during the mid-1990s. 
BRINGING IN THE POLITICAL-CULTURAL APPROACH 
To apply Fligstein，s Political-cultural approach, several issues must be clarified 
at the outset. First of all, the market that is being studied has to be specified. As 
the intention of this research is to probe into the factors that steer the development of 
the Hong Kong film industry, the film market in Hong Kong is the field to be studied. 
A film market, in this research, is defined as an economic field that comprises both 
cultural production and reception. This economic field resembles a social arena in 
which the interactions among different actors as well as the "structured exchange" 
are carried out. "Structured exchange" refers to the "repeated exchange" of 
products among actors (Fligstein 2001: 30). They are guided and organized by the 
rules and the social structures of the field (ibid.). The "structured exchange" of film 
products is arranged along a "chain" of economic processes ranging from the 
production of motion pictures to the distribution and exhibition of the movies. In 
the "commodity chain", film companies or firms which found a spot as film 
producers, distributors, or exhibitors are the key players or the economic actors in 
the field. The relations among these actors ought to be considered when examining 
the development of Hong Kong film industry since they reflect the social structure of 
the market and determine how the film market works. 
While all actors in the market will strive for survival, they have to find ways to 
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stabilize and to routinize competition. For instance, they may use their social 
networks to co-opt suppliers and even their competitors, as well as to create stable 
relations with their customers and the government. They may also formulate rules, 
both formal and informal, to define the conditions in which exchange and 
transactions are processed in the market. These formal and informal rules will 
become the "conceptions of control" when they gain legitimacy from the state or the 
government, and are commonly shared by actors in the field. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, not only do the "conceptions of control" shape the actors' 
perceptions of how the market works, but they define also the status and the roles of 
incumbents and challengers. With a set of widely-shared understandings of the 
positions and relations of actors, the market could be stabilized. 
Following in this vein, this chapter will first describe the industrial setting of 
the Hong Kong film market. The industrial setting is worthy of attention because it 
indicates the social structure of the field in which actors interact with each other. 
As such, two major characteristics of the industrial setting will be highlighted. 
They are the shift in the dominant mode of film production from a studio system to 
an independent production system in the early 1970s, and the revenue-sharing 
structure in the Hong Kong film market. These two characteristics are underscored 
because they help to depict the incumbents and the challengers put more plainly, 
the dominants vis-a-vis the subordinates in the market, and to illustrate the 
"conceptions of control" constructed by the incumbent firms. It will be argued that 
not only did this set of "conceptions of control" give rise to a distributor-driven 
commodity chain, but it also stabilized the Hong Kong film market throughout the 
1970s and the 1980s. In this stable condition, as the last section of this chapter will 
show, the industry reached its peak in the late 1980s in terms of both its film outputs 
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and the box-office grosses. 
THE INDUSTRIAL SETTING OF THE HONG KONG FILM MARKET 
VIS-A-VIS HOLLYWOOD 
This section will depict the industrial setting of the Hong Kong film industry. 
The industrial setting has to be taken into consideration because it indicates the 
social structure of the field. This provides specific understandings about the way 
the Hong Kong film market works. Before delving into the setting of the Hong 
Kong film industry, the industrial setting of Hollywood will be discussed briefly so 
that the Hong Kong setting can be compared to it. As the film industry in the 
United States (U.S.), or Hollywood, is one of the most established film markets in 
the world, a comparison between the settings of the two industries may help to 
illustrate the distinctive features of the social structure of the Hong Kong film market. 
This may also shed light on the two main characteristics of the market structure 
which embody the "conceptions of control" in the field. 
The setting of film market typically comprises three major components, namely 
film production, distribution, and exhibition. These components correspond to the 
three key stages in the commodity chain of film products (Eliashberg et al. 2006). 
Since the 1920s, the film companies in the U.S. which dominated the industry 
through their vertical integration of film production and distribution were the 
so-called "majors" or the "major studios" (Scott 2005: 27; see also McDonald and 
Wasko 2008: 1; Mossig 2008: 46). Five of these "majors" even owned their theatre 
chains before the Paramount Decree went into effect in 1948 (Scott 2005: 27-29). 
After 1948, however, these "majors" "were forced to divest themselves of these 
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chains" (Scott 2004: 35). Henceforth, they have concentrated on "financing and 
distribution rather than [in-house] production" (Schatz 2008: 16). On the 
production front, they finance the film projects directed by the "independent 
producers" in exchange for the rights to distribute the end products (ibid.). 
As a typical practice in today's Hollywood, film producers have to coordinate 
the production and distribution of the movie. Having prepared or received a 
screenplay or a storyline, producers may seek talents, such as directors，^ actors, and 
technicians on one side; and look for funding from potential investors on the other 
(Path 1 in Figure 1). Also, producers have to approach distributors and 
exhibitors'^' to arrange screening in theatres and television channels, and the release 
of ancillary products, such as DVDs (Path 1 in Figure 1). Once the funding (Path 2 
in Figure 1) and the contributors the casts, technicians, and other supporting 
staffs are locked in, the production may begin (Path 3 in Figure 1). While 
distributors, and exhibitors in some cases, carry out the sales and marketing^^ of the 
film products, the revenue generated from the markets will be used to recoup the cost 
of production and to remunerate the investors (Path 4 in Figure 1). Since producers 
play a pivotal role in the film projects, this pattern of film production can be 
29 In some cases, the film producer and the film director can be the same person, and there can be 
more than one producer and director in a film project. While the film producers are in charge of the 
film completion, the directors are contractually responsible for both the content of the film, and the 
performance of actors, technicians, and other supporting staffs. 
Producers sometimes take up the role of distributors. Even if producers are not the distributors, 
some of them have close ties with distribution companies. These relationships enable the producers 
to secure the finance for their film projects, and to control the distribution of their film products. 
31 While distributors are the wholesalers of the film products, exhibitors are the retailers. The date • 
of release and the arrangement of exhibition blocks are negotiated between the distributors and the 
exhibitors. 
32 The sales and marketing of film products typically refer to the delivery of the movies to theatres or 
cinemas, the release of ancillary products such as DVDs, and the advertisements and promotion 
campaigns of the movies. 
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Figure 1 A Producer-driven Model Indicating the Sequence of Interactions 
Between Different Players Involved in the Commodity Chain of 
Film Products 
Unlike the producer-driven commodity chain in Hollywood, Hong Kong 
followed an independent production system driven by distributors throughout the 
1970s and the 1980s. This mode of production differs from the studio system. In 
a studio, film production, distribution, and exhibition are all carried out in-house. 
By contrast, these tasks are performed by separate film companies in an independent 
production system. While some film companies would forge alliances with one 
another, the distributors were central to the coalition in most cases. A 
distributor-driven model exemplifies this setting (Figure 2). The major distributors 
of Hong Kong movies, which were the major film companies or the incumbents 
before the mid-1990s, operated their own theatre chain by acquiring or allying with ‘ 
several theatres or cinemas (Path 1 in Figure 2). Those which did not follow a film 
studio system almost all distributors except Shaw Brothers and Sil-Metropole~ 
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—would look for producers and directors, or invest in some production companies, 
to shoot movies for them (Path 2 in Figure 2). In this fashion, besides carrying out 
the sales and marketing of the film products (Path 3 in Figure 2), the distributors 
were also the chief investor in most productions in the 1970s and the 1980s. The 
movies produced in this system would be screened in the theatre chains of the 
distributors. Revenue received from the box office was used to cover the accrued 
expenses involved in the production, distribution, and exhibition of the movies (Path 
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Figure 2 A Distributor-driven Model Indicating the Sequence of Interactions 
Between Different Players Involved in the Commodity Chain of 
Film Products 
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE HONG KONG FILM MARKET 
Similar to Hollywood, the Hong Kong film industry was organized around 
several "majors". While there is no regulation that prohibits integration among film 
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production, distribution, and exhibition in Hong Kong, the "majors" are commonly 
regarded as the film companies which dominated the industry by investing in and 
distributing Hong Kong movies on one hand, and operating or possessing their 
theatre chains on the other (Chan 2000: 599-600, 605). By integrating film 
production, distribution, and exhibition, the major film companies could solidify 
their foothold with a secured source of film-supply and favorable exhibition blocks 
for their theatrical release. 
As noted above, the production of movies in Hong Kong during the 1970s and 
the 1980s can be characterized as a distributor-driven commodity chain. This 
arrangement was put into practice when Golden Harvest (GH)，a major film 
company established in 1970, carried out an independent production system in the 
early 1970s. In the following section, how GH grew to be a major film company, 
and how it could successfully transform the supply chain of Hong Kong movies into 
a distributor-led independent production system will be explained. This conversion, 
together with the revenue-sharing structure of the film market, established a set of 
"conceptions of control" which then stabilized the market and promoted a rampant 
growth of the industry throughout the 1980s. 
From Studio System to Independent Production System since the 1970s 
In the early 1970s, the Hong Kong film industry underwent a transformation in 
the mode of production from the studio system to the independent production system. 
The transformation can be construed as a political process since the adoption of the 
independent production system in the industry was arguably a "political 
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compromise"' ‘ between the major distribution company, namely Golden Harvest, 
and the filmmakers who loathed the Shaw Brothers' studio system. Prior to the 
success of Golden Harvest (GH), Shaw Brothers (SB) dominated the Hong Kong 
film market after its chief competitor, Cathy, began to wind up its film business in 
the mid-1960s. Shaw Brothers was set up by Run-run Shaw, also known as Shaw 
Yi-fu, in 1958. Run-run Shaw is a wealthy Chinese businessman who moved to 
Hong Kong from Singapore, a place where he stayed for thirty years. In 1958, he 
took over his elder brother's, Runde Shaw's, also known as Shaw Chuen-yan, film 
business, together with the film studio at Clear Water Bay. In the same year, the 
Shaw Brothers (Hong Kong) Limited was incorporated. With the installation of its 
studio at Clear Water Bay completed, the new studio went into production in 1961. 
Shaw Brothers (SB) was a powerhouse of vertical integration (Yu 1993). It 
carried out all stages of film production, distribution, and exhibition in-house 
(Stephanie Chung 2007: 200，221). In an attempt to defeat Cathy, or even to 
capture the entire market, SB engaged in vast production efforts with its own studio. 
It employed a large number of permanent staff in its studio. They were 
accommodated in the rent-free dormitories of the studio (Jarvie 1977: 49). An 
array of departments specialized in the different stages of film production. The 
company exported its film products to overseas markets with its own distribution 
arm, and exhibited those movies in its theatre chain, mainly located in Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Malaya (ibid.: 46). In Hong Kong, SB welded over a dozen 
theatres into a chain to screen the movies it produced. These theatres included Jade, 
King's, Hollywood, Asia, Golden, Odeon, Gold View, Ying King, and Fanling, 
33 See Fligstein (1996: 664) for details on market transformation as a political compromise among 
economic actors. 
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among others (ibid.: 69). 
In spite of its mammoth scale of operation, SB was a "one-man company". 
Most decisions were made centrally by Run-run Shaw. The company did not 
extend "the circle of managerial control far beyond a small group of family members 
[of Shaw]" (Curtin 2007: 44). Even though it was a listed company, the company 
preferred private, rather than public, sources of capital, while most equity was 
brought by the Shaw family (ibid.). As for its organizational structure, Jarvie (1977) 
describes the company as a conservative enterprise operating" on the basis of 
"nepotism", with tight and central control by the senior owner, who would delegate 
mainly to relatives. The senior owner, Run-run Shaw, liked to oversee all aspects 
of his business and to resist any developments he disliked (p.65). He often read the 
scripts written by the directors or the script-writers during breakfast or at bedtime 
(ibid.).. He decided the types or genres of movies to be made, and the cast and crew 
who would take part in the projects. He would even amend the scripts or 
storyboard of the films (ibid.: 74，76). 
Run-run Shaw would only share his ideas with a small number of close 
associates: his nephew, his brother, his "right-hand" woman, Mona Fong, his former 
"right-hand" man, Raymond Chow, who later found Golden Harvest, and his top 
directors, namely Li Han-hsiang and Chang Cheuh. However, none of these 
individuals had clearly defined rights or responsibilities (Jarvie 1977). For example, 
Raymond Chow formerly held the title of the Production Manager of the company, 
yet he in fact was in charge of film distribution as well. While Mona Fiing34 was a 
famous singer in the 1950s, she became the Production Manager, Deputy Chair, and 
Mona Fung later became Run-run Shaw's second wife in 1997. 
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even the General Manager. As Chung (2005) illustrates, the power and duties of 
staffs were poorly defined (p. 14). Those who had close personal relations with the 
boss could exercise much power over others, and those whose ability to work was 
proven might be assigned to handle a lot of duties, many of which were outside of 
their job responsibilities. As Jarvie (1977) puts it: 
The man [Run-run Shaw] who built the business [Shaw Brothers] 
may not himself be able to adapt to and comprehend changes in the 
market, and because of centralization and nepotism, he is poorly 
equipped to hire the kind of associates who can aid him in this, (p.66) 
In this situation, many talented staff was loath to stay in the company. One of 
them was Raymond Chow. When Chow left SB, he established a film company, 
Golden Harvest (GH), with Leonard Ho and Leung To-kin or Leung Fung in 1970. 
This transformed the Hong Kong film market. While SB followed a studio system 
with Run-run Shaw assigning a script to a group or unit in his studio, GH is a film 
company that emphasized "location shooting and partnerships with independent 
producers" (Curtin 2007: 24). Raymond Chow, having served as a former 
employee in SB for around ten years, directed his company, GH, not to tag along 
SB's formula of studio mass production but to adopt the independent production 
system. 
Although GH initially started its film production by using Cathay's leftover 
studio, Raymond Chow understood that he still would have to pour a large amount of 
capital into covering the huge operational costs of running a film studio, which was 
almost impossible for him to do at that time. To challenge the overwhelming • 
strength of SB given his limited resources, therefore, Raymond Chow tried to play 
David to Run-run Shaw's Goliath by roping in filmmakers who would like to make 
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movies but were unwilling to be constrained by SB's organizational culture (T. Lin 
2000: 41). For instance, when Bruce Lee, a renowned martial-arts actor, returned to 
Hong Kong to start his career in the early 1970s, he refused an offer from SB but 
chose instead to collaborate with GH because he believed that GH "would allow him 
more creative control" (Curtin 2007: 47). 
Besides Bruce Lee, Raymond Chow successfully drew in several directors from 
the SB camp to his side. This resembles a political process which involved a lot of 
persuasion by Raymond Chow. In the early 1970s, Michael Hui, a famous comedic 
actor in TVB, the television station of SB, moved to GH when Raymond Chow 
agreed to set him up as an independent producer, and to grant him and his brothers 
the autonomy and the resources to make movies. Comparing such a deal with the 
"restrictive contract at TVB, Hui took the jump" to GH (Curtin 2007: 49). 
Like the case of Hui, GH successfully lured many filmmakers who were averse 
to SB's studio system. Golden Harvest subsidized many of these directors and 
actors to set up their own production companies and invested in the movies they 
made. If these movies made a profit, not only GH, but also those independent 
production companies, could gain a stake in them. In this respect, these production 
companies became satellites of GH. Built on the alliances with these satellite 
companies, GH operated its theatre chain by distributing and exhibiting the movies 
its satellite companies produced, while the satellite independent production 
companies were contracted to supply GH with movies. This pattern of film 
production, known as the independent production system, spread to become the 
conventional practice in the Hong Kong film industry from the 1970s. As the 
system came to be widely adopted by other film companies, it successfully replaced 
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the studio system from then on. 
The Revenue-sharing Structure 
Aside from the independent production system, the revenue-sharing structure is 
worthy of attention because it reflects the power relations among the production 
companies, the distribution companies, and the exhibition companies. For over half 
a century, the Hong Kong film market followed the practice that around half of the 
box-office receipts from each movie screened in the theatre goes into the pocket of 
the exhibitors; i.e., the theatre or cinema owners. Another half is passed to the 
distributors. As a conventional practice, the distributors will get less than half of 
the remaining receipts, about twenty per cent of the box-office grosses. Then an 
agreed percentage, around thirty but less than forty per cent, will be given back to 
the production company (Cheuk 1997: 18; Li 1985: 77). 
In this sense, all expenses involved in the production process have to be covered 
by approximately thirty per cent of the film's total box-office receipts. This means 
that if a film costs three to four million HK dollars to produce, which is a very small 
budget in the 1980s, the movie ought to generate at least ten to thirteen million in 
box-office receipts to recoup the production cost. However, on average less than 
twenty per cent (18.8%) of films produced in Hong Kong during the 1980s could 
earn over ten million HK dollars from box-office receipts (Table 3.2). This does 
not even take inflation into account. 
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Table 3.2 Hong Kong Movies that Received over Ten million 
HK dollars from Box Office, 1980-1989 
Year Number Share in Total Output 
of Movies of Hong Kong Movies 
TO 
1980 0 0 
1981 1 0.93 
1982 9 9.09 
1983 7 7.37 
1984 19 21.84 
1985 16 17.98 
1986 23 26.74 
1987 32 42.11 
1988 41 35.65 
1989 31 26.72 
Sources: Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion 
Picture Industry Association Limited, various years. 
The implication of this revenue-sharing structure is twofold. On one hand, 
without the investment drawn from the "majors", namely the distribution companies 
with their allied theatre chains, most film production companies could hardly earn 
enough to cover the film production costs. As a result, throughout the 1970s and 
1980s，the commodity chain of film products in Hong Kong was driven by the major 
distributors. On the other hand, even if the major distributors invested in film 
productions, they still had to rely on the revenue received from selling the 
distribution rights in overseas markets''-'' because Hong Kong's market size is not big 
enough to generate sufficient return on the film investment (Liang 1998: 312-313). 
35 Although foreign equity stream, mainly from Taiwan, nourished the Hong Kong film industry, and 
even boosted the film outputs to their peak in the early 1990s, the dependence on the capital influx 
from Taiwan had put the industry in a feeble condition. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
shift in strategies of Taiwan and the mainland China for their film industries wilted the "meteor 
shower" of Taiwan capital flight to Hong Kong. This caused an exogenous shock to the Hong Kong 
film market in the early 1990s. 
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In this respect, the finance or the income stream of a film project hinges on the 
distribution network of the major distributors. 
Since the major distributors are central to this revenue-sharing structure, the 
major distribution companies became the incumbents in the Hong Kong film market 
during the 1970s and the 1980s. To maintain their dominance over other companies, 
these incumbents had constructed a set of "conceptions of control" which could 
control competition. The following section expands on these "conceptions of 
control". 
"CONCEPTIONS OF CONTROL" IN THE HONG KONG FILM MARKET 
(1970s-1980s) 
In the early 1970s, Golden Harvest (GH) entered the market and became a 
major film company. It excelled over its chief competitor, Shaw Brothers (SB), 
owing to the "social skills" of Raymond Chow who had successfully roped in a 
couple of renowned filmmakers from SB to its side. While GH had transformed the 
commodity chain of Hong Kong movies into an independent production system, this 
system together with the revenue-sharing structure of the film market enabled GH, as 
a major distributor, to construct a set of "conceptions of control" that stabilized the 
market for two decades. 
The emergence of "conceptions of control" refers to a situation in which the 
incumbent firms that is, GH in this case would use their power privileged by 
their status and positions in the market to undertake strategies to reinforce their 
dominance over other companies (Fligstein 2001). In this process, the incumbents 
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would try to produce "meanings" that allow them to "reproduce their advantage" 
(ibid.: 29). Viewed in this light, this section will delineate the "meanings" or the 
"conceptions of control" that GH constructed to "reproduce its advantage" and 
power over other companies in the Hong Kong film market. 
The "conceptions of control" of a given market, suggests Fligstein (2001)，can be 
recognized by looking into the relations among different actors, including the 
incumbents and the challengers, provided that the market is in a stable condition 
(pp.226-227). To depict the "conceptions of control" in the Hong Kong film 
market, therefore, the relations among the film companies which belong to the three 
key components in the commodity chain will be examined. As will be shown, the 
major distribution companies are found to be the incumbents who held the power 
over the production and exhibition companies. They were also the dominants who 
reaped a lion's share in the film market. 
As discussed in the foregoing sections, the major distributors of local movies 
were central to the commodity chain of film products not only for the reason that 
they seized the source of film-supply from their satellite production companies, but 
also because they forged alliances with theatre owners and built their theatre chains 
for film exhibitions. In this regard, they acted like the bridge between consumers— 
—to be exact, the movie-viewers in different markets and the film production 
companies that seek to deliver their film products to the markets. Since how well a 
movie is expected to perform in markets determines the amount of capital that 
investors are willing to commit, the major distributors who possessed an extensive 
distribution network could largely influence the source of finance for a film project. 
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Moreover, the distributors held the power to control the flow of information to 
cinemagoers through marketing and promotions of movies. While film promotions 
are expected to have an impact on the box-office results, the marketing strategies 
enacted by the distributors when launching a movie substantially affected the 
receivable amount of revenue shared by the film production companies and the 
exhibitors. Hence, the major distributors controlled the source of finance and the 
income stream of both the production companies and the exhibition companies. 
This fostered a distributor-led exhibition and production relation in the Hong Kong 
film market throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Distributor-driven Exhibition 
Before Cineplex replaced the traditional theatres in the early 1990s, the film 
market in Hong Kong followed a distributor-led exhibition system. The social 
relations between the major distributors and exhibitors were that most theatres had 
been grouped into chains which encircled the "majors". Since the 1970s, the 
"majors" were film companies which distributed the movies produced by their 
satellite production companies under an independent production system. These 
"majors" understood that the theatre chains are the major source of cash flow, and 
theatre owners or the exhibitors, who grasped the largest share of the box-office 
receipts, had the power to control the return on film investment. In theory, both the 
distributors and the producers should have to rely on the box-office receipts from the 
exhibitions to cover their expenses in film distribution and production. In practice, 
however, the exhibitors in Hong Kong were ironically under the control of the major 
distributors until Cineplex became popular in the market in the 1990s. This is 
largely because the setting of traditional theatres had reined in the capacity, or the 
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bargaining power, of the exhibitors in the pre-Cineplex era. 
Traditional theatres are big cinema halls with at least several hundreds of seats 
that can accommodate audiences of over a thousand persons. Nonetheless, 
exhibitors in Hong Kong bore a relatively high cost for projecting a motion picture 
since typically only one to two screens were installed in each of their theatres. This 
meant that only one to two movies could be shown at a time, and exhibitors might 
not show a variety of movies on screen at each turn. Given this situation, the major 
distributors could easily dominate all exhibition blocks of a single theatre by offering 
just two to three copies of movies in a given period, usually in every one to three 
weeks' time. This indeed enabled the major distributors to exert their control over 
the exhibitors. 
The major distributors of local movies took advantage of the abovementioned 
theatrical setting and constructed a set of "conceptions of control" that could 
reinforce their power and dominance over other companies in the commodity chain. 
In the 1970s, the distributors of foreign movies largely reduced the local exhibitors' 
share of box-office revenue from the exhibition of imported films (Qiu 2002). This 
drove the theatre owners to approach the distributors of local movies. While the 
major distributors controlled the rights to distribute most movies produced in Hong 
Kong, these "majors" requested the exhibitors who were scouting for local movies to 
sign an exhibition contract. The contract entailed that the exhibitors, or the cinema 
owners, screen exclusively the films provided by a major distributor within a certain 
period of time (Chan 1985: 11). The "booking rights" to control the exhibition 
blocks, denoting how often and how long a movie will be put on screen, were 
typically controlled by the major distributors or decided upon through negotiations 
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between the distributors and the exhibitors (Leng et al. 1985: 5). Each exhibition 
contract typically lasted for one to two years (Curtin 2007: 53). Once an exhibition 
contract was signed, exhibitors with traditional theatres were not allowed to shop 
freely among different distributors for movies to screen (see Law 1992: 71; Cheng 
2000). 
During an interview conducted by Curtin (2007) with Peter Tarn who took 
charge of the exhibition business of Golden Harvest (GH), Tarn recalls that in 1978, 
GH operated seven cinemas in Hong Kong and lined up thirty to thirty-five 
independent theatres;�under a one-year agreement. This agreement required the 
independent theatres to give GH the "booking rights" over their screens in exchange 
for a fifty-fifty revenue split in the first week of its film released, a typical revenue 
split in the Hong Kong film industry. Nevertheless, Tarn notes that GH was "so 
strong .that [it] usually could negotiate for ... a split of sixty-five and thirty-five 
[between GH and the independent theatres]" (Curtin 2007: 53). This indicates that 
even though the exhibitors control the major source of cash flow and are supposed to 
hold much power over other companies in the commodity chain, the setting of the 
traditional theatres subordinated the exhibitors to the distributors. Theatre owners, 
thus, had to comply with the exhibition contract proposed by the major distributors, 
such as Golden Harvest and others, throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. 
In this fashion, the Hong Kong film market followed a set of "conceptions of 
control" which could be construed as a distributor-led exhibition system until the 
mid-1990s. The "conceptions of control" were constructed by the major 
36 Independent theatres refer to the theatres that are not owned by any distribution company. These 
theatres can exhibit movies that are imported or locally produced and distributed by any film 
companies. They may also ally with the major distribution companies if they want. 
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distributors who tried to exert their control over the exhibitors. As a result, the 
theatre owners, stresses Jarvie (1977), would rarely "give a fig for the vagaries 
involved in [film] production" (p.71). Instead, they would stick to their exhibition 
business. Most of their attention was then devoted to the maintenance of their 
theatres, deciding which major distributor they would like to tag along with when 
their current exhibition contract expired, and whether there would be a sufficient 
number of movies for them to fill up their exhibition blocks during the low-season 
(ibid.). 
While the "conceptions of control" had blunted the bargaining power of the 
exhibitors, the major distributors could control the exhibition blocks of their allied 
theatres. In this sense, not only did the major distributors determine the advertising 
strategies and promotion budgets of their movies, but they also controlled when their 
movies would be released and screened in theatres. Under a distributor-led 
exhibition system, therefore, the major distributors were not simply an agent, nor a 
"middleman", between the production companies and the exhibition companies; 
instead, they were the "gatekeepers" with great power over the commodity chain. 
This situation lasted for almost half a century until Cineplex cinemas replaced the 
traditional theatres in Hong Kong from the 1990s. 
Distributor-driven Production 
As discussed above, the revenue sharing structure in the Hong Kong film 
market meant that a movie could hardly be produced without the financial support 
from distributors (Cheung 1998: 70-71). Although exhibitors needed movies to fill 
up their exhibition blocks, they were rarely involved in the film production process 
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in the 1970s (Jarvie 1977: 71). Also, unlike South Korea, filmmakers in Hong 
Kong could not seek equity from banks or corporations outside the film industry (see 
Cheung 1998: 49-54, 66-68)，nor rely on the stock market to raise capital for film 
production. There are almost no institutional means to finance film projects in 
Hong Kong. Banks' rarely lend money to filmmakers since they perceive that the 
budget-control in film production lacks transparency (see Cheung 1998: 57-58，67). 
Moreover, the Hong Kong government had no policy to support the financing of 
film projects until the late 1990s (Lie 2007: 53; Simon Chung 2007; Cheung 1998: 
7). Hence, most investments in film production came from "private" sources, 
namely the major film companies, rather than the "public" sources, such as banks or 
equity market. Since the major film companies were the distributors of local 
movies, these major distributors had provided most financial support in the film 
projects, and they seized the "real power" in film production^^ (Jarvie 1977: 72). 
As a result, directors or filmmakers who wished to complete their projects had to 
rely on the major distributors. 
The distribution-led production relation reflects the "conceptions of control" in 
the film market under which the production companies succumbed to the major 
distribution companies. Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, the major 
distribution companies planted a cluster of independent production houses. These 
production houses resembled the satellites of the major distributors. Not only did 
37 Most commercial banks in Hong Kong, Chiu et al. (1997) find, concentrate on trade finances and 
are notoriously conservative. Even the industrialists who enjoyed their golden days in the 1960s . 
constantly complained about the reluctance of the banks to finance their production and expansion 
(Chiu 1994). 
An exception to this practice is Newport. Newport is formerly an exhibition company, yet it later 
set up its distribution business in the 1980s. Thus, Newport is regarded as a major film company 
that distributes and exhibits movies. 
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the major distributors fund the film projects of these satellite companies, but they 
also screened the movies produced by these companies in their theatre chains. This 
mode of production can be characterized as a distributor-led independent production 
system. 
As noted in the foregoing sections, Golden Harvest (GH) was the first company 
which adopted this mode of production in Hong Kong. A few years after GH was 
established, its founder, Raymond Chow, sought alternative means, other than the 
studio system, to shoot movies (Jarvie 1977: 49). The result was that a number of 
independent production companies were set up with the support of GH. Most of 
these companies were led by film directors or even actors who were bestowed with 
autonomy in the film production process. While GH outsourced its branch of film 
production to the independent production companies, these companies became the 
subsidiaries or the satellites of GH with their movies made to be centrally distributed 
and exhibited by GH. 
Under the umbrella of GH, many independent production companies sprouted 
throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. These included Hui's Film Production Co., 
Ltd (許氏)，a production company directed by the a renowned comedic actor and 
director Michael Hui; Bo Ho Films Co., Ltd (寶禾)，headed by a well-known 
martial-arts actor and director Samo Hung Kam-bo; Golden Way Films Ltd.(威禾)， 
led by a famous martial-arts actor and director Jackie Chan; Film Workshop 
Company Ltd.(電影工f乍室)’ founded by famed director Tsui Hark and his wife; and 
many others. These satellite independent production houses had hitherto made over “ 
four hundred movies for GH, many of which were blockbusters and reaped huge 
profits for their parent company. After its inception, GH's market share of 
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box-office receipts climbed from 4.25 per cent to 7.84 per cent between 1971 and 
1975, and reached a peak of 10.58 per cent in 1976 (Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 Film Outputs and Market Share of Golden Harvest, 1971-1979 
Year Film Outputs Box-office Receipts 
Number % # HK$ %## %### 
(in million) 
1971 5 5.32 5.60 13.26 4.25 
1972 6 6.06 12.10 18.59 6.96 
1973 12 12.50 12.50 17.75 7.06 
1974 11 10.68 13.20 19.56 7.19 
1975 11 11.22 11.19 19.20 7.84 
1976 11 11.58 18.03 23.54 10.58 
1977 7 7.95 11.91 14.08 5.31 
1978 9 9.09 18.86 16.71 7.41 
1979 7 6.42 15.18 11.44 5.12 
Notes: # Golden Harvest's share in total output of Hong Kong movies. 
冊 Golden Harvest's share in total box-office grosses o t local movies. 
冊杯 Golden Harvest's share in total box-office grosses of both local 
movies and imported films. 
Sources: Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry 
Association Limited, various years. 
The distributor-led independent production system soon became the 
"conceptions of control" in the Hong Kong film market. These "conceptions of 
control" act like the "cognitive maps" or the "conceptual tools" for actors to 
understand how the market works (Fligstein 2001: 29). Film companies that joined 
the competition afterward were framed by such conceptions as well. Following the 
distributor-led independent production system initiated by GH in Hong Kong, two 
major film companies Golden Princess and D&B，both with their own theatre 
chains were established in 1980 and in 1984 respectively. 
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Golden Princess (GP) was the second largest film company with its market 
share slightly smaller than Golden Harvest's. It was backed up by its parent 
company, Kowloon Development Company Ltd., a conglomerate with immense 
investments in a vast range of infrastructural projects and public transport, notably 
The Kowloon Motor Bus Co. Ltd. (KMB), in Hong Kong. Similar to Golden 
Harvest, the company financed a bunch of independent production houses as its 
satellites (Chan 2000: 643; Stokes 2007:155). These production houses included 
Cinema City Enterprises Ltd.(新藝城)，a production company founded by Karl 
Maka, Raymond Wong, and Dean Shek, all of whom are directors, producers, and 
actors; Always Good Film Company Ltd.(永佳)，established by Frankie Chan, a 
director and actor; Magnum Films Ltd.(萬能)，set up by Danny Lee Sau-yin, a 
director and actor; and many others. 
While Golden Harvest (GH) dominated the Hong Kong film market since the 
mid-1970s, Golden Princess (GP) grew to be the second largest film company, after 
GH, in the 1980s. One of the most astonishing triumphs of GP was Aces Go Places 
(最佳^^ 白檔），a movie made by Cinema City in 1982. The movie was the 
blockbuster of the year. It recorded over 25 million HK dollars in the box-office 
receipts and accounted for about a quarter (25.7%) of the total theatrical receipts of 
GP in 1982 (Table 3.4)，which amounted to 6.19 per cent of the total Hong Kong 
box-office grosses in that year (Table 3.1). Throughout the 1980s, the box-office 
revenue for GP accounted for over one-tenth (11.9%) of the entire market on average 
(Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.4 Film Outputs and Market Share of Golden Princess, 1980-1989 
Year Film Outputs Box-office Receipts 
Number % # HK$ %## %### 
(in million) 
1980 14 11.86 19.95 10.82 5.24 
1981 18 16.67 46.76 19.33 9.65 
1982 10 10.10 97.18 24.05 14.27 
1983 6 6.32 76.74 18.66 13.24 
1984 12 13.79 162.29 28.94 17.18 
1985 13 14.61 117.49 19.30 13.62 
1986 9 10.47 72.16 11.27 7.17 
1987 14 18.42 193.03 24.83 17.41 
1988 11 9.57 147.10 14.35 11.36 
1989 8 6.90 121.56 13.84 9.68 
Notes: # Golden Princess' share in total output of Hong Kong movies. 
冊 Golden Princess' share in total box-office grosses of local movies. 
#冊 Golden Princess' share in total box-office grosses of both local 
movies and imported films. 
Sources: Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry 
Association Limited, various years. 
In line with Golden Harvest and Golden Princess, D&B followed the 
distributor-led independent production system since the late 1980s. A difference is 
that D&B had its own producers to monitor all of its productions. Under the 
supervisions of these producers at the top, the company contracted with several 
independent directors for film production'^'\ Although D&B was engaged in the 
film business for only nine years (1984-1992), the shortest among the major film 
companies established from the 1970s to the 1980s, it produced and distributed over 
N 
a hundred pictures, some of which turned out to be the yearly blockbuster. For 
instance, two of the company's productions in 1988 were the top two blockbusters of 
39 D&B employed some directors to shoot movies in the first few years. However, the company 
stopped employing directors directly in the late 1980s; instead, it contracted with several independent 
directors for film production on a project basis. In this sense, D&B adopted a distributor-led 
independent production system to make movies. 
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the year. They were Clifton Ko Chi-sum's It's a Mad Mad World II (富貴再逼人） 
and Stephen Shin's Heart to Hearts (三人世界).It's a Mad Mad World II, a 
blockbuster in 1988, reaped 25 million HK dollars at the box office. Its preceding 
series, It's a Mad Mad World (富貴逼人)，was also a blockbuster with the 
third-highest box-office record in 1987 (Chan 2000: 655-660). All of these movies 
were produced in a distributor-led independent production system. 
HONG KONG FILM INDUSTRY AT ITS PEAK IN THE LATE 1980s 
Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, the commodity chain of Hong Kong 
movies was driven by the major distributors. The relations of local film distributors 
with the production companies and the exhibition companies reflect the “conceptions 
of control" in the field. As film companies that entered the market crafted their 
business strategies according to the prevailing "conceptions of control", the power of 
the major distributors over other companies in the commodity chain was reinforced. 
This fostered the superior status and positions of the major film companies, which 
were the incumbents, in the market. Since the incumbents had successfully retained 
their power to control competition, the Hong Kong film, market was effectively 
stabilized in the 1970s and the 1980s. Like other capitalist firms, most film 
companies could survive and earn a profit only under stable market conditions 
(Fligstein 2001: 234). In a stable market, the three major film companies, namely 
Golden Harvest, Golden Princess, and D&B，dominated the Hong Kong film market 
during the 1980s. 
Following the distributor-led exhibition system presented earlier, these three 
major film companies controlled altogether over two-fifths of the theatres in the 
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market during the late 1980s (Table 3.5). In Table 3.5, the number of theatres 
which each "major" had allied exclusively with from 1984 to 1989 is derived by 
counting the theatres that screened the movies released by each of the "majors". As 
explained in the method section in Chapter 1，this information is collected from the 
cinematic advertisements in newspapers, and this study draws a sample from two 
days of each year, June 30 and December 31. A theatre is considered to have allied 
exclusively with a "major" only if it screened the movies released by that particular 
major film company on both of the two sampled dates. If the cinematic 
advertisements identified that a theatre was screening the movies from different 
major film companies on either June 30 or December 31，the theatre is not 
considered to be allied exclusively with any major film company. In this way, the 
averaged number of theatres that showed only the movies released by any one of the 
three "majors" listed in Table 3.5 on the two sampled dates indicates the theatres 
which allied exclusively with the corresponding "major" in the year. 
While the foregoing method is consistently applied in this research to identify 
the source of movies screened in each theatre, there are some rare cases in which a 
few "majors" had no movie screening on any of the two sampled days. In this 
situation, the dates of the theatrical release of those "majors'" two movies which 
gained the highest and the lowest box office of the year are picked. The averaged 
number of theatres screening the two movies indicates the theatres which allied with 
that "major" in the year. Seven cases are handled in this way. They are the 
theatres that screened the movies from Regal in 1992 and 1993，from Modern in 
1994，and those from Mandarin in 1993, 1994，1995，and 1996. Information on ‘ 
these cases is presented in Figure 3 of Chapter 4. 
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Although two different sampling methods are used to estimate the theatrical 
possession of each major film company from 1992 to 1996，none of the theatres 
counted as an ally of the "majors" are duplicated. If any theatre is found to have 
screened the movies from more than one "major" on any of the sampled dates in a 
given year, that theatre is not considered to have allied with any "major" in that year. 
In other words, only if the theatre showed the movies from a single major film 
company on all of the dates sampled within the same year, is it counted among those 
who allied exclusively with the corresponding major film company. As such, this 
study will evaluate the theatrical possession of each "major", and delineate the 
power relations between the major distributors and the film exhibitors. 
Table 3.5 Theatrical Possession of Golden Harvest, Golden Princess, 
and D&B, 1984-1989 
Year Golden Harvest Golden Princess D&B 
Theatres % # Theatres %# Theatres % # 
Allied Allied Allied 
Exclusively Exclusively Exclusively 
1984 9 9.47 25 26.32 1 1.05 
1985 22 21.15 21 20.19 12 11.54 
1986 25 23.81 7 6.67 17 16.19 
1987 22 19.13 23 20.00 • 18 15.65 
1988 18 13.53 17 12.78 16 12.03 
1989 20 17.09 20 17.09 17 14.53 
Note: # Percentage share of theatres under their corresponding theatre 
chain in the total number of theatres of the year. 
Sources: Tabulations from cinematic advertisements in Singtao daily and 
Mingpao daily, 1984-1989; Hong Kong Yearbook, various years; 
Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry Association Limited, 
various years. 
As shown in Table 3.5, Golden Princess possessed as many theatres as Golden 
Harvest since the mid-1980s. Each had forged alliances with around twenty 
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theatres (Table 3.5). When D&B was established in 1984，the company aligned 
with only one theatre. A year later, D&B built its theatre chain by renting four 
cinemas from Shaw Brothers^, and co-opting around a dozen independent theatres 
(Table 3.5). In 1986，the company controlled 16.2 per cent of the theatres in Hong 
Kong (Table 3.5). On the whole, the theatrical possession of the three companies 
peaked at 48.7 per cent in 1989 (Table 3.5). This made them the three major theatre 
chains'*' in Hong Kong. 
While these theatre chains were controlled by the three major film companies, 
each of them would rarely exhibit the movies distributed or produced by their 
counterparts. As each theatre chain requires at least thirty movies to put on screen 
each year (Hong Kong Economy Yearbook 1989: 168), there was a huge demand for 
films to fill up the exhibition blocks of each theatre chain. In this regard, after 
Golden Harvest entered the market and engaged in film production, the number of 
movies produced and released in Hong Kong climbed from 94 in 1971 to 103 in 
1974 (Table 3.1). When Golden Princess joined the competition, the total film 
outputs in Hong Kong spurted from 109 in 1979 to 118 in 1980 (Table 3.1). At the 
time D&B set up its theatre chain, the number rose moderately from 87 in 1984 to 89 
in 1985’ and reached a high of 116 in 1989 (Table 3.1). The three companies 
altogether produced over forty movies each year (Table 3.6) and reaped around forty 
per cent of the total box-office grosses during the late 1980s (Table 3.6). 
40 At that time, Shaw Brothers re-calibrated its business and shifted its focus from film business to 
television business (Curtin 2007: 41). This is one of the reasons why it would lease some of its 
cinemas to D&B. 
41 This has not included the theatre chain of Sil-Metropole (銀都)，a "left-leaning" film company 
incorporated from Great Wall, Feng Huang, and Xin Lian in 1982. 
- 8 4 -
Table 3.6 Aggregate Film Outputs and Market Share of Golden Harvest, 
Golden Princess, and D&B, 1984-1989 
Year Aggregate Film Outputs Aggregate Box-office Receipts 
Number % # HK$ %## %### 
(in million) 
1984 24 27.59 309.69 55.22 32.78 
1985 29 32.58 336.13 55.22 38.98 
1986 48 55.81 412.31 64.39 40.96 
1987 46 60.53 603.04 77.59 54.40 
1988 45 39.13 531.40 51.86 41.03 
1989 40 34.48 411.99 46.89 32.82 
Notes: # The three companies' share in total output of Hong Kong movies. 
冊 The three companies' share in total box-office grosses of local 
movies. 
### The three companies' share in total box-office grosses of both local 
movies and imported films. 
Sources: Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry 
Association Limited, various years. 
While the incumbents, the three major film companies, gained the lion's share 
of the market, the challengers who were the film companies without any alliances 
with the "majors" could barely scrape by. These challengers included the film 
companies that distributed and exhibited foreign movies. As the distributor-driven 
commodity chain allowed local movies to occupy most of the screens available in 
the market, the number of theatres that exhibited local movies exclusively climbed 
from 23 in 1970 to 27 in 1980, and even increased to 33 in 1982 after Golden 
Princess came into operation (Table 3.7). In this very year, the domestic box-office 
revenue for local movies exceeded that for foreign movies for the first time in the 
history of Hong Kong cinema (Table 3.8). 
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Table 3.7 Theatres in Hong Kong by Exhibition of Local Movies or Imported 
Films, and Both, 1970-1985 
Year Exhibited Local Movies Exhibited Imported Films Exhibited Total 
Exclusively Exclusively Both Number 
Number of % # Number of % # Number of % # of 
Theatres Theatres Theatres Theatres 
1970 23 22.33 28 27.18 26 25.24 103 
1971 14 N.A. 31 N.A. 32 N.A. N.A. 
1972 11 11.34 40 41.24 29 29.90 97 
1973 34 N.A. 22 N.A. 14 N.A. N.A. 
1974 24 29.63 30 37.04 10 12.35 81 
1975 22 26.19 32 38.10 8 9.52 84 
1976 34 40.96 26 31.33 15 18.07 83 
1977 23 N.A. 29 N.A. 16 N.A. N.A. 
1978 14 18.67 24 32.00 24 32.00 75 
1979 16 20.00 18 22.50 26 32.50 80 
1980 27 32.53 30 36.14 5 6.02 83 
1981 29 35.37 24 29.27 23 28.05 82 
1982 33 37.08 19 21.35 28 31.46 89 
1983 48 53.33 14 15.56 22 24.44 90 
1984 56 58.95 17 17.89 14 14.74 95 
1985 39 37.50 14 13.46 45 43.27 104 
Notes: "N.A." denotes data are not available because of the deficient information 
on the total number of theatres in the corresponding years. 
Data reflect only the theatrical composition on June 30 and December 31 of 
each corresponding year. 
# The sum of the data in these three columns may be less than a hundred 
since there could be some theatres that were not open to business on June 
30 and December 31 of the corresponding year. 
Sources: Tabulations from cinematic advertisements in Singtao daily and Mingpao 
daily, 1970-1985; Hong Kong Yearbook, various years; Hong Kong Motion 
Picture Industry Association Limited, various years. 
With less theatres exhibiting foreign movies, the box-office receipts of imported 
films plunged from 1.1 billion HK dollars in 1971 to 855 million in 1979，and dipped 
further to 811 million in 1982 at constant prices (Table 3.8). By contrast, the box 
office of local movies surged from 535 million HK dollars in 1971 to 692 million in 
1979, and reached a high of 1.6 billion in 1988 at constant prices (Table 3.8). The 
self-sufficiency ratio rebounded accordingly from 0.32 in 1971 to 0.593 in 1982, and 
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rose to 0.791 in 1988 (Table 3.8). 
Table 3.8 Screening, Box-office Grosses, and Self-sufficiency Ratio of Local 
Movies and Imported Films in Hong Kong, 1971-1989 
Year Local Movies Imported Films Self-sufficiency 
Number of HK$ # N u m b e r of HK$ # Ratio 
Movies (in million) Films (in million) 
1971 94 535 441 1,134 0.320 
1972 99 729 422 1,219 0.374 
1973 96 610 335 924 0.398 
1974 103 541 285 931 0.368 
1975 98 451 300 653 • 0.408 
1976 95 573 283 701 0.450 
1977 88 573 321 947 0.377 
1978 99 719 301 903 0.443 
1979 109 692 293 855 0.447 
1980 118 814 278 868 0.484 
1981 108 832 289 834 0.499 
1982 • 99 1,183 265 811 0.593 
1983 95 1,086 176 444 0.710 
1984 87 1,252 232 860 0.593 
1985 89 1,268 226 528 0.706 
1986 86 1,169 279 668 0.636 
1987 76 1,403 290 598 0.701 
1988 115 1,626 234 429 0.791 
1989 116 1,286 351 551 0.700 
Note: # Figures are weighted by the ticket price in each corresponding year, and 
are at constant 1997 prices. 
Sources: Chan (2000); Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion 
Picture Industry Association Limited, various years. 
Given the self-sufficiency ratio in 1982 had passed the 0.5 level (Table 3.8)， 
Hong Kong movies had for the first time in history surpassed foreign movies in their 
domestic box office in 1982. As the ratio remained above 0.5 in the subsequent 
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years (Table 3.8), the dominance of Hong Kong movies in their domestic market is 
shown to have persisted throughout the 1980s, which marked the peak of the Hong 
Kong film industry. 
SUMMARY 
In the early 1970s, the political struggle between Shaw Brothers and Golden 
Harvest reshaped the "conceptions of control" in the Hong Kong film market by 
replacing the studio system with a distributor-led independent production system. 
The Political-cultural approach suggests that the interactions among players in the 
field who vie to control competitions appear to constitute a political struggle in the 
market (Fligstein 2001). In these struggles, some players may "try to figure out 
what they want, how to get it, and how to get along with others who might want 
other things" (ibid.: 27). One way is to convince others "to go along with their 
conception of the market" (Fligstein 2001: 76; Fligstein 1996: 663). This, however, 
is a "tricky task that requires social skill" (Fligstein 2008: 12). "Social skill" is the 
ability to "induce cooperation amongst others" through the construction of a 
"collective definition of interest" that can be commonly shared by the players in the 
field (Fligstein 1997: 11，36; 2008: 14). 
In the political struggle between Shaw Brothers and Golden Harvest in the early 
1970s，Raymond Chow of Golden Harvest was evidently more "socially skilled"*^^ 
than Run-run Shaw at building alliances with filmmakers. Since Golden Harvest 
(GH) successfully drew to his camp in quite a number of renowned film directors 
42 Fligstein (1997) notes that actors who are more "socially skilled" at attaining cooperation will have 
a higher chance to survive and to play important roles in the field (pp.37-38). 
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and actors who were reluctant to be bound by Shaw Brothers (SB), the company 
outdid its competitors and became a major film company as well as an incumbent in 
the 1970s. Suffice it to say that if SB bore a resemblance to a large standing army, 
GH would be more akin to a mass of guerillas. The guerilla-warfare paid off at the 
end since the David-like GH won the battle against Goliath, SB. The 
distributor-led independent production system which GH had adopted to stave off SB 
soon became a conventional practice, or the "conceptions of control", in the industry. 
Film companies, such as Golden Princess and D&B, which entered the field 
afterward, followed the system too. This set the stage, or laid the "structural 
foundation", for the "independent production houses that flourished during the 
golden age of Hong Kong cinema" (Curtin 2007: 65). 
While the Hong Kong cinema experienced its heyday in the 1980s, many of 
these independent production houses were operated by the "new-wave" young 
directors who made myriads of movies that achieved remarkable commercial success. 
These "new-wave" filmmakers and their production houses were "generally small 
independents that relied largely on a causal workforce" (Curtin 2007: 60). They 
were also heavily financed and backed up by the major distributors, namely Golden 
Harvest (GH), Golden Princess (GP )�and D&B. In this respect, but for the rise of 
an independent production system put forward by GH in the 1970s, which then 
became the "conceptions of control", latecomers such as GP and D&B might not 
have engaged in independent productions. By the same token, if the independent 
production system was not widely applied in Hong Kong, the "new-wave" 
filmmakers might have had to stay on in the studio system at Shaw Brothers, and lost 
the opportunity to prove their talents in a less-restricted environment. 
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As the "conceptions of control" inscribed in the distributor-led independent 
production system came into effect in the 1970s, these conceptions enabled the 
incumbents, who were the major distribution companies, to retain their power and 
dominance over other film companies in the market. Since the major film 
companies had forged alliances with the exhibitors and built their theatre chains, 
most of the screens in the market were occupied by the local movies produced and 
distributed by the "majors". With fewer screens available to foreign movies, the 
box-office returns of imported films dived sharply, whereas local movies achieved 
commercial success which signified the "bloom" in the Hong Kong film industry 
throughout the 1980s. 
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Chapter 4 
The “Twilig[it”43 since the mid-1990s 
WHAT HAPPENED DURING THE 1990s? 
While the previous chapter has presented an exposition of the "bloom" as the 
backdrop to the market transformation later discussed, this chapter focuses on the 
downturn, or the "twilight", of the Hong Kong film industry since the mid-1990s. 
This "twilight" was set off in 1993, the year when the local film outputs reached an 
all-time high of 186 (Table 4.1). In subsequent years, howeyer, the industry 
experienced a downward spiral in both its film outputs and box-office grosses. The 
number of movies produced and released in Hong Kong plunged from 143 in 1994 
to 108 in 1996, and slumped steadily to 85 in 1998 (Table 4.1). During the same 
period, the box-office receipts of local movies recorded a two-fold drop，to 973.5 
million HK dollars in 1994 and a further dip down to 423.9 million in 1998 (Table 
4.1). As it became enfeebled, the Hong Kong film industry ceded its home market 
share to foreign movies. The number of films imported to Hong Kong climbed 
from 318 to 370 between 1994 and 1998, and their box-office grosses surged by 44.2 
per cent from 449.2 million HK dollars to 647.8 million (Table 4.1). The situation 
has persisted for over a decade since the mid-1990s. In view of this, some film 
critics and commentators, and even industry insiders, claim the Hong Kong cinema 
to be a "sunset" industry (Yip 1999; Chan 2006), or even deem the industry to be 
dead (see Stephanie Chung 2007: 39; Lee 2006b: 265). 
"Twilight" is a movie about romance and fantasy. It was directed by Catherine Hardwicke and 
released by Summit Entertainment in 2008. The film is based on a novel written by Stephenie 
Meyer. This study borrows the title of the movie to describe the decline of the Hong Kong film 
industry since the mid-1990s. 
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Table 4.1 Screening and Box-office Grosses of Local Movies and 
Imported Films in Hong Kong, 1987-1998 
Local Movies Imported Films 
Number of H ^ Number o f H ^ 
Year Movies (in million) Films (in million) 
1987 76 777.3 290 331.3 
1988 115 1024.8 234 270.5 
1989 116 878.6 351 376.8 
1990 120 939.2 222 373.3 
1991 135 1038.5 384 338.3 
1992 176 1240.2 294 333.2 
1993 186 1146.1 273 434,3 
1994 143 973.5 318 449.2 
1995 143 785.3 337 571.8 
1996 108 686.4 312 636.7 
1997 86 547.5 383 617.0 
1998 85 423.9 370 647.8 
Sources: Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong 
Motion Picture Industry Association Limited, 
various years. 
The Plot in Brief 
In giving an overview of the downfall of the Hong Kong film industry since 
1993, this chapter will resolve the following puzzles: why the film outputs and 
box-office receipts of Hong Kong movies have fallen from their peak since 1993; 
why the major film companies in Hong Kong failed to retain their power and 
dominance over the film market in the 1990s; how the commodity chain of Hong 
Kong movies was restructured during the late 1990s; and how the restructuring has 
impacted on the Hong Kong film industry throughout the 2000s. 
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This chapter falls into three sections. The first section pinpoints that the key to 
success of the industry throughout the 1980s had grown to be a source of stress in 
the 1990s. This is because the two conventional practices inscribed in the 
"conceptions of control" on the distributor-driven commodity chain had turned into 
an endogenous factor that impaired the major film companies from responding 
effectively when an exogenous shock arrived in Hong Kong during the late 1980s. 
This exogenous shock stemmed from the influx of capital from Taiwan after the 
liberalization of China's film market since the late 1970s along with the lifting of 
martial law in Taiwan in 1987. 
The capital flooding in from Taiwan forged an "industrial complex" among the 
PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. This induced an exogenous shock to Hong Kong 
after a new major film company, Newport, which banked heavily on Taiwan capital, 
was set up in 1988. As the owner of Newport was a theatre owner whose cinemas 
‘ 1 
were formerly allied with the pre-existing major film companies, the establishment 
of Newport entailed the wresting of a considerable number of theatres from the 
"majors". Each theatre chain in the market was henceforth comprised of fewer 
theatres than before. Not only did the rise of Newport cut into the income stream of 
the pre-existing "majors", but also the restructuring of theatre chains that followed 
on revealed the deficiency of the two conventional practices in the distributor-led 
production and exhibition system, a system which, as shown in the previous chapter, 
promoted a rampant growth of the industry during the 1970s and the 1980s. These 
practices were the exclusive exhibition practice and the entwined financial practice 
of the filmmakers. 
So long as the "majors" followed an exclusive exhibition practice, they still had 
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to produce a large number of movies to fill up their theatre chains. With fewer 
theatres under their control, however, the "majors'" income stream was trimmed. 
The theatrical receipts received by the "majors", therefore, were hardly sufficient to 
recoup the cost of their film productions. As film production was no longer a 
lucrative investment, the owners of some major film companies began to question 
the entwined financial practice of the filmmakers. They found such practice could 
no longer protect the interests of the investors. For this reason, the owners of two 
major film companies, D&B and Golden Princess (GP), wound up their business in 
late 1992 and 1996 respectively. This provides clues to why the key to the 
industry's success became a source of stress in the 1990s. 
The second section documents a reversal of fortune in 1993. In 1992 and 1993, 
the box-office receipts and output of Hong Kong movies experienced a freefall from 
their peak. The downfall was directly caused by the closure of many traditional 
theatres during the 1990s owing to the rising land price in Hong Kong, and the 
withdrawal of hot money from Taiwan after 1993 which resulted in the slashing 
of capital investment in many Hong Kong film projects. Since the early 1990s, the 
soaring land price had driven many theatre owners to redevelop their properties for 
alternative uses. This reduced the theatrical possessions of the "newcomers" who 
succeeded D&B and GP, and the major film companies that remained. As there 
were fewer theatres in the market for the "majors" to co-opt, in which an "exclusive 
deal’，could apply, the "majors" could not achieve the economy of scale necessary for 
cost recovery. In this situation, none of these "newcomers" could survive for more 
than a decade. “ 
Added to this, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of 
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China (Taiwan) shifted their policies for their film industries around 1994, the capital 
inflow from Taiwan to the Hong Kong film market subsided. Investment in many 
film projects in Hong Kong, particularly those from Newport which were heavily 
financed by Taiwan capital, dried up. While Newport was an active supplier of 
Hong Kong movies in the early 1990s，the withdrawal of Taiwan capital dragged 
down the film outputs of the company. The diminution in capital, together with the 
shrinking theatrical possessions noted earlier, compelled the company to curtail its 
investment in the impending film projects. Hence, the total film outputs in Hong 
Kong fell precipitously after 1993. 
Although Golden Harvest (GH) the last and the only "major", which started 
its film business with its satellite production houses and its theatre chain yet could 
still manage to survive did not bank on Taiwan capital, the company rearranged 
its core business during the late 1990s from local film production to exhibition and 
distribution of foreign movies. From the early 2000s, GH ceased investing in film 
production. The company made this adjustment largely because its theatrical 
possession was not large enough to achieve the economy of scale needed for cost 
recovery once some Cineplex exhibitors, such as Broadway and UA, have grabbed a 
lion's share of the cinemas in Hong Kong since the late 1990s. In this case, the 
company converted its theatre chain into Cineplex-cinema circuit, and began to 
screen the movies released by any film companies. The distributor-led independent 
production system, the dominant production model of Hong Kong movies 
throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, thus came to a halt in the early 2000s. 
While the distributor-led production system crumbled, the exhibition sectors of 
the Hong Kong film market underwent a transformation. This transformation will 
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be described in the third section. As the soaring land price drove many traditional 
theatre chains to vanish throughout the 1990s, Cineplex cinemas mushroomed 
concurrently in Hong Kong. The replacement of traditional theatres with Cineplex 
cinemas resulted in a fall in the income stream of the "majors" since their theatre 
chains were comprised of traditional theatres. As these "majors" grew weaker, the 
challengers had a chance to construct a new set of "conceptions of control" to 
overthrow the production and exhibition system that was formerly driven by the 
distributors of Hong Kong movies. 
These challengers were the distributors of foreign movies. They allied with 
the Cineplex exhibitors in Hong Kong. Such alliances freed the Cineplex 
exhibitors from the "exclusive deals" imposed by the local production and 
distribution companies in return for a supply of movies. As Cineplex cinemas 
rapidly expanded and gradually replaced the traditional theatres in Hong Kong from 
the 1990s, the alliances between the distributors of foreign movies and the Cineplex 
exhibitors enabled imported films to fill the market niche that was previously 
occupied by Hong Kong movies. 
Since the "exclusive deals" between the distributors of local movies and the 
exhibitors are no longer applicable, the Cineplex exhibitors reclaimed the "booking 
rights" to control the exhibition blocks from the major distributors of local movies. 
Henceforth, film exhibition in Hong Kong is not driven by the major distributors of 
local movies. Instead, the Cineplex exhibitors gained control over the income 
stream of other film companies in the market. As the distributor-led exhibition • 
system a dominant exhibition model in the Hong Kong film market throughout 
the 1970s and the 1980s was abolished, a new "conception of control" inscribed 
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in an exhibitor-driven commodity chain was put into effect. 
Under the new "conceptions of control", the Cineplex exhibitors who control 
the "booking rights" can reserve favorable exhibition blocks for the imported films 
distributed by their allies, whereas the production companies of Hong Kong movies 
no longer benefit from the block-booking preferential treatment offered by the 
exhibitors. This led to a shift in the production model of Hong Kong movies. 
Companies that embark on local film production switched their key exhibition 
channel from theatrical screening to retail in ancillary markets. Without secured 
favorable exhibition blocks in theatrical release, however, the box-office 
performance of the movies released by these companies was stunted. This affected 
their retail deals in the ancillary markets and, in turn, reduced their revenue. As a 
result, these companies curtailed their investment in their subsequent film projects 
and hence, the total film outputs in Hong Kong dropped considerably over the 2000s. 
With fewer local movies released, imported films have come to dominate the Hong 
Kong box office since 1997 as the "twilight" fell on the Hong Kong film industry. 
THE KEY TO SUCCESS TURNS INTO A SOURCE OF STRESS 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the supply chain of film products in Hong 
Kong throughout the 1970s and the 1980s was driven by the major distributors. 
The distributor-led production and exhibition system enabled the Hong Kong film 
industry to outperform the imported films in its domestic market in the 1980s. 
Nonetheless, two conventional practices derived from such production model; • 
namely, the entwined financial practice and the exclusive exhibition practice, had 
ironically undermined the major distributors since the early 1990s. Although these 
- 9 7 -
practices can be construed as the endogenous factors in the industry's downfall, they 
were not a threat to the "majors" during the 1970s and the 1980s until an exogenous 
shock came around the late 1980s. The following section will depict the entwined 
financial practice and the exclusive exhibition practice. Why these practices did 
not impair the "majors" but, quite the contrary, enabled them to wield their power 
over the market before the exogenous shock appeared will also be discussed. 
The distributor-led independent production system was shown in the foregoing 
chapter to be first adopted by Golden Harvest (GH) in Hong Kong during the early 
1970s. To survive in the political struggle with Shaw Brothers (SB), Raymond 
Chow of GH used his "social skills" to draw into his camp quite a number of 
renowned film directors and actors who were reluctant to be bound by the studio 
system at SB. Not only did GH subsidize many of these directors and actors to set 
up their own production companies and invest in the movies they made, but it also 
operated its own theatre chain by distributing and exhibiting the movies its satellite 
companies produced. Since GH, like the other major distributors, controlled the 
supply of local movies, the company snatched the "booking rights" to control the 
exhibition blocks denoting how often and how long a movie will be put on 
screen in its allied theatres. This is known as the distributor-led production and 
exhibition system. 
In the 1980s, film companies, such as Golden Princess and D&B, which were 
then new entrants to field, followed this system too. These companies set up their 
satellite production houses and screened the movies produced by their "satellites" in • 
their theatre chains. As these companies adopted a vertically-integrated mode of 
production, the films they released, mainly Hong Kong movies even though some of 
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them distributed foreign movies as well, occupied most of the screens available in 
the market. Since there were fewer theatres in the market that screened foreign 
movies, the box-office receipts of imported films dived sharply whereas local movies 
achieved commercial success in the 1980s. This signified the "blooming" of the 
Hong Kong film industry. 
Conventional Practices inscribed in the "Conceptions of Control” 
Although the distributor-led production and exhibition system had brought the 
early success of Hong Kong cinema, two conventional practices inscribed in the 
"conceptions of control" under the system had grown to become an endogenous 
factor in the industry's downfall during the early 1990s. They were the entwined 
financial practice and the exclusive exhibition practice. 
The Entwined Financial Practice 
The entwined financial practice denotes that the financing of different film 
projects was bundled together in the sense that the money received from one film 
project would often be used to fuel other film projects. This practice was widely 
adopted in the industry because the film investors, most of whom were the owners of 
the major film companies in the 1970s and the 1980s，used to follow the 
"conceptions of control" of the independent production system initiated by GH. As 
such, the bosses of the "majors" had bestowed a high degree of autonomy on the 
independent directors. These directors could thus wield the power over the film 
projects as long as they could convince the investors to shell out (Liu 2000: 72). * 
In Curtin's (2007) interview conducted with Wellington Fung, now the 
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Secretary-General of the Hong Kong Film Development Council, Fung recalled how 
a film project was implemented in Cinema City (新藝城)，an independent production 
company under Golden Princess. He noted that film directors'^ '* would initiate the 
project by "drawing up a proposal and a budget for presentation to a Hong Kong 
theatre circuit owner [who might also be the major distributors since most theatre 
chains in Hong Kong were integrated with the major distribution companies in the 
1980s], who would be asked to provide a cash advance" (p.62). Once the first cash 
payment was locked in, the director would negotiate with overseas distributors for 
pre-sales of the film. If the directors could raise sufficient funds for the project, 
they would hire scriptwriters, scout for a cast, and start to shoot the movie. 
However, if the finance fell short, they would start another film project "in hopes of 
generating enough cash to pay off the current [and also the preceding] film [projects] 
and to get the next project under way" (ibid.: 63). 
Handling film projects in this way jumbled the financing of several projects 
together. Sam Ho, a film critic, describes the situation as trying to cover ten bottles 
with only nine caps. To keep "shuffling the caps [so as] to keep all the bottles 
covered as much as possible", filmmakers need to "keep coming up with new 
projects just to pay off the last one" (Curtin 2007: 64). If any one of the projects 
lacks financial resources to complete the production, the directors may not have the 
money to fiiel the impending film projects. Since the financing of one project is 
entwined with others, the risk of "dystocia" is accumulated along a group of film 
projects. To put it plainly, any "rupture" to the stream of finance of a single, or a 
few, film project(s) is likely to cause a "chain reaction" that may affect the • 
44 Film directors in Hong Kong typically take up the duties of the producers in Hollywood. They 
are the one who create a screenplay, employ scriptwriters, and approach potential investors (see 
Cheung 1998: 41,49-52, 59-62). 
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completion of many other projects. 
The Exclusive Exhibition Practice 
Even though the entwined financial practice is extremely risky, it was not a 
threat to the major film companies throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. This is 
because each of the "majors" at the time controlled a large number of theatres to 
form their own theatre chain. This provided them with abundant profits to cover 
the production cost of their film projects. 
In the operation of their theatre chains, the "majors" constructed a set of 
"conceptions of control" which brought about an exclusive exhibition practice in the 
market. As noted in the previous chapter, the Hong Kong film market followed a 
distributor-led exhibition system throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. The major 
distributors geared their distribution arm to the exhibition arena. Before the 
Cineplex cinemas became popular in Hong Kong during the 1990s, the "majors" 
could take advantage of the setting of traditional theatres. 
Since only one to two screens were typically installed in each of the traditional 
theatres, exhibitors could hardly screen a variety of movies at each turn. The major 
distributors could thus dominate all exhibition blocks of a single theatre by offering 
just two to three copies of movies in a given period. They requested the exhibitors 
who were scouting for movies to sign an exhibition contract. The contract 
resembles an "exclusive deal". Once it was signed, not only did the distributors 
acquire the "booking rights"'*^ to control the exhibition blocks, but they also forbade • 
45 The "booking rights" to control the exhibition blocks refer to the rights to control when and for 
how long a movie will be put on screen. 
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the exhibitors to shop freely among other distributors for movies to screen. In this 
respect, the theatres could screen only the movies released by the "major" they 
belonged. 
While there were only three "majors" in the mid-1980s, and they accounted for 
a significant share of theatres in Hong Kong (see Table 3.5 in Chapter 3), the 
exclusive exhibition practice enabled the "majors" to generate sufficient returns from 
the box office to recoup the cost of their film productions. Hence, the entwined 
financial practice was not a problem for the "majors" in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
What caused a Turn in the late 1980s? 
The entwined financial practice and the exclusive exhibition practice did not 
imperil the "majors" until an exogenous shock occurred as will be discussed in the 
following sections. This exogenous shock was triggered by a shift in the policies of 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) for their 
film industries during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The PRC government 
gradually liberalized its film market from the early 1980s while the Taiwan 
government lifted its martial law in 1987. These set off a "meteor shower" of an 
influx of capital from Taiwan to the Hong Kong film market. 
The "Meteor Shower” of Taiwan Capital 
For several decades before the mid-1990s, the Taiwan film market was a major 
offshore outlet for Hong Kong movies (Liang 1998). It was also one of the most • 
important sources of pre-sale financing for the Hong Kong film industry in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s (Curtin 2003b: 244). During this period, film investors 
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from Taiwan poured their capital into the Hong Kong film market in droves. This 
gave rise to a "meteor shower"'* '^ of capital movement from Taiwan to Hong Kong. 
Lee (1994) ascribes this rapid flow of Taiwan capital to Hong Kong to be a 
consequence of the ailing box-office performance of Taiwan movies in the 
mid-1980s. When film production in Taiwan fell around 1986 (ibid.: 22), many 
filmmakers became underemployed and left the industry. Some of them, notes Lee, 
switched to "television, advertising, interior design, education, the food service 
industry or emigrated overseas" (ibid.: 22). Many film investors, most of whom 
were formerly the distributors and exhibitors of Taiwan movies, moved their capital 
to Hong Kong. As a result of this capital influx, the movies produced by Hong 
Kong film companies would be shown in both the Hong Kong and Taiwan film 
markets. 
Nonetheless, the capital inflow from Taiwan to Hong Kong during the early 
1990s would not have occurred but for the lifting of martial law in the late 1980s. 
Before the Taiwan government lifted the martial law, the movies produced in 
mainland China were prohibited from being released in Taiwan. Although the film 
products from Hong Kong could be exported to Taiwan, these products were 
prohibited from containing any "leftish" content. Filmmakers and the casts who 
participated in the film projects were also required to be the members of the Hong 
Kong and Kowloon Cinema and Theatrical Enterprises Free General Association*" 
(Yu 1993). For instance, the movies produced under the name of "Sil-Metropole" 
46 The capital influx from Taiwan was analogous to a "meteor shower" because it was a huge amount 
of hot money that arrived and left the Hong Kong film market all of a sudden. In 1989，a flock of 
Taiwan investors penetrated into the Hong Kong film industry, yet in less than four years they had ‘ 
mostly withdrawn their investments. 
47 The Hong Kong and Kowloon Cinema and Theatrical Enterprises Free General Association (香港 
九龍影劇自由總會） i s a quasi-state agent appointed by the Taiwan government to purge any "leftish" 
value from imported film products (Stokes and Hoover 1999: 21; Yu 1993). 
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(銀都)，a "left-leaning" film company incorporated from Great Wall (長城)，Feng 
Huang (MM), and Xin Lian (新耳節)in 1982，were almost never approved by the 
Association, and hence could not be screened or released in Taiwan (Liang 1998: 
138-139). Film companies, like Bang Bang Film Productions (繽繽電影公司)，and 
filmmakers, such as Li Han-hsiang (李翰祥)，Ann Hui (許鞍華)，and Zhang Che (張 
徹)，who had commercial deals with Sil-Metropole were also blacklisted by the 
Association. The movies in which they involved were thereupon prohibited from 
being imported into the Taiwan film market unless they agreed to sever their ties 
with Sil-Metropole and other "left-leaning" film companies (ibid: 139). 
With the lifting of martial law in 1987, however, the Taiwan government 
permitted media professionals, including filmmakers, to make movies as well as 
television programs in the PRC (Hong and Sun 1999: 536). Movies containing 
"China content" could be screened in Taiwan provided that they were not funded by 
capital from the PRC, and no major role was performed by actors from mainland 
China (Liang 1998: 216). These measures hastened the flow of capital from film 
investors in Taiwan to the PRC via Hong Kong. Since Taiwan filmmakers have 
been allowed to make movies in China, many production personnel from Taiwan 
joined forces with those in Hong Kong, and together they co-produced movies in the 
PRC (ibid.: 217). 
China's Cinematic Reform 
Equally important in contributing to the influx of capital investment from 
Taiwan to Hong Kong was the re-opening of mainland China in the late 1970s. In ‘ 
the early 1950s, the Ministry of Culture of the PRC government nationalized all 
private film production activities. A state-directed distribution system of film 
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products was established to centralize the release of movies in China. In 1979, the 
PRC concluded its "isolated tumult" of the Cultural Revolution (Lee 1994: 25). 
Thereafter, the Chinese government adopted an open-door policy and gradually 
liberalized its film market. With the enactment of an open-door policy, the China 
Film Co-production Corporation (CFCC) was founded in 1979 as a quasi-state agent 
to coordinate the co-production of motion pictures between the film companies in 
China and in other countries. This opened the gate for foreign film companies to 
enter the China film market. 
Since the re-opening of China's film market in 1979，foreign film companies 
have been allowed to build co-production partnerships with the film companies in 
China. However, all co-production projects ought to follow the "Regulations on 
Administration of the Film Industry" and the "Rules on Administration of the 
Chinese-Foreign Film Co-production" issued by the State Administration of Radio, 
Film, and Television (SARFT), a state agent. While the SARFT required all 
foreign film companies who seek to establish co-production partnership to apply for 
approvals and permits, the CFCC was commissioned by the SARFT to handle these 
applications, to issue the "entry visas for foreign crews for co-productions", and to 
perform "customs clearance for filming facilities, equipment and materials to be used 
in co-production" (China Film Co-production Corporation 2007). 
With the establishment of CFCC, foreign film companies including those from 
Hong Kong and Taiwan have been allowed to shoot movies in the PRC. These 
movies would be released not only in Hong Kong and Taiwan but could also be • 
screened in the PRC if they passed through SARFT's censorship. As film studios 
in the PRC could sell the "production rights" in the name of "a management fee in 
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the co-production project" to overseas film companies, the movies produced by 
foreign companies that held the "production rights" would be treated as a local China 
movie, and thereby could be distributed and exhibited in the PRC with no tariff and 
quota restriction. In these circumstances, from 1981 to 1994, there were almost 200 
thousand "overseas investment projects [between film companies in China and 
foreign countries]" in which around 2,660 million US dollars was invested (Cheuk 
1994: 135). While most of these investment projects were co-productions between 
film companies in China and Hong Kong (iFilm Connections 2010), many of these 
Hong Kong film companies were funded by overseas investors, .mainly from Taiwan 
(Liang 1998). 
The Resultant Cross-Strait "Industrial Complex” 
The liberalization of China's film market, together with the lifting of martial 
law in Taiwan, led to flocks of film investors pouring their capital into the Hong 
Kong film market in the late 1980s. With film companies gradually redeploying 
their capital and headquarters from Taiwan to Hong Kong, and then to the PRC, the 
resulting convergence of Taiwan's cinema with those of Hong Kong and mainland 
China has been described by Lee (1994) as an "industrial complex". This complex 
comprised the capital and the film personnel from Taiwan and Hong Kong, and the 
sites or locations in and the manpower for film production from the PRC (ibid.: 23). 
In this "industrial complex", Hong Kong acted as a "stepping stone" for Taiwan 
film investors who were eager to take advantage of the co-production partnership 
with film companies in the PRC. These investors followed a "pre-sale system" to • 
acquire the rights to screen the movies that were to be produced by the film 
companies in Hong Kong. Indeed, the acquisition was typically completed before 
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the movies were actually produced (Hong Kong Film Archive 1997: 69). 
Following this "pre-sale system", most production houses in Hong Kong banked on 
the support from the film companies in Taiwan during the early 1990s (Liang 1998). 
For instance, although Cinema City (新藝城）was a satellite production company of 
Golden Princess (GP), many of its productions were financed by Long Shong (育I祥)， 
a film distributor in Taiwan (ibid.: 124). Another Taiwan film distribution company, 
Scholar (學者)，had also invested in the movies produced by Win's Movie 
Production Company (永盛）in Hong Kong. Several other film companies in 
Taiwan, such as New Ship (新船)，Hua Liang (樺棵)，Feng Ming (鳳鳴)，Chang 
Hong (長宏)，and Upland Films Co. Ltd.(新峰)，also funded many film production 
companies in Hong Kong (ibid.: 125). 
Not only did these investors purchase the rights to screen the "unfinished" film 
products from Hong Kong film companies, but they also set up production 
companies in Hong Kong. One of these was Tomson Films Co., Ltd.(湯臣)• The 
company was established in 1984 by a renowned Taiwan film actress, Hsu Feng. It 
produced twenty-six movies and received numerous awards (Tomson Films Co., Ltd. 
2009). For example, Farewell to my Concubine (霸王別女15) was a movie 
co-produced by Tomson (Hong Kong) Films Co., Ltd and the Beijing Film Studio in 
1993. The movie was directed by Chen Kaige, and awarded the "Palme D'or" at 
the 46th Cannes Film Festival in 1993. 
Like Farewell to my Concubine, quite a large number of Hong Kong movies 
featuring Mainland scenes was released in Hong Kong and in Taiwan during the late 
1980s and the early 1990s (Yu 1993: 63). Many of these movies received 
worldwide acclaim. For instance, Raise the Red Lantern (大紅燈籠高高掛)， 
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directed by Zhang Yimou, received the Silver Lion award for Best Director at Venice 
International Film Festival in 1991. The movie was produced in China by Era 
International (Hong Kong) Ltd.(年代國際香港有限公司)，a production company in 
Hong Kong which was funded by Taiwan capital. On the whole, as Leung and 
Chan (1997) note, based on a newspaper article credited to John Dykes in 1993, that 
about one-third of the budgets for Hong Kong movies in the early 1990s came from 
Taiwan investors (p. 146). 
The Exogenous Shock Induced 
Although the influx of Taiwan capital seemed to nourish the film companies in 
Hong Kong, it actually injected an exogenous shock to the Hong Kong film market. 
This shock arrived when Newport a new major film company was set up in 
1988, with the support of Taiwan capital, by a Hong Kong theatre owner whose 
cinemas were formerly allied with the preceding "majors". The emergence of 
Newport resulted in a restructuring of the exhibition sectors during the late 1980s. 
This reduced the number of theatres controlled by each of the "majors" in the market. 
With fewer theatres under their control, the box-office receipts which the "majors" 
could earn from their theatre chains shrank sharply. As the revenue for the 
"majors" began to shrivel, two major film companies closed down by the mid-1990s. 
Before the "meteor shower" from Taiwan capital in the late 1980s, there were 
only three " m a j o r s ” i n Hong Kong, namely Golden Harvest (GH), Golden 
48 This does not include Sil-Metropole (銀都)，a "left-leaning" film company incorporated from 
Great Wall (長城)’ Feng Huang (鳳凰)，and Xin Lian (新聯）in 1982. Although Sil-Metropole 
possessed a film studio and a theatre chain, its influence on the Hong Kong film industry since the 
1980s is often underrated in existing literature. One possible reason is that the market share of 
Sil-Metropole is relatively small in comparison with the major film companies throughout the 1980s 
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Princess (GP), and D&B. These "majors" had their own theatre chains, and they 
controlled around two-fifths of the theatres in the market during the mid-1980s (see 
Table 3.5 in Chapter 3). However, the capital inflow from Taiwan gave birth to the 
fourth major film company, Newport, in 1988. It served as a "middleman" between 
foreign investors, mainly from Taiwan, and the independent production companies in 
Hong Kong (Lam 2007: 60). Overseas investors wanting to invest in Hong Kong 
movies might pass their money to Newport. The company would then lend money 
to the independent production companies. 
Newport's presence had magnetized a flock of independent production 
companies that were once the satellites of other "majors" (Ma 2000: 115). For 
instance, the films produced by Hui's Film Production Co., Ltd (許氏/多 were no 
longer screened primarily in the theatre chains of Golden Harvest and Golden 
Princess but now also in the Newport theatre chain (ibid.: 115). Samo Hung 
Kam-bo, who was under the umbrella of Golden Harvest and later joined D&B, set 
up another film production company, Bojon Films Co. Ltd (寶祥 ) . T h e movies 
made under Bojon were shown on the screens of Newport's theatre chain (Cheung 
� 1988:4-5). 
According to the Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry Association (MPIA), the 
number of newly-registered film production companies climbed to 170 in 1990 
and the 1990s. 
49 Hui's Film Production Co., Ltd (許氏 ) w a s set up by Michael Hui, a renowned comedic actor and 
director. Hui was formerly a famous comedic actor in TVB, the television station of Shaw Brothers.. 
In the mid-1970s, Hui moved to Golden Harvest when Raymond Chow agreed to set him up as an 
independent producer, and granted him and his brothers the autonomy and the resources to make 
movies. When Golden Princess was established in 1980，not only did Hui's Film Production Co., 
Ltd produce movies for Golden Harvest, but it also put its films on the screens of Golden Princess' 
theatre chain. 
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although most of them were "one-picture companies" (Leung and Chan 1997: 147). 
Law (1994) finds that most of these companies were in fact funded by Taiwan 
investors or were the subsidiaries of film companies in Taiwan. The movies made 
by these production houses were shown in Newport's theatre chain (ibid.: 90). 
Box-office revenue was shared among the foreign investors, Newport, and the 
companies that produced the movies. 
Reduction of Theatres in each Theatre Chain and its Impact 
Although the Newport theatre chain became a new "outlet" for local production 
houses to release their movies, its emergence upset the commodity chain of the 
existing "majors". Newport was set up by Chan Wing-mei, a theatre owner whose 
cinemas were had been allied with the three "majors" since the 1980s (Stephanie 
Chung 2007: 297,330). When Chan established his theatre chain in 1988, he 
wrested several theatres from the existing "majors". Six of the twenty theatres in 
Newport's theatre chain were formerly allied with D&B，four were tied-up with 
Golden Princess (GP), and three with Golden Harvest (GH) (Chan 1988b: 4). After 
Newport's theatre chain set sail, therefore, the number of theatres under the control 
of the three "majors" plummeted. 
The establishment of Newport's theatre chain touched off an exogenous shock 
to the Hong Kong film market. The shock triggered off a restructuring in the 
exhibition sectors. Golden Princess (GP) was the most seriously affected. The 
number of theatres allied with GP dropped twenty-six-percent after Newport came in 
the scene in 1988, The number of theatres allied exclusively with GP dropped from 
23 to 17 between 1987 and 1988 (Table 4.2). D&B faced a similar challenge too. 
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There were eighteen theatres controlled fully by D&B in 1987 but the number was 
reduced to sixteen in 1988 (Table 4.2). Although Golden Harvest (GH) still had 
about twenty theatres in the late 1980s, the number had dipped to twelve in 1993 
(Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 Theatres Allied Exclusively with Golden Harvest, Golden Princess, 
D&B, and Newport, 1987-1996 
Year Golden Harvest Golden Princess D&B Newport 
1987 22 23 18 -
1988 18 17 16 19 
1989 20 20 17 20 
1990 17 17 17 19 
1991 15 18 19 12 
1992 14 12 - 17 
1993 12 - 18 
1994 9 - - 18 
1995 8 - - 16 
1996 7 - - 14 
Sources: Tabulations from cinematic advertisements in Singtao daily and Mingpao 
daily, 1987-1996. 
Since theatrical screening, as the first window of exhibition, is always the key 
conduit of profit returns, the cutback of the "majors'" theatrical possession resulted 
in a sharp slump to their revenue. Before Newport was established, there were at 
least twenty theatres screening exclusively each of the yearly blockbusters of GH, 
OP, and D&B in 1987 (Table 4.3). After Newport joined the competition, however, 
only GH still had over twenty theatres for the screening of its blockbuster while the 
yearly blockbusters of GP and D&B were shown in only eighteen and fifteen theatres 
respectively (Table 4.3). As a result, while the blockbusters of the three "majors" 
earned 64, 56.2, and 49 million HK dollars at constant 1997 prices from the box 
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office in 1987, the theatrical receipts of their blockbusters had drifted down in 1991 
to 47.5, 40.6, and 16.4 million at constant prices (Table 4.3). 
I 
Table 4.3 Theatres Screening Exclusively, and Box-office Grosses of, the Yearly 
Blockbusters of Golden Harvest, Golden Princess, and D&B in 1987 
and 1991 
Golden Harvest Golden Princess D&B 
Theatres Box office Theatres Box office Theatres Box office 
Allied At constant Allied At constant Allied At constant 
Exclusively 1997 prices # Exclusively 1997 pices # Exclusively 1997 prices # 
Year (in million HK$) (in million HK$) (in million HK$) 
1987 25 64.0 20 56.2 • 23 49.0 
1991 23 Al^ ^ ^ ^ 16.4 
Note: # Figures are weighted by the ticket price in each corresponding year, and 
are at constant 1997 prices. 
Sources: Tabulations from cinematic advertisements in Singtao daily and Mingpao 
daily in 1987 and 1991; Chan (2000); Hong Kong Motion Picture 
Industry Association Limited, various years. 
The theatrical receipts of the three preceding "majors" thus diminished after the 
emergence of Newport in 1988. While GH, GP, and D&B reaped 534, 348，and 
206 million HK dollars from the box office in 1987 respectively, their revenue 
slumped by 16.7 per cent, 33 per cent, and 19.7 per cent respectively to 445，233, 
and 165 million at constant prices in 1988 (Table 4.4). Before Newport's entry, GH 
had 26.71 per cent of the market share, followed by GP (17.41%), and D&B 
(10.28%). After Newport entered the market, however, the market share of GH 
plunged to 21.64 per cent, while GP's and D&B’s market shares shrank to 11.36 per 
cent and 8.03 per cent respectively (Table 4.4). In the subsequent years, the 
theatrical receipts as well as the market share of the three "majors" continued to fall 
significantly. In 1991, the revenue for these "majors" was just slightly over half of 
what they earned in 1987 (Table 4.4). 
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Table 4.4 Theatrical Receipts and Market Share of Golden Harvest, Golden 
Princess, and D&B, 1987-1996 
Golden Harvest Golden Princess D&B 
At Constant Market At Constant Market At Constant Market 
1997 Prices Share 1997 Prices Share 1997 Prices Share 
Year (in million HK$) % # (in miUion HK$) % # (in million HK$) % # 
1987 534.4 26.71 348.4 17.41 205.7 10.28 
1988 444.7 21.64 233.4 11.36 165.1 8.03 
1989 272.1 14.81 177.9 9.68 152.9 8.33 
1990 302.5 16.81 252.0 14.00 218.0 12.12 
1991 278.9 16.65 207.7 12.40 . 123.0 7.34 
1992 286.2 16.63 283.0 16.44 12.0 0.70 
1993 203.6 12.67 11.4 0.71 - -
1994 229.6 18.55 32.2 2.60 - -
1995 130.3 11.96 19.9 1.83 - -
1996 191.2 19.86 - - -
Notes: The company's theatrical receipts are weighted by the ticket price in each 
corresponding year, and are at constant 1997 prices. 
# The company's share in total box-office grosses of both local movies 
and imported films. 
Sources: Chan (2000); Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion 
Picture Industry Association Limited, various years. 
The Consequence of Exclusive Exhibition Practice 
Given the much reduced profit gained from theatrical receipts, maintaining the 
operation of theatre chains entailed a strenuous effort by the "majors", especially 
under the exclusive exhibition practice they had adopted. Following an exclusive 
exhibition practice, the "majors" rarely screened the movies released by their rivals. 
As the exclusive exhibition practice was entrenched in the "conceptions of control" 
and institutionalized in the industry, the "majors" clung to this practice even when 
their theatre chains comprised fewer theatres than before. In this vein, when 
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Newport snatched some of their theatres, these "majors" still had to produce or 
release a certain number of movies in order to fill up the exhibition blocks of their 
theatre chains. 
However, once Newport wrested control of some of their theatres from the late 
1980s, the "majors'" conduits for profit return were reduced (see Table 4.2). With 
fewer theatres, the box-office grosses earned by the "majors" could hardly recoup 
the cost of their film productions. In this situation, the exclusive exhibition practice 
now encumbered the "majors" with the enormous operational cost of their theatre 
chains. Two of the four "majors" at that time, D&B and Golden Princess (GP), 
could not afford the cost of maintaining a certain volume of movies for their theatre 
chains. As a result, D&B closed down at the end of 1992, and the owners of GP 
wound up their theatre chain in 1993 and ceased investing in film production. In 
the subsequent years, GP distributed only three movies before it shut down 
completely in 1996. 
The Consequence of Entwined Financial Practice 
The exclusive exhibition practice burdened the "majors" with a huge 
operational cost, and the abrupt exit of D&B and GP can be attributed to the situation 
that the "majors" could no longer make sufficient returns from the box office to 
recoup their investment in film production during the early 1990s. Given this 
situation, some of their owners became frustrated with the entwined financial 
practice^" of the filmmakers. • 
As noted earlier, the financing of different film projects was often entwined. This resembles a 
situation in which the film directors were trying to cover ten bottles with only nine caps (Curtin 2007: 
64). 
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When the film business became less lucrative from the early 1990s, the owners 
of D&B and GP reftised to brook the entwined financial practice of the filmmakers. 
One possible reason for their intolerance was that these owners lacked much film 
industry expertise and hence, they found the entwined financial practice 
unacceptable when they controlled an insufficient number of theatres which 
precluded them from recouping their investment. Moreover, they brought in their 
own business perspectives based on their prior success in running other kinds of 
businesses. For example, before Dickson Poon set up the D&B Films Company 
Ltd. in 1984，he has already embarked on various trading businesses, including 
jewelries, watches, and wearing apparels. Like Poon, Lawrence Louey the 
founder of Golden Princess did not start his career as a businessman in the film 
trade. Instead, he and his family set up businesses covering a vast range of 
infrastructural projects and public transports, notably The Kowloon Motor Bus Co. 
Ltd. (KMB), in Hong Kong. 
Most veterans in the Hong Kong film industry stress oftentimes that the ways of 
doing business in the film industry are different from those in other industries (Hong 
Kong Economy Yearbook 1997: 41). Thus, the past business experience of these 
new film tycoons might not apply very well to the Hong Kong film market. Poon 
and Louey were in effect "laypersons" with no notion of how the film directors 
handle the film projects (Cheung 1998: 68-69). Although the expertise of these 
magnates was irrelevant to the film industry, they directed their film companies, 
D&B and GP, to follow in the footsteps of GH and the independent production 
system. As such, Poon and Louey relied heavily upon the film directors in their 
film business (Lam 2007: 60). This attests that the distributor-led independent 
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production system, put forward by GH, was turned into the "conceptions of control" 
or a dominant production model in the Hong Kong film market during the 1980s. It 
served also as a "cultural frame" that shaped the strategic moves of other players, 
including the owners of other major film companies who entered the field 
subsequently. This explains why the "latecomers", namely GP and D&B, followed 
on the heels of GH and adopted the distributor-led independent production system 
although they might not be familiar with it. 
Prior to the "meteor shower" and the emergence of Newport, the theatrical 
receipts of the "majors" could still provide the film directors some "caps" to cover 
their "bottles". When the establishment of Newport's theatre chain cut into the 
income stream of the "majors", however, the owners of the "majors" recognized that 
they no longer obtained enough "caps" for the filmmakers to spare. If the 
filmmakers continued to follow the entwined financial practice, the owners of the 
"majors" might suffer huge deficits or even have to go into liquidation. After 
undertaking some evaluations of their business, some of these owners started to 
query the film directors about the ways they manage their film projects, in particular 
their entwined financial practice. 
When some of the owners of the "majors" could not understand nor put up any 
longer with the entwined financial practice of the film directors, they chose to fold 
up their film companies. For instance, after the Louey's family decided to close 
down Golden Princess (GP) in the mid-1990s, an anonymous industry executive told 
Curtin (2007) that the Louey's family made this decision because they "didn't like 
the way that the cinema people were handling their books" (p.64). One Louey's 
family member who was an accountant even stressed that he was very confused by 
- 1 1 6 -
the bookkeeping practice of the filmmakers (ibid.: 64-65). 
In general, as the reduction of theatres in their theatre chains cut into their 
income stream, the abovementioned "majors'" owners became frustrated with "the 
industry's inability to institute transparent practices that might regularize production, 
distribution, and financing" (Curtin 2007: 67). In this case, some of them, like the 
Louey's family, considered their film business to be incapable of protecting the 
interests of the investors anymore. While the core business of the Louey's family 
was "running KMB, ... movies ... weren't that important [for them]" (ibid.: 64-65). 
This applies to the owner of D&B，Dickson Poon, who ran other businesses apart 
from his film company as well. As a result, the Louey's family and Dickson Poon 
folded up their film companies in the 1990s. 
All in all, the emergence of Newport had restructured the theatre chains in the 
market. This pruned the income stream of the preceding "majors", and revealed the 
deficiencies of the exclusive exhibition practice and the entwined financial practice 
in the distributor-led production and exhibition system. Even though this system 
had promoted rampant growth of the industry during the 1970s and the 1980s (see 
Chapter 3), the two conventional practices in the system had impaired the "majors", 
which consequently drove out D&B and Golden Princess. This is how the key to 
success of the industry during the 1970s and 1980s became a source of stress in the 
1990s. 
A REVERSAL OF FORTUNE IN 1993 
In the foregoing section, the closure of Golden Princess (GP) and D&B in the 
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early 1990s was shown to have revealed the deficiencies of the dominant production 
model in the Hong Kong film market. Not only did the rise of Newport reduce the 
income stream of the preceding "majors", but the restructuring of theatre chains that 
subsequently followed also brought to light the philosophy underlying the market, 
that is: under the exclusive exhibition practice, the more theatres film companies 
could control, the more likely they are to earn higher returns from theatrical 
screening, and therefore have a greater chance to survive. This provides clues to 
why the film outputs and box-office revenue for Hong Kong movies have fallen 
sharply since the early 1990s, and why most of the "majors" failed to continue to 
survive. 
In 1992 and 1993, the box-office receipts and output of Hong Kong movies 
experienced a freefall from their peak (Table 4.1). The downfall resulted from two 
direct causes. First, the rising land price in Hong Kong drove a lot of owners to 
close down their traditional theatres during the 1990s. This trimmed the income 
stream of both the "newcomers" who succeeded GP and D&B, and the remaining 
"majors". As a result, the box-office receipts of Hong Kong movies shrank 
markedly. Second, the withdrawal of hot money from Taiwan after 1993 reduced 
the capital investment in many Hong Kong film projects, particularly those from 
Newport. This dragged down the overall output of Hong Kong movies in the early 
1990s. 
To expand on the two causes, this section will first of all identify the 
"newcomers" who took up the exhibition business of D&B and GP. Then, it will 
examine how the soaring land price led to a crumbling of the theatre chains of the 
"newcomers" and the remaining "majors". After that, the ebb tide of Taiwan 
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capital flows and its impact on the Hong Kong film industry will be discussed. 
This is followed by a note on the decline of Golden Harvest (GH), the last and the 
only "major", which started its business with its satellite production houses and its 
theatre chain yet could still manage to survive. As will be shown, even though GH 
carries on its business, it no longer achieves the economy of scale needed for cost 
recovery. Therefore, it rearranged its core business from local film production to 
the distribution of foreign movies. In the early 2000s, GH ceased investing in film 
production. This marked the end of the distributor-led production system in Hong 
Kong. 
The Short-lived "Newcomers" 
Although two of the "majors", D&B and GP, came to a halt by the mid-1990s, 
there were some "newcomers", namely Regal, Mandarin, and Empire, to take the 
place of the past "majors". Nevertheless, none of these "newcomers" survived in 
the Hong Kong film market for more than a decade. As the following sections will 
show, the distributor-led production and exhibition system adopted by the 
"newcomers", as well as the remaining "majors", could no longer sustain the power 
and dominance of the major film companies over the commodity chain. This is 
because the rising land price drove many theatre owners to close down their theatres 
and to redevelop their properties for alternative uses. In this situation, the number 
of theatres with which these "newcomers" as well as those remaining "majors" could 
ally was not large enough to achieve the economy of scale necessary for cost 
recovery. As a result, both Regal and Mandarin which succeeded D&B，s exhibition 
business (Figure 3) could not afford the operational cost of their theatre chains and 
hence, wound up their theatrical business in 1994 and in 1996 respectively. Empire, 
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a sister company of Newport, that took over some theatres from GP (Figure 3) faced 
the same challenge and it shut down in the early 2000s. These events epitomized 
the collapse of the distributor-driven commodity chain in the Hong Kong film 
market. 
When D&B closed down in 1992, Regal took over some of the theatres that 
were previously allied with D&B (Figure 3). Regal was a film company set up by a 
businessman, Steven Lo Kit-sing. The company sought to follow in the trail of the 
former "majors" by forging a vertically-integrated commodity chain in its film 
business. When Raymond Wong, an actor and film director, split with Karl Maka 
and Dean Shek, and left Cinema City (新藝城)，a satellite production company of 
Golden Princess, he set up his own production house, the Mandarin Film Company 
(東方）in 1991. In the next year, Mandarin together with Regal formed the Regal 
Circuit (永高）by renting some of the theatres from D&B. These theatres were de 
facto owned by Shaw Brothers. Nonetheless, the Mandarin Film Company severed 
its ties with the Regal Circuit due to some unsettled disputes between Wong and Lo 
(Chan 1994: 30). In 1993, therefore, Wong divided the Regal Circuit in two and 
founded the Mandarin's theatre chain (Figure 3). 
While the theatre chain of D&B was succeeded by Regal and Mandarin, the 
theatres under Golden Princess (GP) were merged with Newport (Figure 3). When 
GP wound up its theatrical business in 1993，Chan Wing-mei the owner of 
Newport regained some of the theatres from Golden Princess (Chan 1992: 42)， 
and set up the Empire Circuit, another theatre chain apart from the Newport Circuit 
(Figure 3). 
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Figure 3 Compositions of Theatre Chains of Major Film Companies since 
the 1990s 
(5 1988 Newport] 
« ——'子—— Harvest 
^ since 1971 
1991 D&B 27(19) 29(18) 25(12) 18(15) 
1992 Regal 28(19) 19(12) Go Wen 26(17) 28(14) 
— r ~ ~ P r i n c e s s 
I ^ ^ 〒 
1993 28(16) Regal Mandarin 31(14) Empire + Newport 124(18) 31(12) 
1994 11(1) Modern 29(11) 20(18> 28(9) 
1995 16(3) 一1_ 28(8) 20(16) 20(8) 
1996 1 24(7) 21(14) 26(7) 
early 
2000s, ^ (4) (6) 
Notes: Numbers without parentheses are the averaged number of theatres in which 
each major film company had put its movies to screen on June 30 and 
December 31 of the year. These theatres might have screened also the 
movies released by different "majors" on the two dates. 
Numbers with brackets are the averaged number of theatres that screened 
only the movies released by each major film company on June 30 and 
December 31 of the year. 
If any theatre is found to have screened the movies from more than one 
"major" in a single year, the theatre is excluded from the bracketed number 
and is presented without parenthesis. 
Sources: Tabulations from cinematic advertisements in Singtao daily and Mingpao 
daily from 1991 to 2009; Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry Association 
Limited, various years. 
The replacement of D&B and GP with Regal, Mandarin, and Empire brought a 
restructuring of theater chains in the Hong Kong film market. This restructuring, 
however, did not make the "newcomers" better off. Instead, the number of theatres 
these companies controlled was much smaller than those controlled by the preceding 
"majors", namely D&B and GP. There are two possible reasons for that. First, as 
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more and more film companies tried to set up their own theatre chain, they had to vie 
for theatres and consequently, there might be fewer theatres which would screen 
exclusively the movies released by each "major". Second, the number of theatres 
in the market was shrinking concurrently. This is because the soaring land price 
drove many theatre owners to close down their theatres, and to redevelop their 
properties for alternative uses. As a result, each major film companies in the 
mid-1990s possessed fewer theatres than the "majors" did in the 1980s. As fewer 
theatres denote fewer conduits of profit return, most of the "majors", including those 
"newcomers", failed to survive any longer. The following sections are going to 
throw light on the details. 
The Rising Land Price 
Since the 1980s, the land price in Hong Kong shot skyhigh. This posed a 
formidable challenge to the major film companies. Since most of the "majors" 
rented, rather than acquired, a group of theatres to build their theatre chains, they 
bore a huge rental cost in their exhibition business (Lam 2009: 118). From the late 
1980s, the growth rate of theatrical rents reached forty to fifty per cent per year 
(Hong Kong Economy Yearbook 1987: 165). The rent for some theatres was even 
2 to 2.5 times that of the previous years (ibid.). The skyrocketing rental cost raised 
the burden on the "majors". 
Even though the "majors" could afford the rent, there were fewer theatres 
available in the market. This is because the rising land price drove many theatre 
owners to redevelop their properties for alternative uses, such as to build shopping 
malls, commercial buildings, or private apartments (Zheng 1987; Wong 2007). 
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Table 4.5 Theatre Closures in Hong Kong, 1990-1998 
Theatres converted into 
Shopping Malls, Total Number 
Commercial Buildings, and of Theatres Total 
Private Apartments Shut down Number of 
Year Number % # Number Theatres 
1990 4 44.44 9 120 
1991 3 50.00 6 116 
1992 3 50.00 6 120 
1993 3 37.50 8 123 
1994 8 44.44 18 114 
1995 7 38.89 18 104 
1996 8 61.54 13 100 
1997 9 69.23 13 88 
1998 1 8.33 12 79 
Total 47 103 -
Notes: Figures are slightly underestimated because a few cinemas 
without available data and complete information on their year 
of establishment and year of closure (if any) are not included. 
. Figures of theatres in this table refer to both the traditional 
theatres and the Cineplex cinemas in the market. 
# Percentage share of theatres that were converted into 
shopping malls, commercial buildings, and private 
apartments in the total number of theatres shut down in the 
year. 
Sources: Cinema Treasures (2010); Wong (2007); Hong Kong Motion 
Picture Industry Association Limited, various years. 
Owing to the soaring land price, the total number of theatres in Hong Kong 
shrank from 120 in 1990 to 79 in 1998, or by 34.2 per cent (Table 4.5). During the 
same period, over a hundred theatres closed down. Almost half (45.6%) of these 
theatres were dismantled and converted into shopping malls, commercial buildings, 
and private apartments (Table 4.5). Since the movie business became less lucrative 
than setting up shopping malls, commercial buildings, and private apartments, a lot 
of theatre owners hung back from operating their theatres. 
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As the total number of theatres in the market fell noticeably, the separation of 
Regal and Mandarin did not benefit the two parties; instead, the partition of Regal 
Circuit even attenuated their theatrical possessions, which caused destruction of both 
sides. When the Regal Circuit was established in 1992, it allied exclusively with 
nineteen theatres (Figure 3). In that year, the company released sixteen movies and 
earned 152.4 million HK dollars at constant prices from the box office (Table 4.6). 
After the split, however, three (or 15.8%) of its theatres joined Mandarin (Figure 3). 
The number of theatres fully controlled by Regal dropped from nineteen to sixteen 
(Figure 3). With fewer theatres under its control, the total theatrical, receipts from 
the Regal Circuit in 1993 slumped by 24.2 per cent to 115.5 million HK dollars at 
constant prices, the lowest among all "majors"^' (Table 4.6)^^. 
Since the "majors" still followed an exclusive exhibition practice at that time, 
they rarely screened the movies released by their rivals. In this respect, even 
though Regal had fewer theatres after its split with Mandarin, the company still had 
to maintain a certain volume of movies to fill up the exhibition blocks of its theatre 
“ i 
chain. Maintaining this film-supply for its theatres saddled Regal with an 
enormous operational cost. When its owner, Steven Lo，found difficulty in 
recouping the huge cost involved (Hong Kong Economy Yearbook 1995: 155), he 
folded up his film business in May 1994. 
51 This does not include Golden Princess since it had already begun to wind up its film business and 
hence released only one movie in 1993. 
52 This table does not show the theatrical receipts of Golden Harvest and Newport in 1993. In 1993， 
the two companies earned 204 and 253 million HK dollars at constant 1997 prices respectively (Hong 
Kong Film Archive 2009; Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry Association Limited, various years). 
Since Mandarin earned 183.6 million HK dollars at constant prices in 1993 (Table 4.6)，the theatrical 
receipts from Regal were the lowest among all "majors". 
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Table 4.6 Film Outputs and Box-office Grosses of Regal, Mandarin, and 
Modern, 1991-1996 
Regal Mandarin Modern 
Film Box office Film Box office Film Box office 
Outputs At constant Outputs At constant Outputs At constant 
1997 prices # 1997 prices # 1997 prices # 
Year (in million HK$) (in million HK$) (in million HK$) 
1991 - - - - - -
1992 16 152.4 -
1993 20 115.5 22 183.6 - -
1994 5 23.5 14 100.5 14 50.4 
1995 - - 14 68.3 12 23.7 
1996 - - 11 41.8 - -
Note: # Figures are weighted by the ticket price in each corresponding year, and 
are at constant 1997 prices. 
Sources: Chan (2000); Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion 
Picture Industry Association Limited, various years. 
Although another "newcomer", Modem Films Co. Ltd.(新一代)，undertook 
Steven Lo's exhibition business after he relinquished his control over Regal Circuit 
(Figure 3)，the box-office performance of Modem's theatre chain was even worse 
than that of Regal's. In the second-half of 1994, there was only one theatre allied 
exclusively with Modem while there were just eleven theatres in total screening 
Modem's movies, a lot fewer than its competitors (Figure 3). With the fewest 
theatres among all theatre chains, the company earned only 50.4 million HK dollars 
at constant prices in 1994 from the box office, less than half (43.6%) of the 115.5 
million box-office revenue for Regal in 1993 (Table 4.6). In 1995, its theatrical 
receipts dived ftirther by 53 per cent to 23.7 million HK dollars at constant prices 
(Table 4.6). The financial situation of Modem was so precarious that the company 
lasted for only two years, and shut down in 1995 (Hong Kong Economy Yearbook 
1996: 139). 
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Even though Mandarin's theatre chain surpassed Regal's and Modem's in 
box-office receipts, the company faced the same problem. The number of theatres 
under Mandarin was much smaller than those under other "majors". While 
Newport and Empire, the largest-scale theatre chain at the time, allied exclusively 
with eighteen theatres in 1994, Mandarin had only eleven theatres (Figure 3). In 
1996, the number of theatres controlled fully by Mandarin was even reduced to 
seven (Figure 3). In this case, Mandarin could not achieve the economy of scale 
necessary for cost recovery. With barely 41.8 million HK dollars at constant prices 
from its theatrical receipts in 1996, about a quarter (22.8%) of its box-office revenue 
(183.6 million) in 1993 (Table 4.6), Mandarin could not afford the operational cost 
of its exhibition business (Hong Kong Economy Yearbook 1997: 96). In late 1996， 
therefore, the Mandarin theatre chain was closed down although the company still 
engaged in film production in the subsequent years. 
Not only did the rising land price stymie the foregoing "newcomers", but it also 
stunted the development of the remaining "majors". In 1993，Chan Wing-mei, the 
owner of Newport, regained some of the theatres from Golden Princess (GP) after it 
petered out, and set up the Empire Circuit (Figure 3)，a sister company of Newport 
(Chan 1992: 42). As presented in Table 4.5, however, the number of theatres that 
closed doubled from 8 in 1993 to 18 in 1994. During the late 1990s, the number of 
theatres dismantled stood at twelve to thirteen per year (Table 4.5). In this sense, 
even though Chan Wing-mei strived to acquire the theatres from GP, there were 
simply fewer theatres in the market for Chan to buy up. • 
Although the two Circuits of Chan comprised the largest number of theatres 
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(Figure 3), the soaring land price drove many of his allied theatres to shut down in 
the mid-1990s. The number of theatres in the Newport and Empire Circuits 
plunged by 22.2 per cent from eighteen to fourteen in just three years after Chan took 
over GP's theatre chain in 1993 (Table 4.7). With possession of fewer theatres, its 
box-office revenue dropped markedly from 252.6 million HK dollars to 77.8 million 
at constant prices, or by 69.2 per cent, between 1993 and 1996 (Table 4.7). 
Table 4.7 Theatrical Possession, Film Outputs, and Box-office Grosses of 
Newport and Empire, 1990-1996 
Newport Newport and Empire 
Theatres Film Box office Theatres Film Box office 
Allied Outputs At constant Allied Outputs At constant 
Exclusively 1997 prices # Exclusively 1997 prices # 
Year (in million HK$) (in million HK$) 
1990 19 15 140.0 - -
1991 12 13 184.8 - - -
1992 17 17 175.5 - - -
1993 - - 18 30 252.6 
1994 - 18 4 22.2 
1995 - 16 7 51.5 
1996 - 14 17 77.8 
Note: # Figures are weighted by the ticket price in each corresponding year, and 
are at constant 1997 prices. 
Sources: Tabulations from cinematic advertisements in Singtao daily and Mingpao 
daily from 1990 to 1996; Chan (2000); Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); 
Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry Association Limited, various years. 
As the box-office revenue could hardly cover the rental cost which has been on 
a steady upward climb noted earlier, Chan restructured his theatre chains. Not only 
did he close down the Empire Circuit in the early 2000s, but he also folded up many 
of his theatres in Newport Circuit. In 2009，the number of cinemas under Newport 
fell from twenty in its inception (Chan 1988b: 4) to barely four (Figure 3). 
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The Ebb Tide of the Taiwan Capital Flood 
Besides the rising land price which drove a substantial number of theatres to 
close down, the shrinking theatrical receipts of Hong Kong movies can also be 
attributed to the halt in the Taiwan capital inflow by the mid-1990s. The drought of 
Taiwan capital resulted from the shift in the policies of the PRC and Taiwan for their 
film industries in 1994. Since Newport was bom as a "middleman" between the 
investors from Taiwan and the film production companies in Hong Kong, it banked 
heavily on foreign capital. The withdrawal of Taiwan capital thus dampened the 
investment in many of its film projects. As Newport was an active supplier of 
Hong Kong movies in the early 1990s, the diminution in capital, together with its 
shrinking theatrical possession documented earlier, compelled the company to curtail 
its investment in the impending film projects. This is one of the reasons for the 
heavy slump in the output of Hong Kong movies after 1993 (Table 4.1). 
While Newport's spurt was fueled by the hot money from Taiwan, the company 
was heavily dependent on the policies of the PRC and Taiwan for their film 
industries which triggered off the "meteor shower". Nonetheless, its 
"over-dependence" on the cross-strait relations posed a risk to the company. As 
Fligstein (2001) notes, when there is a "change in conditions across markets", the 
affected market(s) may become instable and is (are) likely to transform (p.90). In 
the same vein, any changes in the relations between the film markets in the PRC and 
Taiwan may have a profound impact on the film companies in Hong Kong. This, in 
fact, was what Newport had experienced during the mid-1990s, the time when the 
capital influx from Taiwan film investors could no longer be expected to happen 
again. 
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The loss of Taiwan capital was arguably caused by the changes in the PRC's 
and Taiwan's policies for their film industries. As discussed earlier, the PRC 
government has gradually relaxed its tight control over the film industry after the 
Cultural Revolution in the 1970s. Following the government's economic reform in 
1979, the marketization of the PRC's film industry continued throughout the 1980s. 
In 1984，the PRC government withdrew its financial backing for the state-owned 
film studios. All privately-owned film companies were permitted to produce and 
distribute movies after applying for, and receiving, approval from the government. 
In the same year, the distribution policy was also revised. Licensed private film 
distributors, rather than the government's China Film Corporation (CFC) had to bear 
the cost for dubbing film prints (Zhu 2002). In 1988，the government further 
abolished the state-controlled single-priced system and allowed the prices of movie 
tickets to be moderately adjusted in the market (Ni 1994). Also, film studios that 
earned a flat fee from selling film prints before the reform have been allowed to 
share the profits earned from the box office with the distributors. 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned measures did not revive the moribund film 
industry in China. In the course of liberalizing the film market, the PRC 
government trimmed their financial support for film studios and film companies. 
When these studios and companies were corporatized, many of them failed to pull 
themselves up by their bootstraps. Ling (1996) finds that around one-third of the 
state-run film studios, and one-fifth of the provincial distributors and exhibitors 
recorded a deficit in the late 1980s (p.37). Given such a bleak condition, not only 
did film studios begin to streamline their operation, but they also endeavored to seek 
co-production with overseas film companies. 
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After the PRC government permitted foreign film companies to forge 
co-production partnership with its film studios since the late 1970s, co-production 
became a key conduit of the income stream for film companies in China. When the 
Taiwan government lifted its martial law in 1987, the capital flow from Taiwan to 
China via Hong Kong fostered an "industrial complex" among the three film markets 
(Lee 1994). As mentioned in the previous sections, this "industrial complex" refers 
to a node of financial capital and film personnel from Taiwan and Hong Kong, with 
the sites or locations and manpower from the PRC (ibid.: 23). To shoot movies in 
the PRC, however, film companies from Hong Kong and Taiwan were required to 
establish co-production partnership with film studios in China. Since these film 
studios would charge the foreign film companies, including those from Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, a "management fee" in return for a "production right" that was allotted 
by the PRC government to the film studios, these "management fees" turned out to 
be a major source of revenue for the film companies in China (Liang 1998). In this 
fashion, the film companies across the straits between the PRC and Taiwan benefited 
from the "honeymoon" of the "industrial complex" in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. 
With the influx of capital from Taiwan, co-production deals were exceptionally 
active in the early 1990s. Even though the PRC government formally restricted the 
number of co-production projects to be at most a quarter of the total number of 
movies produced each year, Stephanie Chung (2007) finds that the film studios in 
China rarely followed this restriction. The number of movies co-produced during 
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the early 1990s exceeded the ceiling by about eight per cent^^ (ibid.: 363), and 
skyrocketed from six in 1988 to forty-two in 1992 (iFilm Connections 2010). In 
1993, nine out of the ten highest box-office blockbusters in the China film market 
were co-productions (Ni 1994). Most of these movies were co-produced by film 
companies in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the PRC (ibid.). While the China film 
market was dominated by these co-production projects, Wang and Ni (1994) stress 
that the over-reliance on co-production could only provide filmmakers and cinema 
owners in the PRC with temporary employment opportunities and short-term 
box-office revenue respectively. Nonetheless, this might keep the ailing film 
production sectors in China being underdeveloped. This could be a reason for the 
PRC government to take measures to curb the co-production craze in the mid-1990s. 
In 1994，a groundbreaking reform in the China film industry was launched. 
The PRC government tightened the number of approvals of co-production projects, 
while concurrently allowing an annual importation of ten foreign movies. These 
measures put the Hong Kong film industry at risk. Since the movies produced by 
Hong Kong film companies were considered by the PRC government to be "foreign" 
movies, the films imported from Hong Kong to China thereafter had to compete with 
the blockbusters from other countries, including those from Hollywood, for a slice 
from the ten import quotas every year. This reduced opportunities for the imported 
films that were produced by the "industrial complex" and hence, blunted the demand 
for co-production deals. As a result, the number of co-produced movies released in 
the PRC film market plunged by almost sixty per cent (57.1%), from 42 in 1992 to 
“Stephanie Chung (2007) notes that in the early 1990s, about one-third (33%) of the movies 
released in the PRC were co-produced by film companies in the PRC with those from overseas 
(p.363). This exceeded the ceiling at most a quarter (25%) of the total number of movies 
produced each year by eight per cent. 
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18 in 1994 (iFilm Connections 2010). 
In the meanwhile, the government of the United States (U.S.) and its Motion 
Picture Export Association (MPEA) pressured a number of countries, including 
Taiwan, to pry open their film markets. As the co-production craze among the film 
companies in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the PRC was stifled, some theatre owners in 
Taiwan who formerly invested in, distributed and exhibited Hong Kong movies 
turned to advocate lifting the quotas on films imported from the U.S. (Curtin 
2003b: 245). For this reason, the Taiwan film investors began to curtail their 
investment in the Hong Kong film industry (Lim 2006). Among all of the movies 
screened in Taiwan, the number of movies imported from Hong Kong dived 
markedly by 38.7 per cent, from 225 to 138 between 1992 and 1995 (Wei 2003: 19). 
Coinciding with the slump in the number of Hong Kong movies exported to Taiwan, 
the blockbusters imported from Hollywood have expanded their dominance over the 
Taiwan film market. In the mid-1990s, over half of the box-office receipts in 
Taiwan were accounted for by Hollywood movies (ibid.). The commercial success 
of Hollywood blockbusters further pushed the film investors in Taiwan to distribute 
and exhibit the movies imported from the U.S. rather than those from Hong Kong. 
In this regard, the "meteor shower" of capital flow from Taiwan to Hong Kong came 
to a close in the mid-1990s. 
As Newport, together with Empire after 1993, were set up to serve as a 
"middleman" between the film investors from Taiwan and the independent 
production companies in Hong Kong, they banked on Taiwan capital to fuel the local 
production houses in return for movies to screen. When the abovementioned shift 
in the policies of the PRC and Taiwan for their film industries took place in the 
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mid-1990s, however, the "meteor shower" of Taiwan capital subsided. This drying 
up of Taiwan hot money slashed down the budgets for many film projects in Hong 
Kong, which consequently held down the volume of movies that could fill up the 
exhibition blocks of Newport's and Empire's theatre chains. 
While Newport released around thirty movies with the support of Taiwan 
capital in 1993 (Table 4.7), its film outputs plummeted by 86.7 per cent to barely 
four in 1994, the year the PRC government tightened the number of approvals of 
co-production projects. The drop in the number of movies released by Newport 
dragged down the overall output of Hong Kong movies. After the industry 
achieved a peak of 186 film outputs in 1993, the number dipped to 143 in 1994, 
forty-three movies fewer than the previous year (Table 4.1). Of this falling number, 
twenty-six were from Newport (Table 4.7), accounting for 60.5 per cent of the total 
reduction. 
With less capital investment and hence fewer film outputs, the theatrical 
receipts of Newport, together with its sister company Empire, shrank from 253 
million HK dollars to 22 million at constant prices between 1993 and 1994，or by 
91.3 per cent (Table 4.7). The contraction of film production not only diminished 
their box-office revenue, but it also hindered the two companies from filling up the 
exhibition blocks of their theatre chains. Since Newport arid Empire were unable to 
maintain a desirable level of movie without the capital from Taiwan, their owner~ 
一Chan Wing-mei could not afford the operational cost of his theatre chains, 
especially when the rising land price resulted in a sharp surge in rental costs. As a 
result, the Empire Circuit closed down in the early 2000s, and the number of theatres 
in the Newport Circuit was reduced to four in 2009 (Figure 3). 
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The Last Samurai^ "^ and the Finale of the Distributor-led Production System 
As Newport almost ground to halt in the late 1990s, Golden Harvest (GH) 
remained the last and the only "major", which had started its film business with its 
satellite production houses and its theatre chain yet could still manage to survive. 
Although GH could survive, the soaring land price and the diminution in theatrical 
receipts pushed the company to restructure its business in the late 1990s. 
Since the late 1990s, GH has rearranged its core business from local film 
production to the distribution of foreign movies. The company made this 
adjustment because it did not have an adequate number of theatres to recoup the cost 
of its film productions. Given that most of its aligned theatres were dismantled in 
the 1990s owing to the rising land price, the number of theatres allied exclusively 
with GH was halved, falling from fifteen in 1991 to seven in 1996 (Table 4.8). 
Following an exclusive exhibition system, however, the company still had to 
maintain a certain volume of film outputs, around twenty movies each year (Table 
4.8)，in order to fill up the exhibition blocks of its theatre chain. While GH had to 
bear the massive expenses involved in its film productions, the contraction of its 
theatre chain has diminished the box-office revenue it gained. From 1994 to 1996, 
the company recorded a seventeen-percent drop in its theatrical receipts, diving from 
229.6 million HK dollars to 191.2 million at constant prices (Table 4.8). 
54 "The Last Samurai" is a movie directed by Edward Zwick and distributed by Warner Brothers in 
2003. In this section, Golden Harvest is analogous to "the last samurai" in a sense that the company 
is the last and the only "major", which started its film business with its satellite production houses and 
its theatre chain yet could still manage to survive in the field. 
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Table 4.8 Theatrical Possession, Film Outputs, and Box-office Grosses of 
Golden Harvest, 1990-1996 
Theatres Film Box office 
Allied Outputs At constant 
Exclusively 1997 prices # 
Year (in million HK$) 
1990 17 25 302.0 
1991 15 17 278.9 
1992 14 22 286.2 
1993 12 16 203.6 
1994 9 18 229.6 
1995 8 17 130.3 
1996 7 25 191.2 
Note: # Figures are weighted by the ticket price in each corresponding year, 
and are at constant 1997 prices. 
Sources: Tabulations from cinematic advertisements in Singtao daily and 
Mingpao daily from 1990 to 1996; Chan (2000); Hong Kong Film 
Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry Association 
Limited, various years. 
As the theatrical receipts of GH shriveled up, the company faced difficulty in 
covering the cost of its film productions. From the mid-1990s, therefore, the 
company began to convert its theatre chain into Cineplex-cinema circuit^-\ hoping 
that the Cineplex settings could attract more cinemagoers. The first Cineplex 
cinema of GH was built in 1995 (Cinema Treasures 2010). The cinema consists of 
four screens or houses (ibid.). In the late 1990s, half of its cinemas were converted 
into Cineplex. In 2008，GH had over twenty-four screens in its circuit (Table 4.9)， 
with four of its five cinemas in Cineplex settings. 
55 By the definition used in this study, cinema circuit is different from theatre chain. The former is a 
group of aligned cinemas, each of which is equipped with at least two screens or houses, with each 
house contains less than a thousand seats, to wit, a Cineplex setting. The latter refers to a chain'of 
allied theatres in traditional settings, only one to two screen(s) or house(s) with more than a thousand 
seats installed in each theatre. However, although some "majors'" owners, such as Chan Wing-mei 
and Steven Lo Kit-sing, named their theatre chains the Newport Circuit, the Empire Circuit, and the 
Regal Circuit, all of these "circuits" comprised theatres in traditional settings, rather than Cineplex 
settings. 
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Table 4.9 Cinemas and Screens in Broadway circuit, UA cinemas, and Golden 
Harvest, 2000-2008 
Broadway circuit UA cinemas Golden Harvest 
Number % # Number Number % # Number Number % # Number 
Year of Cinemas of Screens of Cinemas of Screens of Cinemas of Screens 
2000 10 15.87 47 8 12.70 36 7 11.11 23 
2001 11 17.74 53 7 11.29 34 6 9.68 22 
2002 10 16.39 50 6 9.84 32 6 9.84 22 
2003 11 19.30 55 7 12.28 36 6 10.53 22 
2004 12 21.05 61 8 14.04 42 6 10.53 22 
2005 13 23.21 67 8 14.29 42 6 10.71 26 
2006 13 27.08 62 8 16.67 34 5 10.42 24 
2007 13 26.53 62 10 20.41 45 5 10.20 24 
2008 13 27.08 62 8 16.67 36 5 10.42 24 
Notes: Figures are slightly underestimated because a few cinemas without 
available data and complete information on their year of establishment 
and year of closure (if any) are not included. 
# Percentage share of cinema under their corresponding circuit in the total 
number of cinemas of the year. 
Sources: Cinema Treasures (2010); Wong (2007); Hong Kong Yearbook, various 
years; Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry Association Limited, various 
years. 
Despite the conversion of GH's theatre chain from traditional theatres to 
Cineplex cinemas, the number of cinemas it owned is still insufficient to recoup its 
investment in film production. This is because while most traditional theatres in 
Hong Kong were dismantled, a large portion of cinemas that were newly built in the 
2000s was controlled by two Cineplex exhibitors, namely Broadway and UA. In 
the late 2000s, Broadway and UA have dominated the exhibition sectors by owning 
over twenty cinemas and almost a hundred screens in all (Table 4.9). With only 
five cinemas and twenty-four screens in hand, GH garnered only about ten per cent 
of the market share (Table 4.9). If the company invests in film production, its 
limited control of the exhibition windows is likely to result in a deficit since the scale 
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of its cinema circuit may not be large enough to earn sufficient returns to recover the 
production cost. This can be exemplified by the variation in the number of theatres 
controlled by GH for the release of its yearly blockbuster before and after the boom 
of other Cineplex circuits, such as Broadway and UA (Table 4.10). 
Table 4.10 Theatres Screening Exclusively, and Box-office Grosses of, the 
Yearly Blockbusters of Golden Harvest, 1987-2003 
Number of Box Office 
Movie Title of Theatres At constant 
the Yearly Blockbuster Screening HK$ 1997 prices # 
Year Exclusively (in million) (in million HK$) 
1987 25 35.47 . 64.0 
<龍兄虎弟> 
1991 Armour of 恐 39.05 47.5 
<細计劃〉 
1 麗 Rumble in the Bronx � “ � ， 
1995 鄉 區 〉 8 56.91 45.7 
•2Q�3 5 2 4 , 6 N.A. 
Notes: "N.A." denotes data are not available because of the deficient information 
on the ticket price in 2003. 
# Figures are weighted by the ticket price in each corresponding year, and 
are at constant 1997 prices. 
Sources: Tabulations from cinematic advertisements in Singtao daily and Mingpao 
daily in 1987, 1991, 1995, and 2003; Chan (2000); Hong Kong Motion 
Picture Industry Association Limited, various years. 
Before the expansion of Broadway and UA, GH controlled twenty-three 
theatres in 1991 for the theatrical release of its yearly blockbuster, Armour of God II 
Operation Condor〈飛鷹計劃>.The movie gained 47.5 million HK dollars at 
constant prices from the box office (Table 4.10). After the expansion of 
Broadway's and UA's Cineplex cinemas from the mid-1990s (to be discussed in 
Table 4,12), however, the number of theatres screening exclusively GH's blockbuster 
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of the year in 1995, Rumble in the Bronx <,紅番區>，plunged to eight (Table 4.10). 
With fewer theatres, the box-office grosses of Rumble in the Bronx were 1.9 million 
HK dollars at constant prices less than those of Armour of God II Operation Condor 
(Table 4.10). In 2003，the last year GH invested in film production, its blockbuster, 
My Lucky Star〈行運超人〉，was shown exclusively in just five cinemas'^ ^ (Table 
4.10). No wonder, the box-office return of the movie was less than half (43.9%) of 
that of Rumble in the Bronx (Table 4.10). 
Since its cinema circuit could no longer achieve the economy of scale necessary 
for cost recovery, GH stopped providing financial support for its satellite 
independent production companies. Instead, it relies on alternative sources of 
film-supply to fill up its exhibition blocks. In the early 2000s, GH ceased investing 
in film production and concentrated thereafter on its exhibition business. This 
marked the finale of the distributor-led production system in Hong Kong. 
Summary 
In brief, this section has documented how the "newcomers" who succeeded 
D&B and GP, as well as the remaining "majors", were thwarted by the rising land 
price in Hong Kong. Because of the soaring land price which drove many theatre 
owners to redevelop their properties for alternative uses, these companies possessed 
fewer theatres than the "majors" did before the exogenous shock arrived. The 
dwindling number of theatres reduced the return on their film investment. Since the 
"majors" could no longer recoup the cost of their film projects from the box office, 
56 Although there were six cinemas in Golden Harvest's circuit in 2003 (Table 4.9)，one of them was 
arranged to screen foreign movies only. Since My Lucky Star〈行運超人〉was a Hong Kong movie, 
the film was shown exclusively in five cinemas in 2003. 
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most of them wound up their business by the mid-1990s, and those who remained 
stopped investing in film production. 
Besides the soaring land price which drove the closure of a sizeable number of 
theatres, the declining theatrical receipts of Hong Kong movies can also be attributed 
to the halt to Taiwan capital inflow by the mid-1990s. When the capital flow from 
Taiwan to the Hong Kong film market subsided in 1994，the investment in many film 
projects in Hong Kong, particularly those from Newport, was trimmed. The 
diminution in capital investment, together with the shrinking theatrical possession, 
resulted in a heavy slump in both the film outputs and the box-office receipts of 
Hong Kong movies after 1993. 
Although Golden Harvest (GH), as the last "major", manages to survive, it no 
longer achieves the economy of scale needed for cost recovery since the exhibition 
sectors have already become dominated by other Cineplex-cinema circuits. In the 
early 2000s, therefore, GH ceased investing in film production. This marked the 
finale of the distributor-led production system in Hong Kong, and touched off a 
transformation in the Hong Kong film market. As the following section will show, 
the collapse of the "old" system opened the door for the distributors of foreign 
movies to fill the market niche that was previously occupied by Hong Kong movies. 
TRANSFORMATION IN THE HONG KONG FILM MARKET 
As Newport almost ground to halt and Golden Harvest (GH) stopped engaging 
in film production, the distributor-led production and exhibition system disintegrated. 
While the major film companies, the incumbents before the late 1990s, failed to 
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retain their power and dominance over the commodity chain, not only did the film 
outputs and box-office receipts of Hong Kong movies experience a freefall from 
their peak in 1993 and in 1992 respectively (Table 4.1), but the "conceptions of 
control" constructed by the "majors" throughout the 1970s and the 1980s also fell 
apart gradually. Since the major force that keeps a market stable is the "ability of 
the incumbents firms to continue to enforce a conception of control vis-a-vis one 
another" (Fligstein 1996: 667)，the disintegration of the vertically-integrated mode of 
production in the Hong Kong film market triggered off a crisis in the field. 
When a crisis is about to begin, the market is "susceptible to transformation” 
(Fligstein 1996: 664). In the 1990s, there was a transformation in the power 
relations among the film companies in the different stages of the commodity chain. 
This transformation started with the exhibition sectors. As the traditional theatre 
chains vanished during the 1990s, Cineplex-cinema circuits mushroomed 
concurrently in Hong Kong. The four circuits that have dominated the Hong Kong 
film market since the mid-1990s are the Broadway circuit^^, the UA cinemas'''^, 
Golden Harvest^'^ and the Multiplex Cinema Limited^''' (MCL). While UA and 
MCL set up their exhibition business with Cineplex. cinemas, Broadway and GH 
converted their theatres into Cineplex cinemas circa the 1990s. All of the major 
circuits in Hong Kong nowadays are thus in Cineplex settings. As these circuits 
57 The first theatre of Broadway was established in 1949. The company later restored its theatre to a 
Cineplex cinema in 1987. 
58 UA is the first among the four major Cineplex circuits to set up Cineplex cinema in Hong Kong. 
The first UA cinema was set up in 1985 in Shatin, a suburb in Hong Kong. It contained six screens 
and houses. 
59 Since the mid-1990s, Golden Harvest has steadily converted its theatres into Cineplex cinemas. 
60 The parent company of MCL is Intercontinental Film Distributors (HK) Ltd. (IFDL). IFDL 
distributes foreign movies in Hong Kong. Before the company set up MCL, it rented several 
traditional theatres to exhibit movies. 
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reaped altogether almost eighty per cent of the box-office receipts in 2007 (Ming Pao 
2007)，their dominance implies that the Hong Kong film market has undergone a 
transformation in its exhibition sectors from traditional theatres to Cineplex cinemas. 
When the market undergoes transformation, some economic actors will try to 
establish a new set of "conceptions of control" as the "cultural frames" to challenge 
the existing order so as to control the market (Fligstein 2008: 17). To make this 
possible, they may “create political coalitions" (ibid.) by allying "themselves with 
some of the challengers or existing incumbents" (Fligstein -1996: 664). In Hong 
Kong, the economic actors who challenged the existing order are the distributors of 
foreign movies. As will be shown in this section, these distributors have forged 
alliances with the Cineplex-cinema circuits since the 1990s. More favorable 
exhibition blocks in these cinemas are thus reserved for foreign movies than for 
Hong Kong movies. Not only does such an arrangement intensify the competition 
between foreign and local movies, but it allows also the exhibitors to gain the 
"booking rights" to control the exhibition blocks from the distributors of local 
movies. This gave rise to the "conceptions of control" which foster a mode of 
production driven by the exhibitors owning Cineplex-cinema circuits. 
Before Cineplex cinemas replaced traditional theatres in Hong Kong, the 
distributors of foreign movies allied with the traditional theatres. When Golden 
Harvest and Golden Princess came into operation in 1970 and in 1980 respectively, 
some theatres which used to screen foreign movies turned to exhibit the local movies 
released by the major distributors (Leng et al. 1985: 4). The number of theatres 
showing imported films plunged ftirther from 34 in 1987 to 22 when the fourth 
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"major", Newport, was set up in 1988^' (Chan 1988b: 3). Even though some 
major distributors, such as Shaw Brothers (SB), Golden Harvest (GH), and Golden 
Princess (GP), had their own theatre chain to exhibit foreign movies, most of their 
theatres were used to screen the local movies they released. 
In the mid-1980s, the number of theatres in GH's theatre chain which showed 
local movies was five times higher than the number of its theatres that screened 
foreign movies (Chan 1985). As for GP, the company assigned the local movies it 
released to almost twenty of its allied theatres, accounting for almost a quarter of the 
total theatres in Hong Kong during the mid-1980s (Zhao 2007), while barely three of 
its theatres were reserved for foreign movies (Chan 1985: 12). In this fashion, the 
theatrical receipts of Hong Kong movies were much higher than those of the 
imported films throughout the 1980s until the mid-1990s (Table 4.1). 
In 1997, nevertheless, imported films once again surpassed local movies in the 
Hong Kong box office (Table 4.1). The bounceback of foreign movies hinged on 
the alliances of their distributors with the exhibitors owning Cineplex-cinema 
circuits. In the context of the market crisis documented earlier, the Hong Kong film 
market underwent a transformation in its exhibition downstream. While Cineplex 
cinemas had gradually replaced traditional theatres, most of the Cineplex exhibitors 
at the time faced difficulty in finding movies to screen (Le 1988). Although the 
theatrical setting of Cineplex cinemas allows exhibitors to put a variety of films on 
screens at a turn, the exhibitors may suffer from huge deficits if they do not have 
enough movies to fill up their exhibition blocks (ibid.: 5). To cope with the 
61 In the same year, the total number of theatres that exhibited Hong Kong movies climbed from 88 in 
1987 to 107, out of which twelve screened foreign movies formerly and seven were newly established 
(Chan 1988b: 4). 
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shortage of movies, these exhibitors could no longer rely on the major distributors of 
local movies because most of the "majors" had already ceased investing in local film 
production in the late 1990s or even wound up their film business for the reasons 
presented in the foregoing sections. This gave the distributors of foreign movies an 
opportunity to capture the market niche that was formerly dominated by the major 
distributors of local movies. 
While most of the foreign movies screened in Hong Kong are imported from 
the U.S. (Davis and Yeh 2008: 32-33), the growing share of foreign movies in the 
Hong Kong film market hinged on the coalition between the distributors of 
Hollywood movies and the Cineplex exhibitors in Hong Kong. As a lot of 
traditional theatres shut down throughout the 1990s, the theatre chains of the 
"majors" were gradually displaced by Cineplex-cinema circuits. The rising 
popularity of Cineplex cinemas, together with the massive closure of many 
traditional theatres, opened up "the possibility for new political alliances and new 
rules" in the market (Fligstein 2001: 36). Taking advantage of the transformation in 
the exhibition sectors, the distributors of Hollywood movies have aligned with the 
Cineplex exhibitors since the late 1990s. The following sections will explicate how 
the distributors of Hollywood movies have successfully co-opted the Cineplex 
exhibitors and constructed a new set of "conceptions of control". The impact of 
their alliances and the new "conceptions of control" on the Hong Kong film market 
will also be discussed. 
The Return of the Challengers: Distributors of Foreign Movies 
As documented in the second chapter, the U.S. government, since 1922, has 
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allowed the U.S.-based film production and distribution companies to integrate and 
to expand their distribution network, so as to promote the export of their film 
products. Film companies in Hollywood are thus linked with their distribution 
arms. United International Pictures (UIP), for example, is a joint venture that 
handles the overseas distribution of movies from several Hollywood studios, such as 
Paramount, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM), United Artists, Universal, and 
DreamWorks. 
Since the establishment of UIP in 1981，it has screened the movies from its 
aligned Hollywood studios in one theatre chain in Hong Kong, namely the Ocean 
circuit. UIP did not own the theatres in the Ocean circuit; instead, the theatres 
belonged to separate owners in Hong Kong. When these theatre owners were 
co-opted by Intercontinental Film Distributors (HK) Ltd. (IFDL), the Hong Kong 
representative of Walt Disney's (Buena Vista) movies, the Ocean circuit stopped 
exhibiting the movies distributed by UIP in 1988 (Chan 1988a). In this situation, 
UIP then allied with Panasia'^^, a distribution arm acquired by Golden Harvest (GH) 
in 1976. Even though GH allocated five to six of its theatres to UIP, these theatres 
would occasionally exhibit the local movies released by GH (ibid.). In this sense, 
GH still possessed part of the "booking rights" to control the exhibition blocks in the 
theatres that had been allotted to UIP (ibid.: 10). While GH was a major distributor 
of local movies, its dominance over the exhibition blocks impeded the development 
of UIP in Hong Kong (see Law 1992: 73-74). The situation had lasted for a decade 
until GH began to hold back its film production in the late 1990s. 
62 Although Golden Harvest (GH), or Panasia, exhibits Hollywood movies in its theatres, an 
anonymous industry insider claims that GH invested much of the money it gained from UIP in local 
film productions (Curtin 2007: 55). 
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Table 4.11 Cinemas and Screens in Multiplex Cinema Limited 
(MCL), 1999-2008 
Number % # Number 
Year of Cinemas of Screens 
1999 3 4.17 6 
2000 4 6.35 11 
2001 4 6.45 11 
2002 5 8.20 16 
2003 4 7.02 14 
2004 4 7.02 14 
2005 4 7.14 14 
2006 3 6.25 • 12 
2007 5 10.20 25 
2008 6 12.50 33 
Notes: Figures are slightly underestimated because a few 
cinemas without available data and complete 
information on their year of establishment and year of 
closure (if any) are not included. 
# Percentage share of cinema under MCL in the total 
number of cinemas of the year. 
Sources: Cinema Treasures (2010); Wong (2007); Hong Kong 
Yearbook, various years; Hong Kong Motion Picture 
Industry Association Limited, various years. 
In the early 2000s, Golden Harvest withdrew from film production and focused 
on its distribution and exhibition business for the reasons discussed earlier. When 
the distribution contract between UIP and GH expired in 2006 (Golden Harvest 2006: 
15)，Intercontinental Film Distributors (HK) Ltd/’] (IFDL) acquired the "Hong 
Kong distributorship for UIP's Paramount Pictures and Dreamworks Animation 
products" (Kadokawa Intercontinental Group 2010). Unlike GH, however, IFDL 
and MCL did not invest in any film production, but focused exclusively on film 
distribution and exhibition. In just a decade, MCL expanded its cinematic 
63 Intercontinental Film Distributors (HK) Ltd. (IFDL) is the Hong Kong representative of Walt 
Disney's (Buena Vista) movies. It is also the parent company of the Multiplex Cinema Limited 
(MCL), a Cineplex-cinema circuit in Hong Kong. 
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possession from three cinemas with six screens in 1999 to six cinemas with 
thirty-three screens in 2008, gaining 12.5 per cent of the market share in the 
exhibition sectors (Table 4.11). This enabled MCL to be one of the four major 
exhibition companies in Hong Kong throughout the 2000s. 
Table 4.12 Cinemas and Screens in Broadway circuit, and UA cinemas, 
1990-1999 
Broadway circuit UA cinemas 
Number % # Number Number % # Number 
Year of Cinemas of Screens of Cinemas . of Screens 
1990 2 1.67 6 3 2.50 14 
1991 2 1.72 6 3 2.59 14 
1992 4 3.33 13 3 2.50 14 
1993 4 3.25 13 4 3.25 18 
1994 4 3.51 13 4 3.51 18 
1995 5 4.81 16 4 3.85 18 
1996 8 8.00 27 8 8.00 29 
1997 8 9.09 27 8 9.09 33 
1998 9 11.39 38 9 11.39 38 
1999 10 13.89 46 8 11.11 36 
Notes: Figures are slightly underestimated because a few cinemas without 
available data and complete information on their year of 
establishment and year of closure (if any) are not included. 
# Percentage share of cinema under their corresponding circuit in the 
total number of cinemas of the year. 
Sources: Cinema Treasures (2010); Wong (2007); Hong Kong Yearbook, 
various years; Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry Association 
Limited, various years. 
Besides the coalition between UIP and IFDL, another Hollywood studio, 
Columbia TriStar, cooperates with EDKO the distribution arm of Broadway 
circuit to get their movies screened in Hong Kong (Law 1998: 52). Broadway 
is a Cineplex-cinema circuit that had expanded rapidly during the 1990s. In 1999, 
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Broadway circuit surpassed UA in the total number of screens possessed (Table 4.12). 
The number of cinemas and screens in Broadway circuit soared from two cinemas 
with six screens to ten cinemas with forty-six screens between 1990 and 1999; 
whereas UA, the second-largest cinema circuit in Hong Kong, held eight cinemas 
with thirty-six screens in 1999 (Table 4.12). Although UA does not ally with any 
Hollywood studio, it has its own distribution arm, Lark Films Distribution, to 
arrange screenings of both local and foreign movies (Lark International Holdings 
Limited 2010). In line with IFDL and MCL, moreover, Lark and UA do not invest 
in any film production. 
Among the four major Cineplex exhibitors, only EDKO (Broadway circuit) has 
invested in the production of local movies. Although EDKO has a hand in film 
production, it released at most two to three movies per year over the past decade 
(Hong Kong Film Archive 2010a). Since its inception, the company has produced 
less than thirty movies in total (ibid.). This volume of film outputs is much smaller 
than that of the "majors" in the 1980s and the 1990s. As the film companies that 
control the exhibition blocks are no longer the key investors in local movies, the 
power relations in the commodity chain of Hong Kong film products have changed. 
This gave rise to a new set of "conceptions of control" that reshaped the interactions 
of film companies in the market. 
The Emergence of New "Conceptions of Control，， 
In the twenty-first century, the Hong Kong film market is dominated by the four 
Cineplex exhibitors mentioned earlier. While MCL gained approximately ten per 
cent of the market share in 2007 (Table 4.11), Broadway the largest exhibition 
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company in Hong Kong reaped over a quarter (26.5%) of the market share, 
followed by UA (20.4%) and Golden Harvest (10.2%) (Table 4.9). These 
exhibition companies altogether controlled about two-thirds (67.3%) of the cinemas 
in Hong Kong (see Table 4.9 and Table 4.11) and shared almost eighty per cent of 
the total theatrical receipts in the market (Ming Pao 2007). This served as a catalyst 
for the reconfiguration of the "conceptions of control" in the field. 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, exclusive exhibition was a conventional practice in 
the Hong Kong film market. At that time, the exhibitors with traditional theatres 
were controlled by the major distributors of local movies. As documented in the 
previous sections, these exhibitors would mainly show the movies released by the 
major film companies with which they allied. However, the exclusive exhibition 
practice no longer existed after the Cineplex cinemas replaced the traditional theatres 
in Hong Kong. As each Cineplex cinema comprises at least two screens or houses 
with less than a thousand seats in each house, the movies produced and distributed 
by any film companies, including both local and foreign, can be screened in these 
cinemas. In this vein, the theatrical setting of Cineplex cinemas has avoided having 
their exhibition blocks dominated by a single film supplier. 
Moreover, as all of the four exhibitors have their distribution arm to scout for 
movies, they do not have to rely on the local production houses for their 
movie-supply. While in the past, the exhibitors of the traditional theatres made a 
living through recourse to the major distributors of local movies, the companies 
producing Hong Kong movies nowadays have to practically beg the Cineplex 
exhibitors for favorable exhibition blocks for their theatrical release. As such, the 
incumbent who wields most power over the commodity chain switched from the 
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major distributors of Hong Kong movies to the Cineplex exhibitors. This reflects 
the new set of "conceptions of control" in the Hong Kong film market. 
In the 2000s, the commodity chain of Hong Kong movies has been driven by 
the Cineplex exhibitors. Since the "exclusive deals" between the distributors of 
local movies and exhibitors are no longer applicable, the Cineplex exhibitors 
reclaimed the "booking rights" to control the exhibition blocks from the major 
distributors of local movies. While the exhibition blocks, indicating the period in 
which each movie is screened, were formerly controlled by the major distributors of 
local movies, now it is the Cineplex companies that decide when and what movie(s) 
is/are screened in which house(s) of their circuits. As film exhibition is no longer 
driven by the major distributors of Hong Kong movies, the distributor-led exhibition 
system a dominant exhibition model in the Hong Kong film market throughout 
the 1970s and the 1980s is abolished. Henceforth, the Cineplex exhibitors who 
control the "booking rights" can reserve favorable exhibition blocks for the imported 
films distributed by their allies. 
Since the Cineplex exhibitors have gained control over the income stream of 
other film companies, they hold the power over the commodity chain. In an 
exhibitor-driven commodity chain, the Cineplex exhibitors together with their 
distribution arms have released and screened more and more imported films in Hong 
Kong. For each local movie released in Hong Kong in 1999, there were 1.72 
imported films screening in the cinemas at the same time (Table 4.13). In 2006, the 
ratio of local movies to foreign movies shown in Hong Kong was 1:3.19. This 
indicates that the theatrical release of foreign movies was three times higher than that 
of the local movies in the Hong Kong film market (Table 4.13). Of the 226 movies 
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screened in Hong Kong in 2006, 172 were imported films while only 54 were locally 
produced (Table 4.13). The number of local movies exhibited in 2006 was just 
one-third (33.1%) of the number exhibited in 1999 (Table 4.13). 
Table 4.13 Screening, Box-office Grosses, Self-sufficiency Ratio, and Ratio of 
Local Movies to Imported Films screened in Hong Kong, 
1999-2006 
Local Movies Imported Films Self-sufficiency 
Number of HK$ Number of HK$ Ratio 
Movies (in million) Films (in million) 
Year (I) ® ①：贝） 
1999 163 345.7 281 522.7 “ 0.398 1 ： 1.72 
2000 144 640.9 195 589.5 0.521 1 ： 1.35 
2001 119 461.5 190 611.3 0.430 1 ： 1.60 
2002 91 369.7 195 527.3 0.412 1 ： 2.14 
2003 77 417.8 169 485.9 0.462 1 ： 2.19 
2004 84 433.0 170 800.3 0.351 1 ： 2.02 
2005 66 299.1 177 626.6 0.323 1 ： 2.68 
.2006 54 290.3 172 685.8 0.297 1 ： 3.19 
Sources: Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion Picture Industry 
Association Limited, various years. 
The surge of imported films shown in Hong Kong resulted in their rising 
box-office share of the market. From 2000 to 2006, imported films recorded a 
sixteen-percent growth in their box-office grosses, rising from 589.5 million HK 
dollars to 685.8 million (Table 4.13). The increasing quantity of foreign movies 
screened, as well as their growing share in the box office, has brought stiff 
competition to local movies. The theatrical receipts of imported films have 
outperformed those of the Hong Kong movies since 1997 (Table 4.1), a trend that 
has not been reversed since then (Table 4.13). 
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The Impact on Film Companies producing Local Movies 
To survive under the dominance of the Cineplex exhibitors, companies that 
embark on local film production switched their key exhibition channel from 
theatrical screening to retail in the ancillary markets. Although the movies 
produced by these companies would still be screened in cinemas, the distributors put 
more emphasis on the retail markets, such as television stations and DVD outlets 
(see Stephanie Chung 2007, Chapter 8). Without secured favorable exhibition 
blocks for theatrical release, however, the box-office performance of these movies 
would be dwarfed (Fu 2009: 62). This affected their retail deals in the ancillary 
markets and, in turn, reduced the revenue gained by the film companies even further. 
As a result, these companies might trim their investment in their subsequent film 
projects and hence, the total film outputs in Hong Kong fell precipitously. Details 
on the foregoing are elaborated as follows. 
In the twenty-first century, some film companies in Hong Kong have arranged 
their commodity chain to include a new exhibition window, apart from the theatre or 
cinema. While the past incumbents, Golden Harvest and Newport, called a halt to 
investment in local film production, companies that distribute film products in 
ancillary markets became the major investors in Hong Kong movies. These 
companies neither own nor ally with the Cineplex exhibitors, yet they integrate their 
film production with the distribution division, and switch their key exhibition 
channel from cinemas to retail in the ancillary markets. These retailers can be 
television stations or movie rental outlets. 
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Table 4.14 Aggregate Film Outputs and Market Share of Media Asia 
Group, Star Entertainment (Universe) Ltd., and Mei Ah 
Entertainment Group Co. Ltd., 2000-2006 
Aggregate Aggregate 
Film Outputs Box-office Receipts 
~ N u m b e r of M ~ HK$ W 
Year Movies (in million) 
2000 44 30.56 57.5 4.67 
2001 27 22.69 130.9 12.20 
2002 26 28.57 125.1 13.94 
2003 18 23.38 180.2 19.94 
2004 20 23.81 135.2 10.96 
2005 15 22.73 121.1 13.09 
2006 16 29.63 100.6 10.31 
Total 166 26.14 850.7 11.75 
Notes: # The three companies，share in total output of Hong Kong 
movies. 
## The three companies' share in total box-office grosses of both 
local movies and imported films. 
Sources: Hong Kong Film Archive (2009); Hong Kong Motion Picture 
Industry Association Limited, various years. 
For example, Media Asia Group (寰亞)，Star Entertainment (Universe) Ltd.(寰 
宇)，and Mei Ah Entertainment Group Co. Ltd.(美亞）are the film companies that 
have signed production deals or forged alliances with the companies that release film 
products in ancillary markets, such as VCD, DVD, and pay-TV. To meet the 
condition stipulated in the production deals, these companies have to produce a 
certain number of movies in a given period of time. When the movies are produced, 
these companies on one hand may approach the cinema circuits or other exhibition 
companies for screening. On the other hand, they will distribute their film products 
to television stations and movie rental outlets. In this fashion, the three companies 
altogether produced 166 movies from 2000 to 2006, accounting for over a quarter 
- 1 5 2 -
(26.1%) of the total film outputs in Hong Kong (Table 4.14). 
Switching the key exhibition channel to retail in ancillary markets however did 
not benefit these film companies. This is because, as a rule of thumb in the Hong 
Kong film market, theatrical screening the first window of exhibition is 
always the key conduit of profit return. The box-office results from local theatrical 
screenings are often taken as a benchmark for distributors to bargain with the 
retailers over better terms in the retail deals (Hong Kong Film Archive 1997: 69). 
This practice, in fact, is not peculiar to Hong Kong since a. similar practice can be 
found in Hollywood. As Buck (1992) puts it: 
[T]heater success or failure is what determines the profitability of 
domestic and foreign video sales and rentals, as well as television and 
cable use of film. In other words, to reap big profits from video and 
television sales, success at the box office is still essential, (p. 121) 
Following in this vein, film companies which neither own a cinema nor ally 
with the exhibitors can hardly ensure their movies will be screened in favorable 
exhibition blocks. This may drag down the theatrical receipts of the movies. With 
less desirable box-office results, these companies will find it difficult to get a good 
deal from the retailers regardless of their relations with those retailing companies. 
As a result, film companies that rely upon the ancillary markets, yet without secured 
exhibition blocks for theatrical screening, are expected to gain much smaller profits 
from the ancillary markets. This drives the film companies to trim their investment 
in their impending film projects. 
Although the information on the return of film products from ancillary markets 
is not available, the box-office receipts and film outputs of Media Asia, Universe, 
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and Mei Ah are open to view. In 2001, the three companies accounted for 12.2 per 
cent of the market share (Table 4.14). Without secured exhibition blocks, however, 
the box-office share of their movies shrank from a sizable 19.9 per cent in 2003 to a 
mere 11 per cent in 2004 (Table 4.14). During the same period, the aggregate 
box-office grosses of the movies released by the three companies dwindled by 25 per 
cent, from 180.2 million HK dollars in 2003 to 135.2 million in 2004 (Table 4.14). 
In the subsequent years, the total film outputs from these companies plunged further 
by 25 per cent, from 20 in 2004 to 15 in 2005 (Table 4.14). 
Since the contraction of box-office receipts in a given period is likely to 
diminish the number of movies produced and released by the corresponding film 
companies in the subsequent years, a respectable box-office performance is 
imperative for the survival of film companies. This provides clues to why the 
aforementioned film companies have curtailed their investment in film production 
albeit the consortium they built with the retailers in ancillary markets. As these 
companies are the key investors in Hong Kong movies at present, their curtailment 
of film investment has led to a shriveling of film outputs in Hong Kong during the 
2000s. 
In this situation, the number of local movies released in Hong Kong as 
presented earlier in Table 4.13 slumped markedly by 62.5 per cent, from 144 to 54 
between 2000 and 2006. During the same period, the box-office grosses of Hong 
Kong movies dropped from 640.9 million HK dollars to 290.3 million, or by 54.7 
per cent. As the theatrical receipts of foreign movies spurted concurrently by 16.3 
per cent, climbing from 589.5 million HK dollars in 2000 to 685.8 million in 2006 
(Table 4.13), the self-sufficiency ratio was almost halved, falling sharply from 0.521 
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in 2000 to 0.297 in 2006 (Table 4.13). This indicates that the gap between the 
theatrical receipts of local movies and imported films widened over the past decade. 
The expansion of imported films' dominance over the film market thus signifies the 
"twilight" of the Hong Kong film industry. 
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Chapter 5 
A ^'Revolutionary Road"^^ to the Peak and Drop 
Having discussed the growth and the decline of the Hong Kong film industry 
since the 1970s, this chapter will present a brief reprise of the research findings. 
Then, it will compare the arguments of this study with those from the theoretical 
approaches reviewed in Chapter 2. To conclude, the limitations of the research will 
be discussed, and suggestions will be made for future studies. 
A BRIEF REPRISE 
The rise and fall of the Hong Kong film industry since the 1970s can be 
construed as the outcome of the political struggles among different economic actors 
in the Hong Kong film market. These economic actors refer to the companies in 
the commodity chain comprising film production, distribution, and exhibition. To 
survive in the political struggles, film companies have to find ways to stabilize and 
to routinize competition. One way is to co-opt other companies, including their 
competitors. Another way is to formulate rules, both formal and informal, in order 
to define the conditions in which exchange and transactions are processed in the 
market. If these rules are commonly shared among other companies, they will 
become the "conceptions of control", which are equivalent to a "cultural frame" that 
shapes the actors' perceptions of how the market works. The course of the 
co-optation and the construction of "conceptions of control", thus, resembles a 
64 "Revolutionary Road" is a romantic drama film directed by Sam Mendes. The plot is based on a 
novel of the same name by Richard Yates. The movie is distributed by Paramount Vantage in 2008. 
This chapter borrows the title of the movie to suggest a conclusion from the implications of the 
foregoing discussion on the rise and fall of the Hong Kong film industry since the 1970s. 
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political or a social movement-like process that involves a lot of persuasion and 
depends on the social skills of the actors. 
While the course of the construction and imposition of "conceptions of control" 
resembles a political or a social movement-like process, this study considers this 
process as a "revolutionary road". On this "road", there could be more than one 
actor who is trying to construct new rules and agendas that can overthrow the 
existing "conceptions of control". The success of some "revolutions" but not others 
hinges however on both the social skills'*^ of the actors who initiated them and the 
opportunity given to these actors. Only if the actors managed to seize the 
opportunity presented at their time and apply their social skills to co-opt the valuable 
parties can they overturn the existing "conceptions of control", and turn the rules and 
agendas they created into the new "conceptions of control". 
This research attempts to spell out the causes of the boom and decay of the 
Hong Kong film industry since the 1970s. It was found that the peak and decline of 
the industry were indeed the results of the respective success of the major 
distributors of Hong Kong movies and the distributors of foreign movies in imposing 
their own set of "conceptions of control" over the market. Their success hinged on 
a couple of events that took place since the 1970s. These events presented an 
opportunity for the actors to utilize their social skills to co-opt or to seek the support 
of other actors. 
Before Cineplex cinemas had replaced the traditional theatres in Hong Kong, 
there was an opportunity for the major distributors of Hong Kong movies to control 
65 See Fligstein (1997; 2008). 
- 1 5 7 -
the exhibition sectors by applying an "exclusive deal" to build their own theatre 
chains. One of these major distributors, notably Golden Harvest (GH), had grasped 
such opportunity to achieve the economy of scale necessary for cost recovery. 
Moreover, the company had successfiilly co-opted the filmmakers who were 
reluctant to be bound by the studio system of its chief competitor, Shaw Brothers 
(SB). Henceforth, GH grew to become the incumbent and the distributor-led 
independent production and exhibition system it initiated was developed into the 
"conceptions of control" which were then widely adopted by other companies during 
the 1980s. This boosted the industry to reach its peak in the late 1980s. 
In the following section, how GH had passed through its "revolutionary road" 
to enable the industry to "bloom" during the 1980s will be reiterated. The same 
logic applies to the industry's downfall in the 1990s, and the subsequent section will 
review the "road" taken by the distributors of foreign movies who revolted against 
the preceding incumbents, namely the major distributors of Hong Kong movies, by 
setting up a new set of "conceptions of control" during the 1990s. Their success 
has arguably imperiled the Hong Kong film industry throughout the 2000s. 
The "Bloom" in Retrospect 
While the rise of the Hong Kong film industry was set off by a transformation 
in the mode of production from the studio system to the independent production 
system, the transformation appeared to be a consequence of the political struggle 
between Shaw Brothers (SB) and Golden Harvest (GH) during the 1970s. ‘ To 
challenge the overwhelming strength of SB's mammoth studio, Raymond Chow 
the boss of GH used his networking skills to rope in the filmmakers who would 
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like to make movies, yet were unwilling to be under the constraining organizational 
culture in SB's film studio. The success of GH gave rise to a distributor-led 
independent production system in Hong Kong (Path 1 in Figure 4). In this sense, 
the adoption of an independent production system in the industry was a "political 
compromise" between the major distribution company, namely GH, and the 
filmmakers who loathed SB's studio system. 
In the 1980s, the distributor-led independent production system which GH 
adopted to stave off SB soon turned into a conventional practice, or the "conceptions 
of control", in the industry. Film companies, such as Golden Princess (GP) and 
D&B, which entered the field after that followed the system as well. These 
companies, like GH, set up their theatre chains (Box 2 in Figure 4)，and financed a 
flock of independent production companies as "satellites" (Box 3 in Figure 4). The 
movies produced by these "satellites" would be screened in the theatre chains of GH, 
GP, and D&B. This is known as a distributor-led production and exhibition system 
(Number 4 in Figure 4). 
Under this system, the Hong Kong cinema experienced its heyday in the 1980s. 
Many independent production houses were set up with the support of the three major 
distributors, namely GH, GP, and D&B. These "satellites" were operated by the 
"new-wave" young directors who made myriads of movies that achieved remarkable 
commercial success. In this respect, but for the rise of an independent production 
system put forward by GH in the 1970s, which then became the "conceptions of 
control", latecomers such as GP and D&B might not have engaged in independent 
productions. By the same token, if the independent production system had not been 
widely applied in Hong Kong, the "new-wave" filmmakers might have had to stay 
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on in the studio system at Shaw Brothers, and if so, would have lost the chance to 
prove their talents in a less-restricted environment (Path 5 in Figure 4). 
On the exhibition front, the traditional settings of theatres in Hong Kong 
presented an opportunity for the major distributors of Hong Kong movies to build a 
vertically-integrated commodity chain that could achieve the economy of scale 
needed for cost recovery. These distributors took advantage of the traditional 
theatrical settings and requested the exhibitors who were scouting for movies to sign 
an exhibition contract. While this contract acted like an "exclusive deal" that 
forbade the theatre owners shopping freely among different major distributors for 
movies to screen, the major distributors of Hong Kong movies had acquired the 
"booking rights" to control the exhibition blocks in a considerable number of 
theatres (Path 6 in Figure 4). This enabled them to forge their theatre chains that 
could achieve the economy of scale necessary for cost recovery. In this fashion, 
after GP, the second "major", came into operation in 1980, the number of theatres 
co-opted to screen local movies exclusively rose sharply (Path 7 in Figure 4). 
Since most of the screens in the market were occupied by the local movies 
produced and distributed by the "majors", there were fewer screens available for 
foreign movies. As a result, the box-office return of imported films dived markedly, 
whereas Hong Kong movies became a commercial success in their home market z 
(Path 8 in Figure 4). This signified a "bloom" in the Hong Kong film industry 
throughout the 1980s. 
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Figure 4 Formation of the Distributor-led Production and Exhibition System 
and the Growth of the Hong Kong Film Industry in the 1970s and the 
1980s 
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The "Twilight" in Retrospect 
Sifting through the "twilight" of the industry, this study finds that the 
bounceback of imported films' dominance over the Hong Kong film market was 
attributed to the alliances forged by the distributors of foreign movies with the 
Cineplex exhibitors in Hong Kong, and the "conceptions of control" they constructed. 
There were four main factors that contributed to their success. Without these 
factors, the preceding incumbents the major distributors of Hong Kong movies 
could have retained their market power, and the preceding dominant production 
model, the distributor-led production and exhibition system, might not have 
collapsed. If the "old" system did not break down, the distributors of foreign 
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movies could hardly revolt successfully against the incumbents and capture the Hong 
Kong film market. 
The first factor was the inflow of Taiwan capital which triggered off an 
exogenous shock to the Hong Kong film market. The cinematic reform in the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) since the late 1970s followed by the lifting of 
martial law in the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1987 hastened the flow of capital 
from film investors in Taiwan to the PRC via Hong Kong. With the support of 
Taiwan capital, a new major film company, Newport, was set up in 1988 by a theatre 
owner whose cinemas were formerly allied with the three preceding "majors", 
namely Golden Harvest (GH), Golden Princess (GP), and D&B (Number 1 in Figure 
5). The establishment of Newport resulted in the wresting of a considerable 
number of theatres from the "majors". Each theatre chain in the market henceforth 
comprised fewer theatres than before (Number 2 in Figure 5). 
So long as the "majors" followed an exclusive exhibition practice, they still had 
to produce a large volume of movies to fill up their theatre chains. With fewer 
theatres under their control, however, the income stream of the "majors" was 
trimmed. In this connection, the theatrical receipts of the "majors" were hardly 
sufficient to recoup the cost of their film productions (Path 3 in Figure 5). Since 
investing in movie production was less lucrative than before, the owners of some ^ 
major film companies began to question the entwined financial practice of the 
filmmakers (Path 4 in Figure 5). When the owners of two major film companies, 
GP and D&B, found this practice could no longer protect the interests of the 
investors, they wound up their movie business and left the industry by the mid-1990s 
(Number 5 in Figure 5). As a result, the exclusive exhibition practice and the 
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entwined financial practice in the distributor-led production and exhibition system, a 
system that had promoted the rampant growth of the industry during the 1970s and 
the 1980s, turned into an endogenous factor that impaired the major film companies 
when the exogenous shock arrived. 
The halting of the two "majors" and the presence of "newcomers" who sprang 
up to succeed their exhibition business touched off a restructuring of the theatre 
chains in the market. These "newcomers" were Regal, Empire, Mandarin, and 
Modem (Number 5 in Figure 5). The restructuring, however, further jeopardized 
the survival of the "newcomers" and the remaining "majors". This is because as 
more and more film companies to wit, the "newcomers" tried to set up their 
own theatre chain, they had to vie for theatres. In this situation, there were fewer 
theatres that would screen exclusively the movies released by each "major". 
The second factor was the rising land price in Hong Kong that drove many 
theatre owners to close down their theatres, and to redevelop their properties for 
alternative uses. Since the movie business became less lucrative than setting up 
shopping malls, commercial buildings, and private apartments, a lot of theatre 
owners hung back in the 1990s. As many theatres were dismantled, there were 
fewer theatres in the market for the "majors" to co-opt. Each major film company 
in the mid-1990s, therefore, possessed fewer theatres than the "majors" did in the 
1980s (Path 6 in Figure 5). Since fewer theatres imply fewer conduits for profits, 
the "majors" as well as the "newcomers" could hardly achieve the economy of scale 
necessary for cost recovery. Hence, none of these "newcomers" had survived for 
more than a decade (Path 7 in Figure 5). 
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The third factor was the withdrawal of Taiwan capital in the mid-1990s. With 
the shift in the policies of the PRC and Taiwan for their film industries in 1994, the 
investment of hot money from Taiwan subsided (Box 8 in Figure 5). The ebb tide 
of Taiwan capital inflow led to the tapering of the investment in many film projects 
in Hong Kong, particularly those from Newport which were heavily financed by 
Taiwan capital. While Newport was an active supplier of Hong Kong movies in the 
early 1990s，the wilting of the Taiwan capital dragged down the company's film 
outputs. The diminution in capital, together with the shrinking theatrical possession 
noted earlier, compelled the company to curtail its investment in the impending film 
projects (Number 10 in Figure 5). This held down the volume of movies that could 
fill up the exhibition blocks of Newport's theatre chains. With fewer movies 
supplied by local production companies, Newport had to exhibit the movies from 
different sources, that is to say more imported films were screened. 
The fourth factor was the replacement of traditional theatres with Cineplex 
cinemas. As the soaring land price drove many traditional theatre chains to vanish 
throughout the 1990s, Cineplex cinemas mushroomed concurrently in Hong Kong 
(Box 9 in Figure 5). While the theatre chains of the "majors" were comprised of 
traditional theatres, not only did the dwindling number of theatres in the market cut 
into the income stream of the "majors", but the expansion of Cineplex cinemas made 
it also impossible for the "majors", who were the distributors of Hong Kong movies, z 
to occupy most of the screens in the Cineplex cinemas as each of them contains more 
screens than the traditional theatres. As a result, the "majors" could not control the 
"booking rights" in Cineplex cinemas, and the "exclusive deal" was no longer 
applicable (Number 10 in Figure 5). In this situation, the distributor-led exhibition 
system, a dominant exhibition model in the Hong Kong film market throughout the 
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1970s and the 1980s, collapsed. 
With reference to the several factors noted above, the remaining "majors" could 
not attain the economy of scale needed for cost recovery, and they ceased investing 
in film production. Thus, the distributor-led independent production system, which 
had been a dominant production model of Hong Kong movies throughout the 1970s 
and the 1980s, crumbled in the 2000s (Number 11 in Figure 5). As the production 
system and the exhibition system were no longer controlled by the major distributors 
of Hong Kong movies, the distributor-driven commodity chain that prevailed 
throughout the 1980s was demolished. Since the exhibitors operating 
Cineplex-cinema circuits are no longer bound by the "exclusive deals", they 
retrieved the "booking rights" to control the exhibition blocks from the distributors 
of local movies (Number 12 in Figure 5). This provided an opportunity for the 
distributors of foreign movies to co-opt the Cineplex exhibitors in Hong Kong. 
In the 2000s, the Hong Kong film market has been dominated by 
Cineplex-cinema circuits. Most of these Cineplex exhibitors have their distribution 
arms which ally with the Hollywood studios or other overseas distributors. As 
these exhibitors do not depend on the local production houses for their movie supply, 
they can reserve favorable exhibition blocks for the imported films distributed by 
their allies (Number 12 in Figure 5). Since the income stream of other film 
companies in the market is now controlled by the Cineplex exhibitors, these 
exhibitors together with their distribution arms and the distributors of foreign movies 
with which they allied have constructed a new set of "conceptions of control" to 
replace the production and exhibition system that was formerly driven by the 
distributors of Hong Kong movies. 
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Under the new "conceptions of control", the companies producing Hong Kong 
movies no longer benefit from the block-booking preferential treatment offered by 
the exhibitors. This led to a shift in the production model of Hong Kong movies. 
Companies that embark on local film production switched their key exhibition 
channel from theatrical screening to retail in ancillary markets. Without secured 
favorable exhibition blocks in theatrical release (Number 13 in Figure 5), however, 
the box-office performance of the movies released by these companies was relatively 
poor when compared with the performance of imported movies (Box 14 in Figure 5). 
This affected their retail deals in the ancillary markets and, in turn, further reduced 
their revenue. In this situation, these companies curtailed their investment in their 
subsequent film projects (Number 15 in Figure 5) and hence, the total film outputs in 
Hong Kong dropped considerably over the 2000s (Box 16 in Figure 5). With fewer 
local movies released, imported films have come to dominate the Hong Kong box 
office since 1997. "Twilight" has thereupon fallen on the Hong Kong film industry. 
In short, the revival of imported films in Hong Kong hinged on the alliances 
between the distributors of foreign movies and the Cineplex exhibitors. When 
forging such alliances, the distributors of foreign movies went through a political or 
social movement-like process. This process resembles a "revolutionary road" on 
which they seized the opportunity presented at the time, that was the replacement of ^ 
traditional theatres with Cineplex cinemas, and allied with the Cineplex exhibitors 
who retrieved the "booking rights" to control the exhibition blocks from the major 
distributors of Hong Kong movies. 
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Figure 5 Collapse of the Distributor-led Production and Exhibition System 
and the Decline of the Hong Kong Film Industry since the 1990s 
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Since the distributors of foreign movies took hold of the opportunity and used 
their social skills to co-opt the Cineplex exhibitors, they together with the Cineplex 
exhibitors had succeeded in constructing a new set of "conceptions of control" to 
capture the market niche that was formerly occupied by the preceding "majors". As 
a result, the Hong Kong film market has been dominated by foreign movies since the 
late 1990s. This is how the industry came to experience a downfall over the past 
decade. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY FOR EXISTING APPROACHES 
This research has taken a middle-range or organizational level of analysis to 
study the development of the Hong Kong film industry since the 1970s. It focuses 
on the institutional settings of the industry. Changes in the mode of production of 
Hong Kong movies, and the interactions among film companies in the commodity 
chain are documented. Implications of the study are summarized as follows. 
Implications for the Cultural Imperialism approach 
A postulation of the Cultural Imperialism thesis is that because Hollywood has 
the most abundant resources and has acquired the most advanced filmmaking 
technologies, its blockbusters prove to be so irresistibly attractive to audiences of 
different nations. In spite of Hollywood's comparative advantage, this study finds 
that it is the institutional settings of the film industries in receiving countries that 
determine whether Hollywood could expand its dominance over foreign film 
markets. 
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In the Hong Kong situation, the success of Hollywood's invasion depended on 
the re-alignment between the local Cineplex exhibitors and the distributors of foreign 
movies in the 1990s. In the 1980s, when most theatres which were in traditional 
settings had been occupied by the major distributors of local movies, the market 
share of Hollywood movies was much smaller than that of Hong Kong movies. 
After Cineplex cinemas had replaced traditional theatres, however, the Cineplex 
exhibitors retrieved the "booking rights" to control the exhibition blocks from the 
major distributors of local movies. This gave the distributors of foreign movies a 
chance to ally with the Cineplex exhibitors. Hence, if such, an alliance had not been 
forged, Hollywood blockbusters would not be widely screened in Hong Kong so that 
the postulation derived from the Cultural Imperialism thesis might not be valid. 
In this vein, this study has complemented the Cultural Imperialism approach by 
bringing in the institutional settings of the film industries in receiving countries to 
the discussion. These settings affect the conditions under which Hollywood could 
utilize its comparative advantage over the international film trade. As Curtin 
(2003b) correctly points, "Hollywood exploited opportunities, but it did not 
primarily control the conditions that created those opportunities" (p.254), future 
studies should thus pay heed to the institutional settings of the film industries in 
different receiving countries. Variations in these settings could have affected the 
conditions for Hollywood to actualize their comparative advantage, and thereby to , -
exert their dominance over other film markets. 
Implications for the Cultural-flows/ Network approach 
The Cultural-flows/ Network approach criticizes the Cultural Imperialism thesis 
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for underestimating both the ability of the receiving countries to develop their 
cultural industries, and the importance of cultural exports to these receiving countries. 
It contends that the downfall of the Hong Kong film industry could be attributed to 
the slump in exports of Hong Kong movies, and the meager profits they gained in 
overseas markets. This study finds, however, that the Cultural-flows/ Network 
approach might have overestimated the importance of film exports to the receiving 
countries. Although the export of media and cultural products is obviously one 
way for the receiving countries to gamer resources from overseas markets, these 
resources might not necessarily enable the receiving countries to build up their 
cultural industries to the point where they can compete effectively against the 
Western cultural hegemony. 
As Taiwan was one of the biggest off-shore markets for Hong Kong movies, the 
revenue gained from exports to Taiwan was an important income stream for film 
companies in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, this study shows that the influx of Taiwan 
capital in the late 1980s induced an exogenous shock to the Hong Kong film market. 
This capital gave rise to a new major film company, Newport, which wrested many 
theatres from the existing "majors". The restructuring of theatre chains that 
followed hindered the "majors" from achieving the economy of scale necessary for 
cost recovery. As a result, two "majors", namely D&B and Golden Princess, closed 
down by the mid-1990s. In this sense, the increased "cultural flows" between z 
Taiwan and Hong Kong during the late 1980s had an unintended consequence, to wit, 
the demise of two "majors" in Hong Kong. The resources from foreign markets, 
therefore, would not necessarily benefit the film industries in receiving countries. 
While the importance of cultural exports should not be overstated, the damage 
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caused by reducing "cultural flows" was weaker than the Cultural-flows/ Network 
approach has contended. When the inflow of capital from Taiwan shriveled up in 
the mid-1990s, only one of the "majors" Newport, who banked heavily on this 
capital was seriously affected. In fact, the withdrawal of Taiwan capital did not 
directly lead to the collapse of the "conceptions of control" that prevailed throughout 
the 1980s. Instead, the distributor-led production and exhibition system was 
abolished when the last "major", Golden Harvest (GH), failed to control the 
"booking rights" in film exhibition and ceased investing in film production. The 
fall of GH was not related to the lack of investment from Taiwan hot money since 
the company did not rely on this source of capital. 
As noted in the previous chapter, GH could not maintain the economy of scale 
needed for cost recovery mainly because of the rising land price in Hong Kong that 
drove many of its allied theatres to close down, followed by the expansion of 
Cineplex cinemas, which together precluded the company from controlling a 
sufficient number of cinemas to recoup its production cost. In this respect, the 
distributor-driven commodity chain of Hong Kong movies was brought to a halt. 
This paved the way for the distributors of foreign movies and the Cineplex exhibitors 
to construct a new set of "conceptions of control" to fill the market niche that was 
formerly occupied by Hong Kong movies. 
Viewed in this light, although the wilting of Taiwan capital did drag down the 
output of Hong Kong movies, the collapse of the "old" system and consequently the 
industry's downfall were not a result of the diminution in foreign capital. Thus, 
even though exports could be an important source of revenue for film companies in 
receiving countries, the damage caused by reducing "cultural flows" was less severe 
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than the Cultural-flows/ Network approach has contended. Indeed, the reasons 
behind the decline of film industries in receiving countries are more about the 
institutional settings of the industry, and the changes in power relations among film 
companies in the market. 
Implications for the Reception approach 
The Reception approach explains the shift in demand for foreign and local 
movies in different film markets by the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
recipients. These socio-demographic characteristics include the language, class, 
gender, ethnicity, and social experiences of the cinemagoers. According to this 
approach, the responses of cinemagoers to Hong Kong movies vis-a-vis foreign 
movies are expected to exert considerable influence on the survival of the local film 
industry. 
Although the Reception approach has identified some possible reasons for the 
rising demand for foreign movies, these reasons might not account for the decline of 
Hong Kong film industry. As discussed in Chapter 2, despite the expansion of 
education in Hong Kong since the 1970s which resulted in a growing share of 
population becoming familiar with English, the market share of imported films, 
including those from Hollywood, was found to be much smaller than that of the local ^ 
movies in Hong Kong throughout the 1980s. Suffice it to say that while the 
socio-demographic factors which supposedly would have caused an increased 
demand for Hollywood movies were already in place, the effect of these factors was 
not apparent in the 1980s. Since the domination of Hollywood over the Hong Kong 
film market did not come until the late 1990s, something should have happened in 
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Hong Kong that pulled down its film industry before those socio-demographic 
factors came into effect. 
This research has addressed the foregoing puzzle by providing an answer from 
the "production side". As documented in Chapter 3, the box-office share of 
Hollywood movies in Hong Kong was much smaller than that of local movies during 
the 1980s because most theatres at the time were controlled by the major distributors 
of local movies. After Cineplex cinemas have replaced traditional theatres and 
dominated the exhibition sectors since the mid-1990s, however, the Cineplex 
exhibitors retrieved the "booking rights" to control the exhibition blocks from the 
major distributors of local movies. This lay the basis for the alliances between the 
Cineplex exhibitors and the distributors of foreign movies. But for such alliances, 
Hollywood movies may not be so widely screened in Hong Kong. 
Given that more screens have been assigned to show Hollywood movies, the 
cinemagoers in Hong Kong are now more exposed to foreign movies than before. 
The Reception approach at this stage provides a cultural explanation for the 
increasing acceptance of Hollywood movies in Hong Kong. This contributes to our 
understanding of the reasons for the widened gap between the theatrical receipts of 
local movies and imported films in Hong Kong throughout the 2000s. Nonetheless, 
the seeming growth in popularity or acceptance of Hollywood movies in Hong Kong ^ 
is primarily a consequence rather than the cause of the downfall of the Hong Kong 
film industry. As this study shows，the root of the decline of the Hong Kong film 
industry has more to do with the "production side" than the "reception side". 
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AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO CURRENT THEORIES 
This research aims overall to contribute to the literature on the development of 
the film industries in receiving countries. Why some film industries, but not others, 
have ceded their home markets to other film exporters, and how this could have 
affected the long-term development of the industries are issues that have to be 
further explored. Following this agenda, this research picked the Hong Kong film 
industry as a case to study. The results of this case study have been placed within 
an integrative framework combining several theoretical approaches reviewed earlier. 
This integration is presented below. 
In analyzing the institutional settings of the Hong Kong film industry, this 
research has applied the Political-cultural approach to show how the conventional 
practices in the dominate production model of Hong Kong movies, which boosted 
the industry to its peak in the 1980s, were turned into an endogenous factor that 
toppled the major film companies during the 1990s. The turn was triggered by an 
exogenous shock, the influx of Taiwan capital during the late 1980s. This capital 
brought about a restructuring of the theatre chains of the major film companies in 
Hong Kong. While the capital inflow disrupted the existing order that had enabled 
the "majors" to survive (this contradicts the postulation of the Cultural-flows/ 
Network approach), the rising land price in Hong Kong further hindered the 
"majors" from attaining the economy of scale necessary for cost recovery. These 
undermined the production model that prevailed during the industry's heyday. 
While the "old" system had broken down, the expansion of Cineplex cinemas in 
Hong Kong enabled the Cineplex exhibitors to retrieve the "booking rights" to 
control the exhibition blocks from the major distributors of local movies. As the 
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exhibitors were no longer controlled by the distributors of local movies, the 
distributors of foreign movies had the opportunity to ally with the Cineplex 
exhibitors. They together redefined the rules of the game, or the "conceptions of 
control", and replaced the "old" system with an exhibitor-driven commodity chain. 
Under their alliances, more screens have been assigned to show Hollywood movies, 
including those high-budget blockbusters produced with the most advanced 
filmmaking technologies. This allowed Hollywood to actualize their comparative 
advantage in Hong Kong (here the Cultural Imperialism thesis applies). 
Since the Cineplex exhibitors nowadays can reserve favorable exhibition blocks 
for the imported films distributed by their allies, the cinemagoers in Hong Kong are 
more exposed to foreign movies than before. This provided a platform for the 
Hollywood movies to match up with the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
cinemagoers in Hong Kong (this is where the Reception approach contributes to the 
analysis). As some of these movies matched the taste of the local audiences, they 
achieved better box-office performance. This provides clues to the expanding share 
of foreign movies in the Hong Kong film market throughout the 2000s. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS z 
This study has attempted to elucidate the factors that affect the extent of 
Hollywood's domination over the Hong Kong film market. Nonetheless, the 
pattern of Hollywood's expansion might vary across countries. Since this research 
focuses only on Hong Kong, it is not possible to generalize from it how the film 
industries in other receiving countries react to the film exports from the United 
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States (U.S.) or other countries. Hence, the following questions remain to be 
addressed in future studies: (i) Who are the gatekeepers that control the commodity 
chain in other film industries? (ii) Do these gatekeepers ally with the distributors of 
foreign movies? (iii) What is the relationship between these gatekeepers and the 
companies that produce local movies? (iv) Were there any changes in this 
relationship over the past decades? (v) If yes, what caused these changes? (vi) 
How have these changes affected the development of the local film industry? 
While all of these questions touch on issues for future studies to address, it is 
important to note that there are still some other factors not covered in this study that 
are critical to the development of the film industries in receiving countries. They 
include (i) the role of the audience and cinema-going habits in different societies, (ii) 
the variations in the degree of the state's involvement in different film industries, (iii) 
the co-production partnerships between different film markets, such as the Closer 
Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) between the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) and Hong Kong, and (iv) film festivals and the role of other agents at the 
global level that promote the film products of different countries. Since these 
factors could have affected the development of the film industries in receiving 
countries, as well as their reactions to the challenge brought by Hollywood or other 
film exporters, more extensive research should be pursued in these areas in fiiture. 
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